جستجوی مقالات مرتبط با کلیدواژه « Caucasus » در نشریات گروه « جغرافیا »

Relations between countries are based on economic, security, geographical and cultural conditions. Although the status of these factors is changing in the age of globalization, it is not true to say that these factors do not affect the relations between the two countries. As neighbors, Iran and Azerbaijan share cultural, historical and religious commonalities. Nevertheless, the relations between the two countries have faced certain challenges. One of the main challenges has been the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, which has been addressed in this research on both security and economic levels. This research was conducted with the aim of investigating the economic and security consequences of the Karabakh conflict on the Islamic Republic of Iran. The main question is how the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can have economic and security consequences for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The findings indicate that the consequences and challenges in these two areas are within the scope of the positions of the Islamic Republic, the conflict in the field of energy and relations between Azerbaijan and Israel, along with the confrontation and the introduction of politics and ideology regarding the economic relations of these two countries. This research is done using descriptive-analytical method.

The present research studies the relations between Iran and Armenia in the geopolitical developments of the Caucasus region. The Caucasus, the connecting region of Europe and Asia and the meeting point of great civilizations, is considered one of the most important geopolitical and geoeconomic regions of the world. From a security point of view, Russia is trying to stabilize its past political, economic and military position in the Caucasus and the United States is also seeking to develop its influence and interests with economic investments and geopolitical energy management. Also, the Caucasus is the arena of activity of actors such as Turkey, Israel and the European Union who have entered this region with economic and political goals. In the meantime, intra-regional factors such as energy equations, crises and ethnic conflicts, political and social developments in the countries of this area and economic instability due to the free economy have also provided favorable grounds for intense regional and global competition.

The Zionist regime has attempted to break out the geopolitical isolation with the doctrine of peripheral unity and to establish relations with other countries Since the 1960s. Areas such as the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Caucasus, and Central Asia were given priority by Israel. In the present study, the descriptive-analytical method was adopted to examine the periphery doctrine of Israel in the Caucasus and Central Asia as two important geopolitical areas in northern Iran. Our study indicates that the Zionist doctrine, despite a good start, failed to establish sustainable regional partnerships with five countries (i.e., Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). In contrast, the Israel periphery doctrine in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan has been somewhat successful than these five countries. In this regard, the main Israel stimuli for relations with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan is including the supply of energy resources (40% of Azerbaijan and 25-25% of Kazakhstan), the existence of two countries with a Muslim majority population, a secular structure and the use of this as a leverage, the sale of weapons, as well as the co-border of these countries with Iran, and the using military and cyber capacity for eavesdropping. It is also worth mentioning that Israel remains a minor commercial partner for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, despite the uproar created by commentators. Russia, Turkey and Iran are the biggest trading partners of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan (Iran's commercial ties with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan in 2020 were about ten and three times more, respectively, than the Israel’s). A more precise analysis of arms sales also shows that Israel is not a major supplier of arms to either Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan, and Russia plays a key role in this context.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the field of competition in Central Asia and the Far East became available for Iran and Turkey. The ideological vacuum caused by the collapse of Syria led to the fact that Turkey, with the support of the West, could use the theory of strategic depth to seek ways of influence and alliance with the countries of the region. This country shares historical, cultural and linguistic commonality with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus. In this regard, Turkey was able to promote its ideology by establishing effective institutions in promoting Pan-Turkist ideas. The arena of competition between Iran and Türkiye in the region has become complicated and it seems that the two countries have clashed geopolitical interests in the region. Turkey's ideology is based on secular thinking and Iran's is based on nation-centered thinking. Therefore, the intersection of ideological ideas has also occurred in different fields. In recent years, new campaigns and processes of power are emerging in Central Asia and the Caucasus, which may have created a new structure of power play between regional and extra-regional countries. Regardless of the geopolitical value of this region, it is considered a geopolitical arena for Iran in competition with its other regional competitors, so the loss of strategic depth in this region will have a negative effect on Iran's ability to maneuver in competition with other regional competitors. Therefore, the research seeks to answer the question, "What are the components of the conflict between the geopolitical interests of Iran and Turkey in Central Asia and the Caucasus".

