نشریه خردنامه صدرا
پیاپی 91 (بهار 1397)

In the Transcendent Philosophy, the basis of particular gradation is the return of the shared element to the distinguishing factor. This is a general rule and criterion for particular gradation, based on which at least three types of such gradation can be defined. In the first type, plurality dominates oneness so that all beings and plural things in the world merely share the aspect of being in existence. In the next type, oneness dominates plurality so that all the multiple beings of the world comprise the stages of a single being. The third type of particular gradation is midway between the other two types. Based on the particular gradation discussed by Aqa Ali Mudarres in the book of Bidayah al-hikam, oneness dominates plurality among possible multiple beings because all of them comprise the different grades of a single and absolute being. However, between the Almighty Necessary and the collection of possible multiple things, it is plurality which dominates oneness.

One of the useful views regarding the expansibility of meaning in the Qur’an is rooted in the theory of “coining words for spirits of meaning”. This view originates in a gnostic principle based on which the vertical levels of the meanings of words have a single spirit that applies to all referents in the real sense of the word. Through expanding sensible and material concepts to meta-gnostic meanings, the advocates of the principle of the spirit of meaning maintain that the features originated in the referents of words cannot affect the real meaning because the signified objects of words are general. Accordingly, the truth of words can be applied to all levels of meaning from the level of hidden truth to a lower level which is comprehensible to all. The followers of this theory consider “expanded concept” to be a level of word meaning without rejecting the common understanding of the lexical meanings of words. In this paper, the writers have examined the defects of the theory of the spirit of meaning through an accurate analysis of its nature and extracting its principles from the various interpretations provided by its advocates. The disagreement with predicating predicate adjectives on metaphoric expressions, concentration on objective affairs in word semantics, and lack of attention to new linguistic views are among the most important defects of this theory.

In religious sources, based on the logic of revelation, the development of the soul in the intermediate world is certain and impeccable. However, the quality of intermediary development and its probable inconsistency certain philosophical principles, such as the necessity for any kind of development to be preceded by potency and motion and allocating them to matter, makes it necessary for this kind of development to be only possible based on religious (Shar‘i) principles. In other words, philosophers might not be able to demonstrate the possibility of the souls’ intermediary development on the basis of rational principles. In this paper, the writers initially examine the traditional proofs for intermediary development based on religious texts and then investigate it in the light of the fundamental principles proposed by two prominent Islamic philosophers, Ibn Sina and Mulla Sadra. After a comparative study of their views, the writers conclude that intermediary development is impossible based on both philosophers’ principles regarding motion. However, they also argue that, given Mulla Sadra’s view of the Ideal immateriality of the soul and his belief in the Ideal Otherworldly body, there is a more appropriate, but not sufficient, context for the posthumous development of the body.

The four-fold gnostic journeys provide a well-known model for explaining the stages of tawhidi (monotheistic) wayfaring. However, a study of the logic of such journeys and an investigation of the reasons for dividing mystic wayfaring into these four-fold stages reveals that this model enjoys a desirable capacity for clarifying the stages of thinking in theoretical wayfaring. In this paper, in order to provide an extensive explanation of the model of four-fold journeys for thought, the writers initially explore their logic through referring to the background of the four-fold gnostic journeys. After clarifying the essence of these journeys, they demonstrate that the stages of desirable thinking in the process of solving any scientific problem could consist of the same stages as the four gnostic journeys. Following a detailed explanation of this similarity, the four journeys of thought in Sadrian philosophy and in relation to the problem of anthropology are briefly explored. Finally, the writers examine some of the general principles of the model of the four-fold journeys in the realm of thinking and elaborate on the educational advantages of using this particular model.

Since Almighty God has created the human soul as a comprehensive example of all beings in the world, and also because the human soul rules and manages its realm similar to a powerful administrator and leader, this study, inspired by a philosophical approach to the soul, aims to revisit the patterns of the management of organizational behavior and supreme organizational acts. The reason is that one of the successful methods of portraying valid social structures is to benefit from the truth of the creation-centered fitrah (primordial nature). This paper explains the relationship between the soul and its faculties based on the psychological approaches of the Peripatetic and Transcendent schools of philosophy. Here, the writers clarify the theories of “conquer relation” and “gradation relation” and try to gain a new perspective of the relationship between the soul and its faculties as two models of management and leadership, called “delegated management” and “diffused management” and explain their features. Finally, they try to provide and explain a single model based on an integration of the mentioned models.

In the philosophical tradition of Islamic philosophers, the discussion of the five-fold external senses takes place based on a particular criterion and order. Philosophers generally believe that the order of the senses from the lowest to the highest consists of touch, taste, smell, hearing, and sight, among which hearing and sight are subtler and nobler. Based on the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, such as the trans-substantial motion, the given order develops an ontological and perfectional aspect, which is the reason why Mulla Sadra’s discussions of the soul in relation to the external senses generally enjoy an ontological nature. The ontological level of the first three senses in the given order is always fixed; nevertheless, regarding the ontological superiority of hearing and sight over each other, some pieces of evidence testify to the superiority of hearing over the other, and some others testify otherwise. In this paper, the writers have examined and analyzed the reasons behind the ontological order of the senses based on the Transcendent Philosophy. Moreover, given the particular attention paid to hearing and sight, they have evaluated the reasons adduced for the ontological superiority of these two senses.

The issue of motion in philosophy has been discussed from different angles. One of them is the discussion of the existence and survival of the subject of motion, particularly, in the trans-substantial motion, which was viewed as one of the concomitants of motion and one of the elements of its individuation in pre-Sadrian philosophies. Through presenting his innovative principles, Mulla Sadra transformed the view of motion and its concomitants, including the subject of motion, to a large extent. The problem of motion in the trans-substantial motion has always provoked controversial debates and conflicts in Mulla Sadra’s philosophical school and among neo-Sadrians.
In certain cases, Mulla Sadra emphasizes the need of trans-substantial motion for a subject, and in some other cases he overlooks it. The same point has always created some conflicts among the advocates of Sadrian school, including ‘Allamah Tabataba’i and Mutahhari. In this paper, while investigating different views and their strengths and weak points, the writers conclude that the trans-substantial motion does not need a subject; rather, motion in accidents is also needless of its subject. They also maintain that, given the Sadrian principiality of existence, one can support a single fluid existence in the real world which is by itself the same as motion, the mover, and the moved, and that distinguishing them from each other would only be possible through analysis.