مجله فلسفه و کلام اسلامی
سال چهل و نهم شماره 1 (بهار و تابستان 1395)

In Mulla Sadra's and Mir Damad's works, modes- with the criterion of being part of subject or out of subject- are restricted in two meanings: mode of delimitation and mode of causation, mode of delimitation for the mode which is part of subject (both real part in real composite and imaginary part in imaginary composite) and mode of causation for the mode which is out of subject. Regardless of criterion of division that clears mode of delimitation meaning obviously, mode of delimitation usage in part of subject meaning in Mulla Sadra's and Mir Damad's works, shows this term has been distorted in later periods and supposed equivalent of "mediator of occurrence". Never and nowhere has been mentioned the usage of new meaning for mode of delimitation but it is pretended that the previous philosophers applied mode of delimitation in this new meaning. Even though it is said that a philosopher does not deal with terms, generally mediator of occurrence cannot be considered as a mode of the subject.

Lakoff criticized Aristotelian view of metaphor and founded cognitive theory of metaphor. Assuming the acceptance of this theory, abstract concepts in Islamic philosophy are understood by conceptual metaphors. The conceptual metaphors are often unconsciously used by the philosophers.
The existence as one of important bases of Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is conceptualized by several conceptual metaphors. “Existence Is Light” metaphor imports our conventional experiences of sensible light in format of systematic descriptions to Mulla Sadra’s metaphysics and applies it to the conceptualization of the existence. The mentioned metaphor plays remarkable role in Sadrian metaphysics and epistemology. The gradation of the existence is understood by this metaphor; the existence, like light, can be intense or weak. According to this metaphor, the existence, like light, is self-manifesting and makes others apparent.

Ibn Sina, in his Al-Isharat, presents an argument for the Divine Unity based on His Uniqueness. This argument has been the subject of different interpretations by the commentators of Al-Isharat. The first interpretation is whether Ibn Sina presented one argument or two for Divine Uniqueness. The second is whether his argument against the uniqueness outside God’s essence is one or two. There are also interpretations on what Ibn Sina meant by “… wa baqy al-aqsaam muhaal” (“ …Other options are impossible”). In this paper we will investigate all the three interpretations and propose the correct one in each case.

In Islamic philosophy non-certain beliefs are not knowledge but Ignorance, and arguments for the validity of "confidence" in the Science of Usul al-Fiqh only prove its pragmatic value; The question is whether or not non-certain opinions have epistemic values? In this article, we reconstruct the theory of “conventional perceptions” and divide the "mental existence" to "inherent mental existence" and "conventional mental existence", and then we explain some conventional ideas can represent the facts. Conventional perception represents reality, if it relies on the inherent perception; otherwise, this convention is arbitrary. This link is the source of representation in conventional perceptions and the source of partial truth in non-certain knowledge; but we cannot determine directly this source, and in non-certain knowledge the criterion of evaluation does not rely on the criterion of representation.

Skepticism about the external world is a philosophical view that claims we can’t know anything about the external world. Some kinds of philosophical skepticism use skeptical hypothesis to prove that we cannot know anything about the external world. This view has its roots in the fact that we don’t know skeptical hypothesis is wrong. Putnam hold that accepting the semantical externalism refutes this kind of skepticism about the external world. Davies has an important interpretation of Putnam’s argument against the external world skepticism. In this paper, we have logically analyzed and evaluated Davies’ semantical externalism argument against skepticism concerning the external world. The conclusion is that Davies’s argument refutes an important kind of skeptical hypothesis. By using the other kinds of skeptical hypothesis, however, the skeptics can’t conclude that it is impossible to know anything about the external world.

In this paper, through exploring the problem of equivocal types and its historical roots in Islamic Peripatetic school, we will explain the differences between Khajeh Nasir’s approach to equivocal types and Avicenna’s one; and show that such differences result from Sohrevardi’s criticisms and his belief in the priority of essence.
On the one hand, Khajeh Nasir embraces Sohrevardi’s criticism of Avicenna, and on the other, he never could accommodate modulation and gradation of essence in the framework of Peripatetic school. Thus, he considers the equivocal types as required common accidental of their tokens. In this paper, it has been shown that, firstly, Khajeh Nasir borrows this idea from the matter of the relation of genus and differentia and of accident and Aristotle’s accidental categories. Secondly, to embrace such idea epistemologically results in inconformity between subject and object form Peripatetic point of view. Furthermore, from theological point of view, it paves the way to Ibn Kamooneh’s doubt.

The present paper studies the status of reason in the religious issues from the viewpoints of the Salafis and Akhbaris sects. The study indicates that the Salafis rely only on the appearances of the traditions (hadiths) of the Prophet and the life style (seerah) of predecessor scholars, and similarly the Akhbaris consider the appearances of the narrations of Imams the only authentic resources for religious reference. They deny the validity of reasoning and Ijtihad in their opinion.It can be said in criticism of their opinions: despite the plenty of advices from the exact religious texts on reasoning and its significance, rationality is completely ignored by them.

The soul in transcendent theosophy has both corporeal creation and spiritual permanence; hence, it has two aspects of “corporeality and belongingness to the body” and “inherent immateriality”. The main purpose of this study is to recognize the multiplicity of the human soul in three stages of its coming-to-be
Human Souls were immaterial intellects before they came to be attached to the body. Hence, the multiplicity of human souls can be regarded as the multiplicity of the “species of the intellects.” After the corporeal creation of humans, all of them became the “species of the natural” category in terms of the body, and they are also multiple. But after the acquisition of permanent spiritual states and on the basis of these states’ alliance with the essence of the soul, every soul has a different essence from other essences in terms of their nature. Hence, every soul has a unique and "imaginal class". A small number of human souls that have reached perfection and became immaterial intellects based on their origin and target alliance will acquire the perfection of the “species of the intellects” category.