فصلنامه نقد و نظر
سال بیست و دوم شماره 2 (پیاپی 86، تابستان 1396)

With an analytic approach, we will show in this paper that basically evey knowledge, incluing the human sciences, are subjet o paradigmatic presuppositions in ontological and epistemological terms, though in human sciences, anthropological assumptions will also play an essential role such that they can affect other aspects as well. Thus, other domains of the human knowledge will be meaningful in light of its assumptions under paradigmatic developments in human sciences and the significance of philosophical anthroplogy. This could go beyond simple presuppositions and assumptions regarding the human being, producing a sort of moral and prescriptive anthrology along with conceptualizations and theorizations concerning human beings. Thus, all its concepts and their existential necessity in human sciences will be meaningful in light of this anthropology. The encounter will be the key to the production of native sciences, that is, Islamic human sciences, because Islamic theories and social knowledge can be achieved in terms of knowledge and conceptualizations on the basis of Islamic sources. Thus, along with a reconstruction of 'Allāma Ṭabāṭabā'ī's theory of social constructs in terms of a philosophical anthropology and its various layers, we can arrive at the existential necessity of justice as the central element of every human and social science in aspects of the philosophy of social sciences in the Islamic tradition.

According to Shahīd Ṣadr, social justice is an authentic, foundational, and basic value and a unique pillar of Islam. In this paper, we draw implications from Sadr’s works with a semantic method—a textual interpretation—in order to make sense of the essence of his view concerning social justice. According to Sadr, justice as a monotheistic value means different things in different domains. In the individual domain, justice means to observe the moderation and persistence on the sharia, and in the collective domain in connection with the general human succession of God, it involves two tenets: social balance and social security, the latter of which can be accomplished both by people and the government. Thus, social justice is accompanied with a sort of social balance, and social security functions to return the society to the balance in question. Thus, Islam recognizes the criterion of need, in addition to that of job, as a principle governing the realm of social security. On the other hand, Shahid Sadr believes that the popular and governmental aspects of social security are different with respect to their extensions. In Sadr’s view, the Islamic theory of justice is the main element of the Islamic social school, involving a detailed plan provided by the sharia. The accomplishment of social justice requires the direct and maximal interference of the Islamic government, especially in the domain of the Lacuna (manṭaqat al-firāgh). He believes that the main obstacle to the realization of justice is the attachment to the mundane world.

Justice is an issue that can be studied in different sciences from different aspects. This paper is concerned with the objectivity or relativity of social justice. The issue is concerned with the foundations and presuppositions of justice, rather than justice itself, and thus, it exhibits the connection between politics and metaphysics on the one hand, reveals a significant anthropological foundation in theories of human sciences, on the other hand. The main conclusions of the paper are as follows: (a) justice is not relative because it comes from the human innate idea (fiṭrat) of perfection and the just legislative divine laws derived from the ontology, (b) theories according to which social justice is relative to different times do not enjoy any convincing arguments, (c) there are theories that claim objectivity about justice, but they fall into the relativistic trap since they do not refer justice to fiṭrat and the ontology, and (d) there are theories that allegedly take justice to be relative, but since they refer it to fiṭrat and the ontology, they have provided a dual-aspect picture of justice in which they accept the relativity of moral oughts while taking the validity of justice to be unchangeable and common.

The issue of justice has always been central for intellectuals. In this paper, we have provided an examination, analysis, and a logical presentation of the theory of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī concerning social justice. The research is concerned with the identification of the foundations of the theory of social justice in the views of ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and the way he finds his way from these foundations to his theory of social justice. Moreover, we have examined the origin of the goodness of social justice as well as its absoluteness or relativity from his view. Conventional perceptions (idrākāt-e itibārī) consist in the deployment and collection of foundations on the basis of which ‘Allāma analyzes social justice. Self-love motivates human persons to appropriate all interests to themselves. Human persons inevitably accept social justice in order to make their own gains of personal interests possible. The criterion of essential goodness and badness of happiness and misery—and the conventional justice—is their being pleasant or unpleasant to the human nature. Justice is good, because it is required for the human happiness. Moreover, the definition of justice shows that it is a philosophical secondary intelligible, and thus, it enjoys absolute goodness.

Mohammad Reza Hakimi has appealed to some remarks by prominent Muslim philosophers to find support for the claims of the School of Tafkīk, that is, to show that even philosophers themselves believe that philosophy is not valuable. He has selected some remarks by Avicenna, Khwaja Naṣīr Ṭūsī, Ṣadr al-Muta’allihīn, ‘Allāma Ṭabāṭabā’ī and Imam Khomeini and accused them of contradiction in sayings and deed, ignoring their scholarships and practice. He attributed to them the view that philosophy (and mysticism) was worthless. In this paper, I try to show some problems in Hakimi’s remarks. Firstly, I show the falsity of the accusation that philosophy and philosophers (or mysticism and mystics) are at odds with the doctrines of Ahl al-Bayt (peace be upon them). Secondly, I assess the few remarks selected by Hakimi from among tends of philosophical books as evidence for the rejection of philosophy (and mysticism). I appeal to different pieces of evidence from philosophers themselves as well as their scholarly and practical conducts to show the true meanings of those remarks.

All Muslim scholars take both the Quranic meanings and words to be issued from God on the basis of Quranic verses and intellectual principles. However, there is a rare view according to which only the meaning of the revelation (waḥy) comes from God, and the words were selected by the Prophet. On this view, the history of the Prophet’s life and his psychological states such as sadness and happiness had a role to play in how he chose the words of the revelation and the ups and downs of the Quranic verses. Some people maintain that the Prophet had to draw on the science commonly accepted by people of his time in order to make the transcendental truth of the revelation understandable by them, and some such scientific views may as well have been proved false as the science developed, while the Prophet was only in charge of conveying the divine revelation. In this paper, I explain that, just like other entities in the world, the Quran enjoys stages that match one another, and thus, the verbal mundane stage of the Quran is a mirror representation of its spiritual or malakūtī stage, and according to the principle of the match between entities at different stages, nothing exists except the truth. This is based on the view that the words of Quran are divine revelations, and so the Quran exists independently of the Prophet’s natural existence which is the voice of the revelation.

The Problem Of Evil Is A Fundamental Problem In The Philosophy Of Religion In Response To Which A Variety Of Conflicting Views Have Been Proposed. The Question Is Why Different Intellectuals Have Adopted Different, And Sometimes Conflicting, Approaches To The Problem Of Evil. In Response, Many Disagreements Can Be Accounted For If We Adopt A Paradigmatic View Of Intellectual Problems Given The Ontological And Epistemological Principles Assumed By A Thinker. In Accounting For Why Philosophers Of Religion Disagree In Their Accounts Of Theological Problems, We Concluded In This Paper That Appeal Could Be Made To Two Conceptual Systems Or Philosophical-Theological Paradigms: Traditional And Modern, And So, The Explanatory Differences Of The Two Rival Approaches In Solving Problems Such As Evil Can Be Reduced To Differences In Conceptual Systems. The Two Epistemic Systems Are Displayed In The Views Of Some Contemporary Philosophers Of Religion. In This Paper, We Focus On Brian Davis’s Neo-Thomistic Approach To The Problem Of Evil, And Seek To Reduce Its Conflict With The Views Of Other Contemporary Philosophers Of Religion To The Difference Between Their Conceptual Systems, Showing The Effect And The Extent Of The Success Of Each Paradigm In Response To The Problem Of Evil.