The current research aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the clash of geopolitical interests of Iran and Türkiye and extract the geopolitical components of this issue. The current research method is qualitative and the data analysis strategy is inductive. Therefore, by using the descriptive-analytical approach and collecting data in a documentary-library form and by studying books, articles and also online resources, inferences have been made from the discussion.

Türkiye's foreign policy based on the theory of strategic depth is looking for a way to penetrate Central Asia using the Caucasus route. This is the most important gate for this country in order to develop economic relations and trade relations with the mentioned regions. Linguistic, racial and ethnic similarity, the framework of secular governments, the revival of Turkish nationalism using the concept of pan-Turkism and historical-cultural commonalities are the factors that lead to the use of the geopolitical approach of influence in the countries of the region and the clash of interests with the Islamic Republic of Iran. What was inferred in the research studies is the conflict of interests including political-ideological, political-nationalist, economic and Karabakh war components. The political and ideological problem has been created from the political systems, different attitudes and structures and the specific ideology of the ruler in the two countries. Türkiye has a secular attitude and Iran is nation-oriented. In the political and nationalistic issue, Turkey's emphasis is on ethnicity and pan-Turkism. The roots of this difference can be considered the thoughts of Turkish nationalism. In the economic field, due to sanctions and lack of attention to regional countries, Turkey's financial transactions with these countries are much more than with Iran. Finally, the Karabakh war, which had geopolitical reasons, increased the differences and the field of conflict was clearly defined.

The different and competitive roles of Turkey and Iran cause a clash of geopolitical interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Finally, the pattern of behavior of the two countries has been led to conflict, competition and confrontation. Iran's advantage over Turkey in these areas is Iran's common border with other countries, as opposed to Turkey's border of a few kilometers in Nakhchivan with Azerbaijan, so it can be claimed that Turkey practically does not have a border with this country. Also, Iran's traditional ties with the Transcaucasia peoples are that unlike the Armenian-Turkish relations, there is no feeling of dissatisfaction and insult to the past. As long as the two countries are in a similar situation in terms of the extent of power, they will consider any relations, behavior and developments with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus as vital, and we will witness serious differences between the two countries. This challenge will become more serious with the increasing power of Türkiye and Iran. Because the two countries seek to increase their geopolitical influence in the region by increasing their power. This role will cause the two countries' strategies to overlap, and as a result, the pattern of competition, conflict and confrontation between Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran will increase.

The Republic of Armenia is one of the countries in the South Caucasus Basin and shares a common border with Iran. Despite the lack of access to open waters and economic blockade by two neighboring countries (Azerbaijan and Turkey), this country has a special geopolitical position in the region and has friendly relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. has it. In this research, with the aim of explaining the role of Armenia in the geopolitical development of Iran in the region and analyzing the divergent and convergent factors in the relations between the two countries, it has been argued that the development of diplomatic, commercial, security and… activities between the Islamic Republic Iran and the Republic of Armenia have caused the stability, security and geopolitical development of Iran in the region, and on the other hand, based on such reasoning, the development of relations between the two countries will reduce interference and create tension by regional powers.

