فهرست مطالب

ذهن - سال پانزدهم شماره 3 (پیاپی 59، پاییز 1393)

فصلنامه ذهن
سال پانزدهم شماره 3 (پیاپی 59، پاییز 1393)

  • بهای روی جلد: 60,000ريال
  • تاریخ انتشار: 1393/11/28
  • تعداد عناوین: 6
|
|
  • Mahdi Abbaszadeh Pages 5-34
    This article is an effort to present a brief comparison between the views of the western contemporary epistemologists and Illuminative philosophy of Suhrawardi in analysis of “knowledge”, and to designate the capacity of his thought to answer the contemporary epistemological problems and issues. Under the subject of “analysis of knowledge”, it sets forth some problems such as true application of the word “knowledge”, definition of the knowledge and objections to this definition; then it concludes that the knowledge is limited to “propositional knowledge” (i.e. true justified belief) and the abovementioned objections will be answered. Subsequently, the article deals with the "elements of knowledge"; explaining the theories on the nature of belief, truthfulness and justification, it concludes that a true belief is a “belief that” or a belief that belongs to a proposition. In the set of his epistemic discussions, Suhrawardi pays attention to many of the abovementioned problems and issues. He does not limit the knowledge to propositional knowledge, which is generally a kind of “acquired knowledge”; but introduces “knowledge by presence” and “intuitive knowledge” as the true knowledge. In his point of view, “acquired knowledge” has the same three elements: belief, truthfulness and justification, but it must enjoy “certainty” for arriving to the stage of true knowledge. He also does not limit the belief to a belief that belongs to a proposition, which is somehow “acquired”; but he introduces the intuitive and presential beliefs as to be more reliable than the acquired one. In the discussion about the truth, he believes in the "theory of correspondence", which is in turn based on epistemic realism; likewise, he believes in foundationalism in the discussion about justification.
    Keywords: Suhrawardi, Epistemology, Knowledge, Belief, Truth, Justification, Realism, Certainty.
  • Mahmood Saeidi, Ali Hosseini, Sayed Mostefa Mousavi Aazam Pages 35-54
    The faculty of Delusion or Vahm has several aspects like proving it, being independent from other faculties of rational soul, how delusional concepts were comprehended and understood the concepts, material or immateriality of this faculty, and the conjunction of it to the practical and theoretical reason. In this research, Ibn Sina’s views in theses aspects are studied and explained. In this regard, it has been proved that the proving of this faculty, independency of it from reason and rational soul, and materiality of it are incorrect even according to the philosophy of Avicenna himself. The two demonstrations that proving the independency of faculties of rational soul have no indication for independency of delusion and changelessness of the concepts which this faculty comprehend are the sign of it’s immateriality and their subject.
    Keywords: Ibn Sina, Delusion, Rational soul, Comprehension, Concepts
  • Mahdi Nosratian Ahur Pages 55-68
    Hypothetical syllogism is one of the solution of problem. The main kinds of syllogism are as follows: relative hypothetical, incomplete, and creative syllogism. In discussing the hadith 'Allah sent His messengers to people for no other reason but that they would have understanding about Him;' in some cases, uses have been made of relative hypothetical syllogism which is based on a particular ideological presumption. Using incomplete hypothetical syllogism, however, it has been shown that the relative hypothetical syllogism is not consistent with the internal and external context of hadith; and, as a result, it cannot be accepted.
    Keywords: Hypothetical syllogism, Relative hypothetical syllogism, Incomplete hypothetical syllogism, Creative syllogism
  • Mohammad Bagher Ghomi Pages 69-104
    This paper aims to challenge the current chronology of Plato’s dialogues based on the development of the concepts of knowledge and being in his philosophy. The six presented objections are arranged in two groups. The first group is to criticize the position of some of the late period dialogues after the middle period ones. While the first objection discusses the problems of Theaetetus’ late position, the second argues about the the problems of the late position of Sophist and the second part of Parmenides after Republic and the third that of Laws and Politicus.The second group of objections is going to challenge the position of Parmenides after the middle period dialogues. Criticizing the dominant theory that Parmenides’ critics of the theory of Forms are referring to the theory in the middle dialogues, we will try to illustrate that not only these dialogues provide the answers of the critics, but they are constructed based on, and directed to, them. The fifth and sixth objections show that based on the current chronology of the dialogues we can neither take Parmenides’ critics as valid nor as invalid.
    Keywords: Plato, Dialogues, Chronology, Being, Knowledge
  • Mohammad Ali Ardestani Pages 105-126
    One of the basic theories on knowledge criterion in Islamic philosophy is scientific privileges of holistic spiritual intellect on whose basis knowledge criterion i. e. correspondence criterion is based on holistic spiritual intellect. That is to say، relying practically on holistic spiritual intellect we can attain knowledge about the universe via verdicts and statements stable in the mind. Then if they correspond to the subject’s knowledge، they are true; otherwise they are false. This essay is an explanation، analysis، and evaluation on the abovementioned theory in brief.
    Keywords: Knowledge criterion, Correspondence, Truth, Fact, Active intellect, Spiritual essence
  • Somayeh Kamrani, Mohammad Sa’Idi Mehr, Seyyed Abbas Dhahabi Pages 127-164
    One of important discussions in Islamic philosophy is question of limiting motion to material beings. The view of negation of motion in immaterial beings that most philosophers have accepted is on The basis of principles and foundations. The present article tries to explain this view and then examine each of these foundations on The basis of Mullasadras philosophy. And, finally considering this view is rejected, at least, conclude non- limiting motion to material beings and possibility that in immaterial beings.
    Keywords: Substantial motion, Motion in immaterial beings, Immaterial beings, Hyle, Soul, Mulla Sadra