نشریه خردنامه صدرا
پیاپی 90 (زمستان 1396)

The emanation of the First Intellect as the first thing which was created without an intermediary by Almighty Truth is one of the important problems in Islamic philosophy. The First Intellect or the First Emanated in the Transcendent Philosophy is the essence and transcendent spirit of the Holy Prophet (s) or the same “Mohammedan truth”, which is confirmed based on transmitted proofs and rational principles. Following a descriptive-analytic method, this paper explains the ontological bases of this theory in the Transcendent Philosophy while clarifying its meaning and referents in Islamic philosophy and gnosis. Some of the philosophical fundamental principles upon which the understanding and explanation of Mohammedan truth depends include the principiality of existence, the principle of the One, the principle of the noblest possibility, simplicity of existence or the principle of simple truth, and the principle of the simplicity and diffusion of existence. In the final section of this paper, based on Mulla Sadra’s works, the writers have dealt with the genetic place of Mohammedan truth in the system of being and elaborated on some of the most important effects and ontological blessings of this transcendent truth, such as mediation in divine blessing and mercy, maintaining the basis and order of the world, providing guidance towards the right path and attainment of happiness, and gaining proximity to God and benefitting from His intercession.

A study of Mulla Sadra’s encounter with Qur’anic ambiguities reveals that, in his view, Qur’anic verses possess two inward and outward meanings and, when dealing with ambiguous verses, one must value their outward meaning and does not deviate from it. At the same time, he holds that the meaning of ambiguous verses must conform to the intellect and the traditions that have been correctly narrated from the Infallible Imams (a). In his view, the understanding of ambiguous verses is relative and depends on the intellectual capacity of people. Those who are firmly rooted in knowledge (the Infallible Imams (a)) know the whole meanings of ambiguous verses and, in fact, find nothing ambiguous about them. However, based on his monotheistic theory, Mulla Sadra believes that all levels of being, from the highest to the lowest, are ontologically hierarchical. Accordingly, it can be claimed that without interpreting ambiguous verses or resorting to the embodiment of the essence of the Necessary Being, one can preserve the outward meaning of Qur’anic verses through the semantic expansion of ambiguous terms and grasp their outward meanings. The strengths of Mulla Sadra’s theory concerning ambiguous verses generally consist of accepting the necessity of existence of ambiguous verses in the Qur’an, limiting ambiguities to ideological teachings, gradedness of the concept of ambiguity, limiting the complete perception and interpretation of ambiguities to the People of the Prophet’s House, accepting the method of the Infallible Imams (a) (Rasikhun) in dealing with ambiguous verses, acknowledging the gradedness or relativeness of understanding ambiguous verses, emphasizing the necessity of interpretation based on a method between analogy and agnosticism relying on rational principles and the teachings of the Infallibles (a), and interpreting ambiguities based on the semantic essence of words.

When discussing the rational soul, Muslim philosophers deal with certain problems such as the eternity or originatedness, immateriality or materiality, and the subsistence or annihilation of the soul after death. As a prominent Muslim gnostic, Rumi tried to provide some answers to similar philosophical questions. However, it is noted that his approach was to some extent different from that of philosophers. In his view, the core of the problem was the perfection of the soul through wayfaring, abandoning the world of matter, and union with the Essence of the Truth at the level of oneness and divinity. Since knowledge is at the heart of gaining proximity to God, Rumi focused his efforts on defining the soul in the light of intuitive knowledge and explained the difference among human beings in terms of their specific differences. He believed in the union of the soul with the Essence of the Truth and maintained that this union has some effects on the soul.

