مجله فلسفه و کلام اسلامی
سال چهل و نهم شماره 2 (پاییز و زمستان 1395)

The problem of good and bad in philosophy and theology can be discussed from two perspectives, ontological and epistemological. The problem that were seeking to answer in this paper is that: Does the theory of “al-idrakat al-itibariyah” (constructive perceptions) has presented a new solution for it? If yes, which way it has used to deal with the problem (ontological or epistemological)?
The answer that has been discussed is that this theory, by considering the epistemological aspect of al-itibariyah in the scope of practical intellect, presents a third meaning for the problem of good and bad and provides an innovative way for the problem.

The eternity of Al-Nafs al-Juziyah (finite self) is one of the most complicated philosophical issues. In some of his works, Mulla Sadra firmly pointed out the eternity of finite self; he similarly has specified the created-ness of the bodily soul; however, the former and the latter are apparently contradictory. The main objective of the present study is to indicate that according to the mystical foundations of Mulla Sadra in the theory of “the individual unity of existence”, firstly, the theory of the eternity of finite self is a reasonable matter, and secondly, there is no contradiction between such an eternity and created-ness of the bodily soul. According to this theory, as the existence is a united truth, its manifestation is a united truth too; besides, this manifestation possesses three levels: abstract, semi-abstract, and material. According to the gradation of manifestations, the human truth is present in both intellectual and in infra intellectual levels. The intellectual reality of man in purgatory (intermediate) world is accompanied with material requisites, while in the physical world, in addition to the material requisites, it is also accompanied with matter, itself, and dispositions.

Ibn Sina Characterizes Sidiqin Argument as an argument by means of which the existence of Necessary Being is proved just on the basis of reflecting on the nature of being. He claims that his versions of the argument satisfy the criterion, really. Mulla Sadra, however, argues first that Ibn Sina’s arguments are not, properly speaking, based on reflecting on the nature of being, and second that they are based on reflecting on the concept of being. Here, we first formalize one of the Ibn Sina’s arguments, namely the version of Najat. Then we argue that based on Ibn Sina’s metaphysical system, Sadra’s objections do not work. Finally, we propose that if one redefines necessary being and contingent being by use of causality, then one reaches to a new version of Ibn Sina’s Sidiqin Argument that dissolves Sadra’s objection.

Aristotle took Per Impossibile as a form of Hypothetical Syllogism which was composed of a Syllogistic and a non-syllogistic part. But he didn’t express the relation between these two parts clearly. Alexander of Aphrodisias and Philoponus didn’t add any specific comments to Aristotle’s view. Al-Farabi believed that Per Impossible includes three deductions: two categorical syllogisms and one exceptional syllogism; Avicenna introduced Connective Conditional Syllogism, and, based on it, he explained the relation between two parts that Aristotle propounded in Per Impossible. This interpretation is accepted by many of Islamic logicians, nevertheless Averroes followed Aristotle’s outline and ruled out Avicenna’s Connective Conditional Syllogism. Afḍal al-Din Maraqi took Aristotle’s opinion and clarified the relation between Syllogistic and non-syllogistic parts well, finally Quṭb al-Din Razi modified some aspects of Avicenna’s view.

Mulla Sadra uses his own principles in the debate over unity, multiplicity and graded unity of being to develop a profound interpretation from the noble tradition “There is no compulsion and volition but something in between”. This approach is formed via exposing the meaning of hierarchy in Sadra’s theosophy, human deeds are attributed both to the individual himself and the divine will. His breakthrough in this debate is his depiction of volition as compulsion and compulsion as volition for humans. In this regard, human is obliged to conduct his own volitional action; nevertheless, this compulsion does not reject but approves of volition. For Mulla Sadra, unlike other theosophists, God is the proximate reason behind deeds not the remote one. Secondly, compulsion and volition or, in other words, purification and assimilation are unifiable. Sadra’s assimilation of mild water, according to many thinkers, and to the celestial body confirms this plan.

Ibn Abi- Jumhur Ahsa’i, a prominent thinker of the Shi’ite sage, who was alive until the early era of the Safavid dynasty, can be called “the founder” because of his revolution in the form and method as well as in the theological attitude of Shiite Kalam, and since this revolution is fulfilled through illuminative wisdom, he has to be called “the founder of Illuminative Shiite Kalam”.
In this research, we have shown that the very revolution, in respect of form, basically takes place through “method of synthesis and the correspondence” and, in respect of attitude, will be fulfilled through the ontological level of Kalam. In consequence, standard and common theological views on God’s Unity, Prophecy, Imamate and Resurrection improve on the basis of the esoteric meanings of Shiite beliefs.

One of the criticisms of comparative philosophy is the incommensurability of different traditions. That is, various systems or disciplines, conceptually and methodologically different, are grown in the context of different traditions and thus making them incommensurable. Xianglong Zhang holds that incommensurability is because of the lack of grounds for comparison. To accomplish fruitful comparisons, one ought to fully discern the points of comparison. The originality of the current paper is its attempt to draw attention to the point that comparative philosophy should be approached through an inter-paradigmatic stand. It can be attained when the researcher transcends the limits of paradigms. Inter-paradigmatic perspective along with grounds for comparison when maintained leads to effective comparison of philosophical traditions.

Avicenna, being influenced by Farabi’s specific terms about the dual concepts of existence and quiddity, believed in external occurrence of existence upon quiddity in the contingents and the accidental synthesis of things from them. But Bahmanyar, the self-proclaimed commentator on Avicenna, expressly states in Al-Tahsil that the existence of a thing is the objectivity of its external quiddity and enumerates “existence”, like “substance” and “thing”, as intellectual fictions abstracted from existing quiddities. This paper scrutinizes this conflict, using the first-hand sources of peripatetic philosophers, then gives forth four distinctive interpretations of their beliefs regarding the existence and quiddity of things. Namely, thinkers such as Avicenna and Sohrevardi, recognized this conflict between Bahmanyar and his teacher, and strengthened the former’s views, whereas some orthodox peripatetic philosophers, specially commentators of Fusus-al-Hikmah ignored this difference and re-read and interpreted the theory of external occurrence of existence upon contingent quiddities. Mulla Sadra, taking into account this latter view, maintained two different opinions about Bahmanyar. But, sadly, most of Mulla Sadra’s commentators have read peripatetic philosopher’s sources based on Sadraic tradition, and therefore have remained unaware of their conflicts and the differences of their views.