The Karabakh crisis, which flared again with the Azerbaijani army's attacks on Armenian forces in the region on 20th of November in 2020, is rooted in the crises and differences between the Armenian and Azerbaijani people since the formation of the Soviet Union. The second Karabakh war ended 44 days after the victory of the Azerbaijani army and the signing of a tripartite ceasefire agreement by the leaders of Russia, Azerbaijan and Armenia on the 20th of November. These wars and conflicts, which after a period of intense conflict eventually led to a temporary ceasefire between the two countries, with the intervention of Russia, took place while ambiguities and important questions remained unanswered about the past, present and future of the Caucasus geopolitical region and the implications of current developments in the Nagorno-Karabakh crisis for neighboring countries. In recent decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has not been able to take advantage of the geopolitical opportunities in Central Asia and the Caucasus as it should. Now, the issue that rapid and serious developments have taken place in the Caucasus, especially in the relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia, has paved the way for new dual conditions for Iranian politicians and has created opportunities and reciprocal threats that, if not dealt with intelligently, will not only have no benefits for Iran, but it will inflict heavy losses on our country. The issues addressed in this article as the geopolitical implications of the 2020 Karabakh war are considerations and concerns which might may create problems for Iran in the future. It goes without saying that the active presence and strong diplomacy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this region, especially in the current sensitive situation, can turn many of the existing threats into opportunities and eliminate the existing concerns. It should be noted that the Karabakh crisis and its developments so far show a deeper and broader policy for the entire Greater Caucasus and even Southwest Asia, a deep policy whose geopolitical implications can be very influential for some regional actors such as Iran.

The article examines the limits of Iranian foreign policy toward Georgia, outlines the threats from the US and other regional players such as Russia, Turkey and Israeli, and also attempts to identify the main causes and motivations for Tehran’s affiliation with Tbilisi. Since regaining its independence two decades ago, Georgia, a small weak state, has developed close relations with Iran in order to compensate for its weaknesses. In contrast, Iran is a mighty regional power, having big role in the Middle East, although, its influence over South Caucasus is smaller and unsteady. The South Caucasus, as a source of both opportunity and threat, occupies a major place in Iran’s multiregional foreign policy agenda. Besides US factor, this is partly due to the main regional powers in South Caucasus, Russia, Turkey and Israel, creating difficulty for Iran in bolstering its position in relations with Georgia. But Georgia is the only South Caucasian country, which has no border with Iran; and this geographical factor has affected relations between the two countries over more than last two decades.
MethodologyThis paper has been performed as a field and analytical-descriptive study and has also been analyzed by “Realism theory” in Persian and English resources. The authors of the analysis studies in detail the opportunities for economic and other forms of partnership with Iran, which will help diversify Georgia's neighborhood policy, while balancing the interests of regional players of the South Caucasus. At the end of the research, the possible opportunity for Iran and Georgia that might accompany such a political strategy are discussed as well. The final goal of this document is maximum detection of the potential for improving Georgia-Iran relations and its in-depth analysis, as well as opening a space for discussion and debate on Georgia-Iran relations.
