فصلنامه نقد و نظر
سال بیست و یکم شماره 4 (پیاپی 84، زمستان 1395)

The divergence or contrast between religion and spirituality is a consequence of the theory of rationality-spirituality nexus. In this approach, the theorizer has taken spirituality to be inconsistent with fundamental doctrines of the religion in three of its main features. He takes eschatologism, a heavy metaphysics, and followership to be the three main features of the religion which diverge from the three main and inevitable features of spirituality, that is, secularism, a light metaphysics, and authentic life of a spiritual person. He believes that the divergence of the main components of religion and spirituality leads to the divergence of religion and spirituality themselves. He takes spirituality to consist in beliefs leading to one’s peace and the alleviation of one’s pains. By rationality which is connected to spirituality, he means instrumental rationality. In alleged cases of inconsistency between religion and spirituality, there are problems with respect to foundations of, and concepts employed in, the theory, as there are problems with the internal structure of the theory as well as other claims of the theorist. The spirituality in this theory can lead to eschatologism and a heavy metaphysics, and religious beliefs can, in terms of this theory, enjoy rationality. Therefore, the alleged divergence between the religion and spirituality can be resolved.

Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi’s theory about moral oughts came to be known as the theory of relative necessity (al-ḍarūra bi l-qīyās ila l-ghayr), because he explicitly accounts for moral oughts in terms of the notion of relative necessity. Some scholars have objected that moral oughts cannot be conceptualized under relative necessity. In this paper, I seek to delineate Ayatollah Mesbah’s theory and examine the above objection. I examine the theory and its objection in terms of philosophical analysis with reference to conceptual intuitions and practical cases. My conclusion is that Ayatollah Mesbah’s remarks cannot be accurately captured in terms of relative necessity, and in fact, it is incorrect to account for moral oughts in terms of this notion. However, unlike the above objection, this does not lead to the rejection of any causal explanation of moral oughts; rather Ayatollah Mesbah’s view can be taken as capturing a necessity which is inherent in the principle of causation, and in particularly, the principle of homogeneity between causes and effects. In fact, the only problem with Mesbah’s view in this issue is the labeling of his view as “relative necessity”. In order to call his causal explanation of moral oughts into question, a different path should be taken.

Two basic problems about inductive reasoning are those of justification and description. The problem of the description of inductive reasoning has not much been discussed (unlike that of justification). However, Peter Lipton, a contemporary philosopher of science, has concerned himself with the solution of this overlooked problem. He has first examined some models or views about the problem of the description of induction and considered them to be flawed, and then introduced his own model under the attraction version of “inference to the best explanation”. In this paper, I will delineate and then examine Lipton’s model.

The existential nature of civilization has not been much discussed in philosophy, but that part of philosophy which is concerned with civilization has posed important issues and opened new aspects. In this paper, I will be concerned with some, and not all, philosophical questions about civilization in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of civilization, its nature, and its existential elements beyond linguistic definitions. The most important philosophical issues discussed in this paper are as follows: the spiritual and ethical nature of civilization (softness or hardness of civilization), its objectivity or subjectivity, its compositional and systematic nature, the relationship between civilizational plurality and variety and civilizational unity and identity, its being a substance or an accident, and finally, its being a whole or a universal.

Before the Minor Occultation (al-Ghayba al-Ṣughrā), the terminology of “Imāmīyya” was used for the majority of Shiite Muslims. Although the term, “Rāfiḍa”, was more frequently used by opponents of Imāmīyya. In the period of the Imams (a), the term, “Imāmīyya”, was a general terminology for all Islamic denominations that believed in textual evidence for Imamate, but during the Minor Occultation and after that, the term, “Imāmīyya”, was specifically used for Twelver Shi’as, while this development has been overlooked by historiographers. Thus, in this paper we appealed to evidence to show the periods in which some Shi’as were called “Imāmīyya” and who the term referred to in each period in order to show the development of this notion (lexicological priority, reasons for appellation, and identifying the instances) which is significant for a systematic examination of the history of Shiism.

According to the value-free ideal of science, only epistemic values can have a legitimate role in epistemic assessment of scientific theories. In this paper, I seek to show that the value-free ideal of science is based on a picture of science and its relation with values, that implies certain meta-normative assumptions, which are for several reasons worth noting. Accordingly, after a brief introduction of the main issues of the meta-normative theory, we will discuss the assumptions of the value-free ideal about the relation between science and values. Suggesting an explicit articulation of these assumptions, we show their meta-normative implications. Then a brief sketch of arguments against the value-free ideal follows, which makes clear the neutrality of these arguments with respect to meta-normative positions. Finally, addressing the question whether it is necessary to take into account meta-normative implications of the value-free ideal, it will be noted that recognizing meta-normative commitments of value-free ideal serves a better understanding of the thesis and also opens a new path for putting forward arguments both for and against the value-free ideal of science.

In this paper, I focus on the relation between higher-order evidence and equal weight view in the debate concerning the epistemology of disagreement. First of all, I make a distinction between first-order and higher-order evidence and then present Kelly's argument according to which the effect of higher-order evidence should not necessarily be considered in favor of conciliationists. Then I concentrate on Matheson's argument which claims the opposite. I show that the Matheson's argument is dependent upon a theory of evidence which is called the two-part theory of evidence. After explaining the general problems of such a theory—including the regress problem—I show that this is a highly demanding theory of evidence due to the costs it imposes on the its defenders. Then, by a simple probabilistic modelling, I demonstrate that even accepting the two-part theory of evidence, does not necessarily lead to equal weight view in epistemic disagreement. If my argument works, it cancels out one of the most important arguments in favor of conciliationism