فصلنامه آینه معرفت
پیاپی 28 (پاییز 1390)

One of the issues discussed by Avicenna is resurrection and its Eschatological states. In his philosophy, Avicenna paid due attention to the controversial issue of pleasure and pain with the purpose of making the deists and theologians understand the issue pleasure and pain. In his works, Avicenna provides proof for the existence of soul and the immortality of soul, but he insists that various human faculties vanish after death; the only faculty which remains and transferred to the hereafter is the intellectual faculty. Avicenna used different categories to classify human souls so that he could clarify their eschatological positions. In Avicennian philosophy, proof is provided for the comprehensiveness and dominance of other-worldly happiness and the souls’ pleasure and pain is considered intellectual. From Avicenna’s point of view, all other-worldly spiritual; rewards, pleasures and pain are thought to be intellectual. The other-worldly promises which have been included in the holy scriptures are only allusions and metaphors. It is for imperfect souls that he considered a carnal position hanging over celestial bodies. His contention was that the pleasure and pain of imperfect souls is of a materialistic nature.

The present article aims at examining the intentional theory of perception. This theory is an attempt to provide an account which could explain both veridical and non-veridical perceptions. Based on this theory, both types of perception are treated as an intentional mental state which is representational. Although for many intentionalists, the physical object is immediately experienced, it is not an essential element of the perceptual experience. In other words, for them, the relationship between the mind and the object is not a necessary condition for the perceptual experience. So it can be concluded that the theory of perception cannot totally support the intuition that perception is openness to the world. Thus it is consistent with a kind of skepticism.

In the transcendental deduction of the critique of the pure reason, Kant emphasizes the importance and function of imagination. Kant, in contrast with Descartes, believed that imagination is one of the essential faculties in the process of threefold transcendental synthesis. The reproduction synthesis is the special function of imagination. In the recognition synthesis, which is to be fulfilled by partnership of understanding and imagination, it is revealed that Kant only recognizes acquired knowledge. Yet, using the acquired knowledge as a basis, Kant fails to present an acceptable answer to the question that whether this synthesis is a conscious process or not. Drawing on Mulla Sadra’s views on imagination and knowledge, the present article assesses Kant’s views of imagination and the process of synthesis comparatively.

In philosophy and theoretical mysticism, different views have been expressed on the interpretation of Seddiqin argument with regard to the relationship between existence and quiddity. Avicenna by basing his argument on the differentiation between quiddity and existence; Sohravardi by his denial of this differentiation and basing his argument on the theory of lights and Mulla Sadra by deriving his argument from two bases: the priority of existence over quiddity and modulation of existence have tried to provide proof for the existence of God, as the first philosophical issue. But none of these arguments have provided the proof they have sought for. Allame Tabatabaee, taking a new approach to the connection between existence and quiddity and using the originality of reality, runs the shortest way toward the provision of proof for existence of God. Reliance on Allameh’s argument has had valuable outcomes among which we can refer to the proof for the necessary being as the first philosophical issue.

A field of knowledge for its being a field of knowledge is indebted to the coherence of its issues and the coherence of issues is indebted to a unifying factor. This factor is considered the subject matter of any field of knowledge. The question focused on in the present paper is the determination of the subject matter of philosophy and its difference from the other fields of knowledge from Avicenna’s and Mulla Sadra’s points of view. The subject matter of any field of knowledge is the one whose essential accidents are the focus of discussion. In other words, the predicates of issues in any field of knowledge constitute the essential accidents of that filed of knowledge. Therefore, there is a close relationship between each field of knowledge and its issues. According to Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, the subject matter of philosophy is existence as it exists and the issues of existence as it exists are among the essential accidents of existence in general. However, the application of the logical rules of philosophy on what is propounded as philosophical issues is controversial, since the philosophical issues must be among the essential accidents of existence as it exists, while this application to some of the issues is truly problematic. So there is a gap between the definition of philosophy and its realization which needs to be bridged. For example, if we wish to prove our beliefs philosophically we can examine them in a separate field of knowledge or in co-related philosophies. Therefore, there is no ban to the efforts to identify and define the different areas of philosophy with different domains through which we can reach at specific and general philosophies.

Badā is an important concept in Imamite Shiism. The Sunnis, in their narrated theological works, disapprove of Badā as heretical. Imamite Shiism is of this belief that Badā’s appropriate delineation can pave the way for its acceptance by all Muslims especially the Sunnis. That is why it has made considerable efforts to achieve this aim. The present article first discusses in brief the beliefs of famous Sunni scholars regarding Badā and then continues with the discussion of the Shiites’ major rational and narrative discussions on Badā.

The concept of knowledge has been discussed in philosophy from the ontological and epistemological perspectives. Though the present article takes an epistemological view of Imam Khomeini’s works, its aim is not to separate the two perspectives. It rather aims at explaining some major points in the field of knowledge and their implications for Imam Khomeini’s educational philosophy. Questions like the quiddity of knowledge and its definition, types of knowledge, conditions on reaching a useful knowledge constitute the focus of the present article. This would include the different divisions made in the categorization of knowledge including acquired and intuitive, pragmatic and theoretical, and also a division based on the domains of human existence. The article also provides an explanation of the conditions for the usefulness of knowledge including the contiguity of knowledge with humbleness and self-refinement, internalization of sciences and knowledge, and the goodness of the agent. The final part covers the educational implication of the above-mentioned concepts.