Results and DiscussionGeorgia has had longstanding ties with Iran, regardless of both countries’ constantly changing political dynamics. But Iran’s strained relations with the US and several other factors have prevented close cooperation between Iran and Georgia, which is discussed in detail in this article.
One of the most important reasons that hampered the countries’ relations initially was Georgia`s obvious course toward the West and its impact on Georgia`s decision making. From Iran`s point of view, having close ties with the country who wants more contacts with its enemies, appeared to be a factor that hindered relations. Iran constantly had a fear that the US might have used its power to use Georgia as a bridge-head against Iran. Georgia cancelled a free visa regime with Iran in 2013 due to some pressure from the West. Iran is very prudent when it comes to its relations with Georgia, as far as the Iranian political establishment is not willing to be affected by United States’ increased influence. This fear is expected to be diminished when Iran’s relations with Western countries gradually becomes less harsh
And the other hand, from a Russian perspective, improved Iran-Georgian relations will harm the Kremlin’s strategic interests in south Caucasus, given that the Russian Federation is seeking the absolute hegemonic position in the region and perceives the third party’s increased influence in a negative light. Iran is able to become an alternative energy source for Georgia, therefore take credit in decreased energy dependence on Russia. Showing more interest in the region stems from the fact that Turkey, one of the opponents of Iran, increased its influence and potential in the region and Georgia. In parallel with intensification of relations of Georgia with Iran, it is possible for Russia and Turkey to enhance their impact in terms of Soft power, intensifying special services and their impact on certain political processes. The Georgian authorities must be prepared to meet these challenges.
The issue of Israel should be considered in the same context. Israel has a long-standing partnership with Georgia including in the sphere of defense. Officials in Tel Aviv openly criticize the nuclear agreement and believe that Tehran the biggest threat to its statehood. Therefore, it should be taken into account that Georgia’s interests towards the Jewish state may be sacrificed to Tbilisi’s close ties with Tehran.
Georgian-Iranian relations to some extent have generally improved since the P5 countries and Iran signed a nuclear agreement in July 2015. For Iran, gaining an influence on the South Caucasus is one of the top foreign priorities so as to settle in the region as the powerful actor. The main obstacle of achieving its intentions is the West`s politics towards Iran, sanctioning its economic activities, halting its growing potential. Intensifying relations with Georgia seemed prolific for Iran in such circumstances. Thus, Iran's main interest in the Georgia could be defined as follows: first, to reduce the influence of outside powers, the US and Turkey, but also Israel, which is viewed as a security threat.
ConclusionIran's foreign policy towards Georgia is essentially a pragmatic one, shaped by realpolitik, historical experiences and balance-of-power calculations. So while Tehran may be eager to assert itself as a regional power, it is able to acknowledge the limitations of its own capacity and the constraint of external challenges by regional players (Russia, Turkey and Israel) and trans-regional powers such as United States. Therefore its regional policy is relatively cautious and balanced. Regional stability and security is of particular importance and have often taken precedence over the ideological preoccupations in Iran´s policy choices in the South Caucasus, inherent to a revolutionary and religious behavior. The JCPOA gives a new chance for establishment of good relations between the two countries. The Georgian side has already started talks on import of natural gas from Iran. Iran views Georgia as a transit country, which could bring its goods to Europe. But there is no doubt that even after JCPOA, US-Iranian hostility and Russia, Turkey and Israel factors still will poison bilateral relations between Tehran and Tbilisi.

