فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال شانزدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 61، پاییز 1397)

The present study aims at presenting a precise explanation of the principle of ‘Unification of Lordship’ in Mulla Sadra’s view and its difference from similar terminologies. The research question is as follows: “How is divine lordship explained from philosophical aspect?” To investigate the issue, first we have given a clear explanation of various types of divine actions. Then, we have compared the quality of divine action with that of the human’s action, stated their differences, and enumerated – to explain the truth of divine attributes – various types of divine attributes, returning them to self-subsistence. Finally, we have scrutinized the difference between Unification of Lordship and unity of divine actions. The findings of the study show that what is realized, in the divine action, outwardly is the very innovation and effusion from whose various modes a variety of conceptions, including Lordship, is abstracted. This relative attribute returns to God’s subsistence without any change. Unification of Lordship, that is supporting and management of the creatures, means the very divine governance, but in a lower rank.

Among the well-known arguments presented by Islamic thinkers – including Martyr Mutahhari – for proving God’s existence is the pseudo-philosophical argument of ‘order’. In explaining that argument, Martyr Mutahhari resorts to the principle of ‘probabilities’ to prove the order originated from the ‘ultimate cause’, regarding it as the tool of proving God for the natural world. He believes that ‘order’ as the result of agentive cause cannot prove God’s existence, and emphasizes the argument of ‘order’ is not related to the agentive cause. He presents, while criticizing the theological statement of argument of ‘order’, a philosophical statement of it, separating the argument of ‘guidance’ from the argument of ‘order’ with a special precision. He also explains the argument of ‘order’ on the basis of the principles accepted by previous scholars, considering as an incomplete statement of the argument. In the present study, we have tried to use a descriptive-analytical method to investigate the argument of ‘order’ in Martyr Mutahhari’s view to resolve some ambiguities in his introductions, definitions, and explanations by adducing his intellectual foundations in his works.

The world of ‘grave’ and human’s reward and punishment therein has been mentioned in numerous Quranic verses and traditions. Therefore, Muslim scholars have explained them and, naturally, each of the theologians, philosophers and commentators have presented a different explanation of it based on their own special foundations. Among them is Mulla Sadra, the great philosopher and commentator, who has stated in his works the four lives of the man, presenting a new explanation of the truth of ‘grave’ as well as the reward and the punishment therein in two ways: (a) an explanation based on the embodiment of one’s morality and actions and removal of the veils; and (b) an explanation based on illusive perception of punishment and reward. In the present article, we have attempted to compare Mulla Sadra’s view with religious teachings, while reporting his explanations and foundations. As a result, although Mulla Sadra’s explanations of the elements of the religious doctrine of ‘resurrection’ may answer some of the related doubts, they require more reflections and more precise studies in view of religious texts.

    Hassan Mu’allemi / Associate Professor in Baqer al-‘Uloom University         Received: 2017/08/08 - Accepted: 2018/06/13 In the Islamic philosophy, the active intellect has been regarded the agentive and ultimate cause for the soul in the cause and effect system, to which the soul is united in its way to perfection. What is criticized and investigated in the present article is the connection or unity of man’s soul, in its way to perfection, with the active intellect. This critique is done in two ways: (a) the review of the bases for accepting the active intellect such as the Ten Intellects and the longitudinal system of stoic philosophy; and (b) the critique on the unity or connection of the two beings with one another after getting the precise meaning of unity and proving the point that the only correct meaning for unity is the soul’s achieving the existential degree of the active intellect and connection with its emanations.

The human dignity is among the fundamental topics in the series of issues of practical philosophy. The importance and necessity of this topic and its special position in resolving philosophical issues, especially the anthropological issues, has caused many thinkers – including Emanuel Kant and Martyr Mutahhari as two influential personages in the realm of Western and Islamic philosophy – to pay special attention to it. In the present article, we have used descriptive-analytical method to explore the views of these two thinkers. The findings show that Kant and Mutahhari agree that the man has an intrinsic value that distinguishes him from other creatures and that human dignity is not acquired just by perfection of his theoretical intellect. However, there are disagreements in their criterion for human dignity and mechanism for its actualization.

In this paper I examine some contemporary challenges to Ibn Sina's account of inductive arguments. According to that account there is a distinction between mere inductions on the one hand and what they call ‘experiential arguments’ on the other hand. The latter is based on some observations and an additional deductive argument. The major premise in this deduction is the allegedly self-evident principle that ‘something accidental is not persistent or nearly persistent’. The main criticism is that this principle is neither self-evident nor derived from self-evident truths. I argue that this criticism is based on some wrong conception of ‘accidental’. In order to grasp the right meaning of ‘accidental’ I have to clarify the Ibn Sina's general theory of physical causation. After that, I will proceed by giving a more plausible account of the principle regarding the accidentals. Finally I will show how the traditional account survives these recent challenges.

All derivative propositions return to self-evident propositions; and sciences thus end and lead to their origin. According to this foundation, some have thought that all negations are theoretical and there is no axiomatic negation, because for them, negating attribute from the subject always necessities a middle term that proves one feature for the subject and prepares the ground for negating an attribute from the subject through that term. Thus, the axiomatic negation is not sensible without a middle term. This is, however, rejected by Avicenna and Aristotle. For them, just as the theoretical affirmation leads to axiomatic affirmations through analysis, and just as accepting an axiomatic affirmation is sensible without a middle term, the same rational reason that makes us accept axiomatic affirmations makes us accept axiomatic negations as well. Just as accepting theoretical affirmations without leading to axiomatic affirmations would necessarily result in vicious circle, accepting theoretical negation without their leading to axiomatic negations would necessarily result in vicious circle and finally a contradiction which is rejected.

Opposition and conflict among united propositions in predicate and subject and the relation between them is one of the judgments of the propositions and investigation of the relations among them (from the viewpoint of concomitance or contradiction), based on which the ‘square of opposition’ is formed. This issue is one of the most important discussions in logic of reasoning and has been the focus of attention from the onset of Aristotlian and stoic logic. Aristotle has limited the opposition of propositions to opposition in veracity, introducing it as the opposition in affirmation and negation. He introduces the opposition of predicates, dividing it into contradiction and contrast. Muslim logicians have regarded the opposition of propositions in contrast to interference of propositions, and those two as types of difference in propositions. They regard opposition as inclusive of opposition in truth and opposition in falsehood. Accordingly, they have added entrance under contrast to instances of opposition if propositions. In addition to affirming the contradiction with its instances as affirmation and negation, stoic philosophers have dealt with opposition between modes of truth such as opposition between necessity and non-necessity and opposition of possibility and refusal. The difference in meaning and instance of opposition in speeches of logicians, which leads to difference in formation of square of opposition, clarifies the necessity to investigate different meanings and instances of opposition and the way the square of opposition is formed for each.