Different philosophical and gnostic schools have each presented some theories regarding the perfect Man relying on their own specific worldviews. Believing in a worldview based on the “individual unity of existence”, gnostics maintain that it is only the Truth which exists, and what is other than the Truth is only among the modes and manifestations of the Truth. In the view of this group, the perfect Man is a human being who has attained supreme glory. Such a person is indeed the locus of the manifestation of essential and nominal perfections of the Truth rather than having a different existence from the Truth. In his critique of gnostics’ theory of perfect Man, Mutahhari, based on the theory of the graded unity of existence, believes that the perfect Man is a human being who, while actualizing all goals and values to the level of moderation in oneself, has a single goal in mind which is the same proximity to God. According to the gradedness of existence, multiple goals and a single goal are the same but are different in their levels. In multiple goals, the intentions and the ultimate levels of divine proximity are also different. In other words, in the view of Mutahhari, as the graded unity of existence dominates the truth of being, a human being who has attained the graded goal is the same perfect Man. In this paper, the writer explains that none of Mutahhari’s criticisms of gnostics’ views are justified, and explicit references in the related texts demonstrate the falsity of his objections. Therefore, gnostics provide a more complete explanation of the perfect Man, and the existence of this human being is consistent with the individual unity of existence.

The problem of the origination and eternity of the world has always been one of the most challenging topics of debate among Muslim philosophers and mutikallimun. This issue is closely related to different problems such as explaining the divine essence, attributes of knowledge, power and will, the relationship between attributes and essence, cause-effect necessity, the relationship between the perfect cause and effect, the criteria for the need of effect for a cause, determinant of the origination of the world, and the nature of time, place, etc. Early Muslim philosophers believed in the eternity of the world, which, in the view of Muslim mutikallimun, was inconsistent with religious verses and teachings. Given the literal meaning of Qur’anic verses and their own specific interpretation of the essence and attributes of knowledge and the divine power and free will, they brought faith in the temporal origination of the world. In order to justify this view, mutikallimun imagined a time at which the world did not exist but came into existence later. This time was named the “chimeric time”. The present study explores the relationship between the theory of chimeric time and temporal origination in the view of Muslim mutikallimun. Ultimately, it becomes clear that chimeric time is, firstly, based on the same general principles of the design of temporal origination. Secondly, it has been introduced in order to improve the idea of temporal origination in terms of structure and respond to philosophers’ related criticisms. At the same time, this theory is consistent with other aspects of kalami thoughts, such as the common view of the world, its relationship with God, and the lack of its demonstrative analysis. Generally speaking, in spite of the different and, at times, contradictory interpretations of this theory, it is yet a step forward in propounding the temporal origination of the world, which entails the idea of a time in conformity with various ontological worlds.

One of the most important issues in theoretical gnosis which gnostics have tried to explain in the light of gnostic principles is the oneness of being. Nevertheless, the basic problem here is the demonstration of this gnostic theory. Fayyad Lahiji, one of the most prominent Shi‘ite mutikalimun and philosophers, initially advanced certain criticisms against the theory of the oneness of being based on the principles of the Peripatetic philosophy, then equated it with the graded oneness of being in the Transcendent Philosophy, and finally provided a philosophical kalami critique of Muhaqqiq Dawani’s theory in this regard. The present study indicates that Lahiji’s criticisms of the theory of the oneness of being were rooted in his ignorance of the related gnostic principles and the fact that the gradedness of being is different from the oneness of being in the view of gnostics. Hence, one cannot equate the oneness of being with the gradedness of being. Dawani’s theory also suffers from confusing the meanings of shared gnostic/philosophical and kalami terminology with each other.

Given the systematic nature of his philosophy, Mulla Sadra has categorized his semantic study of practical reason and theoretical reason under the theme of philosophical psychology. Following a descriptive-analytic approach, this paper explains his views in the field of semantics of practical and theoretical types of reason and explores their epistemological realms. Mulla Sadra believes that reason is one of the faculties of the rational soul and refers to two theoretical and practical faculties in order to clarify its functions. He maintains that, in spite of their different functions, these two faculties are, in a way, concomitant with each other. Given its role in the perception of universals, theoretical reason provides the basic concepts for morality and ethics, and practical reason perceives particular practical affairs through such basic concepts. By considering theoretical reason as the perceiver of universal concepts, Mulla Sadra introduces it as the origin of the development of two theoretical and practical types of wisdom. Regarding practical reason, neither, like some philosophers, does he consider it to be a purely practical faculty, nor, like some others, does he equate it with theoretical reason in terms of status. Rather, he believes that practical reason is capable of a kind of particular perception along with inference.