نشریه مطالعات خاورمیانه
سال هجدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 65، تابستان 1390)

This paper seeks to examine Obama Administration’s new strategy towards Afghanistan entitled AFPAK and to identify its implications for Iran’s national interests and security. The Obama Administration considers border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan as the most dangerous place in the world. On this basis, they maintain that the U.S. new strategy, contrary to Bush administration’s, is focused on politicalsecurity and economic attitudes, and as such it is able to resolve the Afghan crisis. The authors, nonetheless, believe that the new U.S. strategy is an extension of Bush Administration’s one in a different shape. For this reason, the critics have questioned the main themes in this strategy including increase in the number of forces, enhancing the government’s capacity to battle inefficiency, and negotiation with the Taliban. In spite of Obama’s promising statements in 2009, after almost three years have passed since the strategy was proclaimed, no success has been achieved in order to attain the declared goals.

The Kurds are among the largest ethnic groups in the Middle East who are present in Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Syria. Struggle for autonomy has been part of the contemporary history of this ethnic group, while just the Iraqi Kurds managed to attain autonomy. With the advent of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the subsequent Iran-Iraq war, grounds were further provided for cooperation between the Iranian government and the Iraqi Kurds against the common enemy, i.e. Saddam Hussein. Relations between Iran and the Kurdistan Regional Government have always seen ups and downs. This article seeks to answer the question that to what extent the Islamic Revolution in Iran affected the Iraqi Kurdistan region and what ups and downs Iran-Kurdistan relations have seen. The presence of regional and trans-regional actors like the United States and Israel and their search for finding a base and forging alliances in the region after the September 11th events make it more necessary to study relations between Iran and the Kurdistan Regional Government.

China is among the great powers that can play a significant, constructive role with respect to Iranian nuclear program, trying to make this case proceed normally and reaching a conclusion peacefully. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council and an atomic power, China has tried to become an economic superpower in the world since three decades ago. In order to attain this goal, it has adopted specific policies including establishing stability and relations with the other great powers as well as expanding peaceful relations with the neighboring and regional countries including Iran. Concerning Iranian nuclear dossier, Chinese positions as a great power matter towards the non-proliferation policy, the status of International Atomic Energy Agency and UN Security Council. This article seeks to identify and evaluate China’s Middle East policy and Iran’s place in it, and then to take advantage of this assessment in order to predict the country’s attitude towards this issue in the future developments about the nuclear dossier.

Iraqi Kurdistan is located at the three cultural-civilizational fields of Persians, Arabs and Turks. This paper argues that Iraqi Kurds, given their inaction in the regional field of game that has pre-existed and the security syndrome found in their neighboring countries towards them, have put Israel in their magnetic field. It has resulted in convergence between these two players. At the same time, the author demonstrates that Kurdistan’s vulnerable geopolitics has caused conflict with the existing regional fields and their distrust in them. Distrust in these three fields have led the Kurds to look at Israel as a strategic ally, because Kurdistan’s fragile geopolitics has heightened its bargaining capacity that is the same as attracting Israel in Iraqi Kurdistan’s magnetic field.

A study of EU foreign policy in the Middle East indicates that this institution used its soft power during the Cold War and entrusted the protection of the Union’s security to the United States. EU policies in the post-Cold War era have been characterized with the difficulty in foreign policy decision-making particularly due to the entry of new member states, increased efforts at coordination of foreign policies of member states and divisions in the Union’s opinions notably among the Great Britain, Germany and France towards the Middle East crises. The EU tried to make use of hard power especially with respect to Libya and to take advantage of soft power and hard power at the same time, that is called smart power. Making efforts at consolidating the Middle East peace process, Barcelona process, partnership in the quartet and financial aids are among the Union’s policies aimed at its soft power. Foreign policies of the powerful states of the EU towards the Middle East were intended to attain the following goals: acquiring new markets in the region, securing reliable energy resources, establishing peace and stability in the region in order to increase commercial exchanges, preventing the overflow of refugees and immigrants, and struggle against terrorist and extremist movements.

France’s Middle East policies in general and its Arab policies in particular were founded by Charles de Gaulle after the June 1967 Arab- Israeli war. Since then, Arab policies as de Gaulle’s legacy became a role model in the foreign policy pursued by the French presidents. Chirac was among the presidents who remained faithful to de Gaulle’s foreign policy precepts including his Arab policies, establishing good relations with secular Arab governments in the Middle East during his tenure. After Chirac left office, in his campaign, rupture from the past and weakening of France’s Arab policies became a priority for Sarkozy. However, after he won the presidential elections, France’s Arab policies have in practice persisted in French foreign policy.

This article seeks to examine how and to what extend religious beliefs influence the formation of democratic values and outlooks. The prevalent perception is that religion is an obstacle to the rise of democratic culture in the Middle Eastern countries, but findings reversing such an idea abound in the studies conducted by researchers. Drawing upon data from the World Values Survey conducted in 2005, the authors tested the hypothesis that religious beliefs affect democratic outlooks positively in the Middle East. The findings of this research indicate that the positive impact of religion on democratic outlooks has not been proved, but at the same time the opposite hypothesis concerning the negative impact of religion on democratic outlooks in the Middle East has not been supported as well. In other words, it can be suggested that religion does not affect outlooks on democracy significantly and does not create an obstacle to the rise of democratic culture. It can be concluded that the causes accounting for the absence of democratic culture have to be sought in factors other than Islam.