Undoubtedly, the behavior of each state in the international equations, especially in the geopolitical crisis is directed by special factors that direct usually different and even opposite approaches and behaviors of states. Each geopolitical crisis shows the conflict between at least two states and a tense competition related to the national interests. In this regard, we are witnessing these conflicts between Azerbaijan and Armenia plus Karabakh Republic. The second group of players engaged in Karabachos crisis are regional players (i.e. Russia, Turkey and Iran) and supra-regional players (i.e. the US and Europe). Because of their nature, geopolitical crises are usually suitable settings for geopolitical rivalries. The interests of regional powers differ from the interests of supra-regional players. Regional players are mainly the states whose interests overlap with geographical territory of the crisis. The main excuse for supra-regional powers to engage in the crisis is their potential to manage the crisis. Beside major players, some international organizations and non-governmental groups (in particular, Diaspora groups) are among players in this crisis. The present research, however, focuses only on the major players. With regards to the complexity of the geopolitical crises and the dynamism of the factors caused competition among players, we are witnessing contradictory behavioral patterns in the Karabakh crisis. In this relation, the research question is “what are the main factors directing the players’ behavior in Karabakh Crisis?”
The research methodology adopted here is descriptive- analytic, and data gathering procedure is based on library findings. The first section is intended to present a theoretical perspective which will be applied on Karabakh Crisis in the second section. As mentioned above, the article will focus on major players.
Findings : Based on the research findings, in any geopolitical crisis, strategic approach is the most important parameter in the players’ behaviors. Strategic approach increases the players’ potential in order to reach their strategic interests. In strategic approach, the states play role in the crisis by knowing the environment of the crisis in regional and global levels, time situation, and the nature of the crisis. The matter is also applicable to the Karabakh crisis. Generally, the strategic approaches of different players based on situation of the crisis, players’ mentality and nature have different roles in the nature of Karabakh crisis.
Also, Geopolitical code is the only substantive reasoning to justify the intervention of the players in a geopolitical crisis. Based on this view, the role-playing of the players would be various based on the nature and number geopolitical codes. If the states’ geopolitical codes are formed in opposition with each other, the potential of war and conflict would be so high. The Research findings show that foreign policies of the states show that their geopolitical codes are formed in opposition with each other and this has complicated the crisis. Based on the research findings, geopolitical interests are among parameters affecting the players’ behaviors. Geopolitical interests mean strategic depth of the states. Geopolitical interests produce geographic identity for the states. On the one hand, the geographic identity creates inherent right for the states because the state is attributed to the identity. This allows the states to act in an international system. In fact, it is a license for states to play their role in the geopolitical crisis background. On the other hand, these crises can be seen as security gaps of geopolitical interests that threaten geographic identity of the states. Based on the research findings, Karabakh crisis which is placed at a geostrategic region, and attracts interests of different players and threatens geopolitical interests of the players, has put South Caucasus at the intersection of geopolitical interests of different players. Based on the geopolitical and national interests, each of the players has different geopolitical concerns, and psychologically the nature of geopolitical and political role- playing of the players is directly or indirectly in connection with the geopolitical concerns that are discussed in this section.
Research findings show that the nature of role-playing of the players in the Karabakh crisis is the effect of some special factors which determine the nature of behavioral patterns. In this research, these parameters are known as the principles directing the states’ behavior. Considering that these parameters are formed differently because of various interests of different players. The consequence would be forming the contradictory behavioral patterns, a phenomenon that is obvious in the Karabakh crisis. Hence, players’ behavior in the region is affected by strategic approach, geopolitical codes, geopolitical interests, geopolitical concerns and national, subjects that were discussed in this paper. In fact, although contradictions and conceptual differences of the players have made them show ambiguous and contradictory behaviors, it is essential to consider spatial and temporal conditions of the region which paved the way in this regard. In sum, save for Europe, all players in the crisis have adopted a unilateral strategic approach, an important obstacle to settle the crisis. Also, the contradictory geopolitical codes of the players directing the states’ foreign policies are among obstacles. Yet, because geopolitical interests show strategic depth of the states and mutually geopolitical crises are security gaps threatening are contradictory, Karabakh crisis not only has taken the attention of different players, but also is the main factor threatening geopolitical interests in this geo-strategic region. Additionally, any player in the crisis considers different geopolitical and national- strategic interests based on their geopolitical concerns, an issue that affects the nature of their political and geopolitical role-playing.

