فصلنامه ذهن
سال نوزدهم شماره 2 (پیاپی 74، تابستان 1397)

The issue of the possibility of expressing mystical intuition is one of the important issues of the philosophy of mysticism. There are different perspectives in this regard, which we explain and criticize them. In this essay, we outline the concept of expressiveness based on three areas of truth, meaning and language, then we will present some mystical texts that can confirm such a view. Since the mystic confronts with truth by “Absolute Experienced Certainty” intuition and understands it by illuminated reason, can put it in language templates. Of course, the mystic in each of these areas is in trouble. Among the problems that make it difficult and sometimes impossible for him to report observations as follows: In the realm of truth, its complexity and extent, and the weakness of intuition, In the realm of meaning, novelty and added intellectual interpretation, and lack of semantic skills, and in the realm of language, the use of common language and lack of technical language.

Undoubtedly, the mankind's recognition of the real that various human sciences follow it, is fallible. Logics was designed and arranged from the past to block some of the error factors. But about logics and any other knowledge that seeks to correct, repel and obviate the faul, this question arises as to what knowledge can act as a criterion and the possibility of transferring to the real estate to it infallible. Reason, as the discoverer of the real, has a part that can be considered as critic of criterion. At the same time, this criterion needs help and it's complements is criterion of religion that hasn't limit and there is infallible. Religion has honored the criterion of rationality, which calls it in
argumentation observe to criterion of religion. In this article, according to a verse from God's Book, we try to show the validity of the rational criterion in all areas of human knowledge and discoveries, including intuitive knowledge and even in achieve to religious purposes.

This paper is an initial attempt to lay the foundations for what may be termed as the logic of theoretical ʿirfān. Since theoretical mysticism is based on descriptions of mystical witnessing — which is liable to be mistakenly interpreted in the process of describing the experience itself — there is a need to identify framework by which the validity of these experiences can be tested. What are the criterion upon which this framework can be based? The proposed framework is based on two criterion. The first is the criterion of religion and the second, the criterion of the intellect. Both of these criterion have two measures; foundational and not foundational. The foundational measures are those which are necessary, real and certain and their attestation is absolute. The measures which are not foundational are limited, graded in their attainment and theoretical and so they are conditionally attested. The criterion of religion is organised according to what is present in the Qurʾān and the aḥādīth reports which together form a criterion against which the descriptive accounts of mystical experience can be  tested. Those accounts have two types of implication; real implications and certain implications. The first type of implication has foundational measures and the second type has advanced measures.The foundational measures result in definitive reasons (iḥtijājāt) and the advanced measures result in conditional reasons (tanjīzāt). The iḥtijājāt are implications in which what is implied is testified by the intellect in a manner that all of its foundations are accepted unconditionally and with certainty. Tanjīzāt, on the other hand, are implications where what is implied is testified by the intellect with a more general certainty that may not be acted against. If someone acts against this type of certainty they are not pardonable (maʿdhūr), rather what is implied can also be unconditionally ratified. The criterion of the intellect applies to universal, theoretical sceince (dānesh-i kullī naẓarī). By using intellectual principles and intellectual methods of derivation intellectual questions are answered through the frameworks of logic and philosophy. The criterion of the intellect is the framework for all universal and particular statements. These statements specific to the intellect can be categorised with the categorisation of the intellect into the general intellect and the specific intellect. Using this criterion necessary statements (ḍurūrīyāt), the general principles (usūl-i ʿāmma), pre-experience (pīshātajribī), prederivation (pīshāistidlālī) and what is essentially ratified (ḍurūrīyat-i ṣidq) are the foundation, whereas theories (naẓariyāt), uncommon principles (uṣūl ghayrhamgānī) and uncommon derivation are advanced measures.

The inexpressibility of mystical intuitions and experiences refers to the impossibility of expressing mystical experience in words. The following are some of the arguments that have been posed in order to prove this claim: the existential non-transferability of feeling, the symbolic nature of mystical language, the metaphorical theory, the non-conceptuality of mystical experience, the indefinability of mystical experience, the non-restrictedness of mystical experience, the lower rank of the meanings of the purports of words in relation to intuitional meanings, spiritual annihilation, the impossibility of homonyms and shared meanings and transience with approaches concerning the essence of the experiencer, the essence of experience and the essence of the object of experience. This article describes, analyzes and assesses the abovementioned arguments. The conclusion drawn from this study is that the arguments are mostly unable to present a correct meaning of inexpressibility and some issues within them have rendered them void and despite their similarity to inexpressibility, they have some fundamental with it; likewise some of
the premises were false and some others had some critical issues. Therefore one cannot assume the impossibility of inexpressibility of mysticism according to these arguments.

