فصلنامه معرفت فلسفی
سال چهاردهم شماره 4 (پیاپی 56، تابستان 1396)

Causality can be divided into external and analytical ones. In external causality, cause and effect have separate and independent existences. In analytical causality, however, they do not have separate existences, whether both of them exist as a unique simple being or are of non-existent meanings. Philosophers have not explicitly referred to this division; however, there are issues in their texts that cannot be justified except by accepting analytical causality. These issues can be considered as the implicit acceptance of analytical causality by Islamic philosophers. Maybe the most important evidence proving analytical causality is the a priori demonstration in categorical syllogism. In a priori demonstration, the middle term causes the major proposition for the minor one, while in categorical syllogism, all terms of the demonstration have come to existence by the same existence. The present article investigates this reason and other reasons for analytical causality.

Mulla Sadra maintains that the soul has – rationally – existed by its intellectual existence in its previous stratums. At the same time, since the soul is the manager of the body and essentially belongs to the body in its mode of existence, it has physical origination. He has successfully reconciled these two apparently floundering views. Although this philosophical view of Mulla Sadra is quite innovative, its traces are clearly found in the works of mystics such as Ibn Arabi. In other words, Ibn Arabi emphasizes the existence of the soul in previous stratums on the one hand, and stresses the physical origination of the soul in its worldly mode, on the other.

Throughout history, most philosophers have been incapable of proving the universal conscience of all creatures in a philosophical term; rather, they have denied any conscience in physical entitites, based on some evidences. Transcendental philosophy has made valuable efforts to present a philosophical explanation for this religious teaching, and Mulla Sadra and the followers of transcendental philosophy have attempted to explain it intellectually and rationally. In the present article, through a descriptive-analytical method and using a comparative-critical approach, an explanation of the generalization of understanding to physical entities by considering their non-physical facet has been investigated. The findings of the present research suggest that although Mulla Sadra and many other thinkers have accepted the abovementioned explanation, putting it forward as one of the ways to reconcile the belief in universal conscience of all beings based on the concomitance on the one hand and the acceptance of the reasons for abstractness of knowledge on the other hand, its verity is doubted. However, the writer believes that although one cannot prove the universal conscience of all beings using this reason, we may adduce those Quranic verses and traditions that denote comparatively or essentially the influence of perception in beings to conclude that any being – including material ones – somewhat enjoy knowledge.

The logic of Aristotle—Ibn-Sina has been founded on neglecting existence, and on looking at the external reality through quiddity. Mulla Sadra’s different view of the external reality and how the man becomes aware of it, causes a change in the foundations of the logic of quiddity. In his logical works, Mulla Sadra does not present a systematic expression of his existential logic. In his philosophical works, however, he has presented some of the issues related to the existential logics. In Mulla Sadra’s view, existence is the ultimate differentia or form, unifying the type, the ultimate differentia, and previous genuses and differentia. This is in contrast with the general view that organic composition of matter and form denotes the arbitrary union of the essence and cannot justify the modality of union in attribution of essential universals to one another. In the well-known view, the matter and form are regarded external realities and are among the primary intelligible; but genus and differentia are only mental and are among the secondary logical intelligible. In existential view of Mulla Sadra, however, what is real and realized in external world is the existence of differentia which is followed by type, genus, previous differentia and accidental affairs. Thus, genus and differentia as well as type are not merely mental and among the secondary logical intelligible. Mulla Sadra regards non-conditioned conventions in five universals among external judgments of the essence, referring it to the existence and its judgments. Besides, in his existential view, the kind of from and ultimate differentia is quite separate from the kind of essence in type and genus, and those two do not belong to the essence of quiddity.

In the theory of collections, not only zero and one, but also the extent of membership of a collection of numbers between zero and one posed. This is the fundamental basis of Fuzzy thinking. The external world is no more white and black; rather, it is grey as well and any member in this grey collection enjoys the numerical value between zero and one. On the other hand, Mulla Sadra’s philosophical system has been formed on the basis of the principality of existence, and the innovation and the highest point in it is the gradation in the orders of truth of existence. In view of the basis of principality of existence, existence is a unique truth that forms all the external identity and text. This unique truth of existence which is common among so many beings and external truths exists in gradation and with orders in the external world. Enjoying gradational thought in transcendental philosophy has beneficial effects in recognizing external beings as plural truths and is, somehow, similar to fuzzy thought. Now the question is whether there is a relationship and affinity between fuzzy thought and the principle of gradation of existence. In seeking to answer this question, the present enquiry has achieved numerous parameters that prove this affinity.

To know the nature of thought and philosophy in Heidegger’s view, in the present article we have firstly distinguished between thought and philosophy. The subject of philosophy is existent and the subject of thought is existence. Unlike the existent, existence is not something presupposed and imagined. The thought is reminding the existence. Existence escapes from us on the one hand, and we are neglecting it on the other hand. Neglecting existence in the philosophy has misled it. The existent is the veil for the existence on the one hand, and it is the sign for it on the other hand. For thinking, we must approach the existent, but how is it possible? The only way to existence is “Dasein”. The fear- consciousness characteristic of Dasein is the condition for non-existence. When non-existence dominates Dasein, existence comes in and we become reminded of existence. Of course, existence is related to us even when we neglect it. In the light of the relationship of existence with human being, the essence of philosophy, the nature of the man, the essence of art and the essence of technique are established. At the end of the article, we review and investigate Heidegger’s views.

Since ancient Greece, and even after the establishment of the science of aesthetics, the question of what beauty is has always been unresolved among scientists. However, apart from these struggles, human beings deal with beautifying their environment and instruments, and even themselves at the expense of risking their life. What is beauty that man protects it with his life? How is the existence it enjoys? The present study uses library resources and gathers the scholars’ views in this sphere and analyzes them logically to find the answers to the aforementioned questions and some other related questions. Stressing the objectivity of beauty and rejecting its subjectivity, rejecting the idea of non-definability of beauty, and suggesting solutions for defining it in the form of establishing or reinforcing previous definitions or offering new definitions using genus and composite differentia are among the findings of the present study.

After the discovery of defects in Descartes’ epistemological structure and revealing the skeptical implications in it by philosophers such as Locke, Barkley and Hume, despair of achieving the knowledge and cognition filled the philosophical atmosphere of the eighteenth century. The first who systematically confronted modern skepticism was Thomas Reid. Relying on the basics of common sense, he challenged the theory of thoughts – postulated by skeptics – and introduced it as inconsistent with common sense. In the present article, we attempt to use Reid’s books and other writings regarding his ideas to explain Reid’s objections to the theory of thoughts and his alternative theory on perception. In addition, we will explain his arguments against the skeptics’ avarices including reasoning based on inability, necessity of precaution and precedent, and his argument of regarding having to trust the belief-making forces. At the end, we will deal with methodology of reason in Reid’s view; and in the section of conclusion, we will state that we have no choice except to trust the belief-making forces.