According to the Russian leader's ideas, traditional sphere of Soviet Union particularly, central Asia and Caucasus, is the first defensive trend for protecting of Russian national security, and it should be looking to exert dominance over the region, on the context of the Tosarist Russia and soviet. Nevertheless, Russia during the two past decades, has taken different approaches towards central Asia and Caucasus, that, at first glance it may associated to confusion of kremlin leaders; but with scrutiny about the reason of adopting such a procedure can be realized that the approaches have been just tactical and in order to achieve the overall strategy in central Asia and Caucasus. Current trends, indicate that, Russian administration with its long-term strategy, have always been looking for Russia as an empire of oil and acting with their promotion, able to play the geopolitical key role in energy, And exploit Russia's energy resources and also energy transfer pipeline monopoly as a mean of political and economical to provide the geopolitical benefits of country in Eurasia, especially in relations with Europe union. In this research we want to answer this question that what are the obstacles in achieving the goals for Russia after cold war in central Asia and Caucasus? It seems that some of the obstacles are Ethnic - cultural wars in Caucasus and after that the presence of Trans-regional powers in this area that in this research we focus on this two issues.

IntroductionPower vacuum was created after the collapse of the Soviet Union in some regions of the world. Azerbaijan in Caucasus and Turkmenistan in central Asia were regions that faced with power vacuum. So, divergence and convergence analysis of these countries related to Iran was converted to a geopolitical matter. But this paper investigates the impact rate of underling factors of Iran’s geopolitical interests in these republics in addition to their divergence and convergence with Iran. Also, in this paper we debate geopolitical interests of Iran in these republics using Matrix Examination Model, and then, analyze the twenty underlying factors to address this question: How much these factors can influence the relations of Iran and these republics? It is assumed that geopolitical interests of Iran in these countries are different. Research findings show that Iran’s geopolitical interests in Azerbaijan are more than Turkmenistan.MethodologyThis research paper attempts to determine the influence rate of elementary factors of the geopolitical interests of Iran in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan republics. Thus, in the present paper, explaining the elements of Iran’s geopolitical interests in the two mentioned republics via Matrix Examination Model. It will be analyzed twenty elementary factors to answer this research question: How much each of the elementary factors can be influential on Iran’s geopolitical interests in the two countries of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan?In this way, the quantities of each factor are collected from valid documents. At first, it analyzed, countered and compared each factor and then determined Islamic Republic of Iran’s rate of geopolitical interests at the two mentioned countries through this trine process:1. Determining absolute percent of factor X in the two comparing countries through these formulas: 100 Quantities of factor X in country B 100 Quantities of factor X in country A Quantities of factor X in Iran Quantities of factor X in Iran2. Counting sum of absolute percent quantities of factor X in the two comparing countries regarding Iran3. Determining the rate of Iran’s geopolitical interest toward the two comparing countries through these formulas: 100 Absolute percent of factor X in Country A Sum of absolute percent of factor X in Country A regarding Iran 100 Absolute percent of factor X in Country B Sum of absolute percent of factor X in Country B regarding Iran Statistical PopulationStatistical populations in this article are Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Because these countries are neighboring countries and are setting in Asia that have different communions in cultural, economical, political, military and security fields. Sampling According to H.S. Boula’s table if statistical population were less than ten, sample size and statistical population will be equal. Then in this article 100% of statistical population (Iran, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) are sample of research.Results and discussionThis article explained four field of economical, political, social and cultural field in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan that influence Iran’s geopolitical national interests. In this way, twenty factors were extracted from these fields and the role of each factor in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan was showed.ConclusionAlthough the Cold War was ended soon after the fragmentation of the Soviet Union, geostrategic and geo-economic competition was intensified, especially in central Asia and Caucasus. Both Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have a collection of geographical, historical, religious, cultural, and etc. communions with Iran that make both countries to protect their relation with Iran for two decades after their independence. But which of the two mentioned countries has more importance in Iran’s geopolitical interests is the matter of evaluating the role of each of twenty factors in each country and the comparison of their quantities. Finally, research findings indicate that Iran’s geopolitical interests in Azerbaijan are more than geopolitical interests in Turkmenistan.

In future decades, a new global structure based on a widespread global cooperation will be formed. Which is on the basis of Geopolitics realities of the actors? The special task of this axial and dominant group is guarantee of the world's peace and stability. In such structure, as a different type must do the play of power. After collapsing USSR We are watching forming a new thinking in the area of strategic analyses which their aim is improving the actor's place aiming to create balance in strategic equivalents. USA, Europe, Russia, Iran and Turkey were the main countries that after collapsing USSR, Tried to make relations with the new independent countries. Also of this tries were not applied monotony and very country considering their own strategic, Economic, Political and cultural priorities, Acted with the region countries and the countries of Caucasus region also based on their specific considerations were defining the foreign relations. As a result Caucasus countries wished or unwished, Entered into the worldwide and regional strategic ranking and the consequents of this strategic rankings and the consequent of this strategic ranking, Created a relative balance between region countries interests and international actors. Based on strategic approach, Security issues of Caucasus in a frame of new big play are analyzed in the region.

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