Mysticism as a kind of knowledge is the outcome of an inner experience which is usually called "discovery" and "intuition" in the Islamic tradition and in the Modern Western tradition it is usually called "mystical experience. In the contemporary "philosophy of religion", too, many speak of a "religious experience" that is close to the mystical experience. The issues raised in these two titles are similar and in some cases overlapping. Sometimes they consider
religious experience as a general and mystical experience as a part of it, in which case their relation is general and particular. Sometimes they consider them to be two different types of experience. In this usage mystical experience is a direct witnessing of the unity of being, whereas religious experience is the experience of the Holy without the element of unity of being. What is common in all these considerations is a higher kind of inner and spiritual experience. In order to know the essence and reality of mystical experience, first I deal with the most important characteristics of this phenomenon from the viewpoints of  ome Western scholars. Then I mention some points about the essence of the mystic experiences, especially intuition and its different types in Islamic mysticism.

Reason as a power of human powers has various functions that are perception and understanding, abstraction, generalization, analysis, decomposition, composition, definition, measurement and comparison, judgment and reasoning or inference. The mention of these functions is inductive and other things can be found and added to these. Ibn 'Arabi in al-Futuhat spoke spontaneously about the  functions of reason, and has specific explanations in this regard. The reason has the ability to perceive immaterial meanings, and perceives and accepts the intuitive learning because of the property of acceptance in him. The condition for the acquisition of reason to immaterial meanings is abstraction and freshening of meaning from matter and its accidents and this is done by imagination and with the help of reason. Also, the degradation of immaterial meanings from the world of intellect to world of imagination and sense requires the duplication and formulation of meanings in imagination. The sensory and imagination perception provides the necessary talent for the perception of meanings by reason. The meanings can not be created and invented. They are merely thought out and their main position is in the presence of meanings and the Divine knowledge. The truth of things is made up of meanings, and the emergence and degradation of them in every stage requires the adoption of the rules and effects of that stage. The sense perception of things is perception of meanings on sensible material forms, the imaginary apprehension is apprehension of meaning on imaginal forms, and intellectual apprehension is apprehension of meaning on intellectual forms. Most people do not have the power to abstract the meaning of their material and maximum use of meanings in the form of fantasy and imaginal forms is obscure.

The inexpressibility of mysticism to mean "the impossibility of expressing mystical experience in the form of words" is considered as one of the characteristics of mystical intuition or experience. The existence of this characteristic concerning mystical experience is supported by a wide range of arguments, some of which are the following: spiritual blindness, the barrier of intellect, the lower rank of the meanings of the purports of words in comparison to intuitional meanings, the non-conceptuality of spiritual experience, the impossibility of speech while experiencing mystical union, the existential non-transferability of feeling, the depth of feeling and emotion in mystical experience etc. A study of these arguments shows that some of them have incorrect premises or foundations or some serious issues and objections can be raised against them or that a correct perception of the concept of inexpressibility does not exist within them. Therefore, either the arguments are not enough to get the objective across or the inexpressibility that is intended in these arguments cannot be considered to mean "the impossibility of expressing mystical experience in the form of words"; ultimately, the conclusion that must be drawn is that the possibility of expressing mystical intuitions and experiences is not eliminated and argumentation in favor of inexpressibility does not follow  an impossible path.

The present paper relates to this question, what are the characteristics of the language of mysticism in the 7th and 8th centuries, during the rule of the Ilkhanites. Using the Whittsteinnean linguistic theories and Foucault's power/ knowledge theory, this study tries to explain the characteristics of the language of mysticism in this age. From the perspective of this paper, although the mystical concepts comes from the inner experience of human and is not related to the senses, but the works of mystics are expressed in the common language of mankind. Examining the main characteristics of the language of mysticism such as antirationality, removing established habits, breaking the taboo and being secret…we try to explain the relationship between each of this elements with political power.