فصلنامه آینه معرفت
پیاپی 46 (بهار 1395)

Avicenna has based his philosophical system on the principle of distinction between existence and quiddity. However, this principle has been criticized by some other philosophers and thinkers in the Islamic world. It has been accepted by many scholars since past times that some of these critics such as Suhrawardi and Ibn Rushd, have misunderstood Avicennian view of this distinction. But, is there really such a misunderstanding? Our response to the question of misunderstanding is that, as for Ibn Rushd, yes he did, but, as for Suhrawardi, the answer is no, he did not. Because Ibn Rushd sees Avicenna as a commentator who had misinterpreted Aristotle. While Suhrawardithinks differently. The analysis of Suhrawardi's 'iitibarat aqliyyah' (rational considerations) shows that, understanding the basic differences between Aristotle and Avicenna and basing himself on the new elements of 'anvar-I ilahiyyah' (metaphysical lights]) and 'idhafah ishraqiyyah' (illuminative relation) which are the philosophical explanations of the theorem of 'iijado-shey la min shey' (existentiating the thing not from something), makes him a different critic of Avicenna’s philosophy. Avicenna himself in some cases has mentioned that he has never meant external distinction between existence and quiddity; what he had in mind is a metaphysical and not an external distinction. Suhrawardi was aware of this kind of distinction precisely. Indeed, Suhrawardi's criticism is about metaphysical distinction, not external distinction, though the structure of his specific objections is similar to those which Avicenna and Ibn Rush pose against external distinction. This may be the reason why some have formed the idea that Suhrawardi misunderstood Avicenna’s distinction between existence and quiddity.

What is our relation to God and the transcendent reality of the world? Can we know Him? Or because it is impossible to imagine "the ocean in a drop" and "the sun in a particle", He is totally beyond any human delusion and preoccupations. It is a long-standing issue in the discussions of theological scholars; an issue which has attracted the attention of the researchers everywhere. Various approaches have emerged to deal with this issue; one of them is negative theology in contrast with positive theology. Based on negative theology, we cannot acquire knowledge of God, for our knowledge is absolutely finite, while He is infinite.Therefore, knowing Him is impossible. One of the most important thinkers who thinks negatively concerning the knowledge of God is Hakim Sanai (1080 to 1141) as a Persian famous poet and theosophist. Many grand mystics after Sanai have drawn on him and have acknowledged that they had been affected by him. The purpose of the present article is to explain the role of reason in acquiring knowledge of God based on negative theology, drawing on Sanai's ideas. To this end, the authors have adopted a descriptive-analytical method relying on library sources.

Beauty is one of the attractions of human soul. It is also the fundamental and consolidating element of art. Depending on the definition of art by the artist, works of art can vary and take different forms. Throughout history, various definitions have been provided for art. The present article first provides Farabi’s definition of beauty and then tries to compare it with those of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus from the ancient times and Hume, Kant, Hegel and Hutcheson from the modern period. So the main question of this article is: What are distinctive features of Farabi’s definition compared to other definitions? The extroversive and introversive nature of beauty in Farabi’s definitions and its applied or non-applied nature in the modern definitions or secondary issues discussed in the present article. According to Farabi's definition, beauty is exactness of supreme being and ultimate perfection of a kind irrespective of its being natural or fabricated. The study shows that Farabi's definition of beauty is more comprehensive and complete than other definitions. His definition is applicable to abstract and spiritual beings while the other definitions are devoid of this feature. His definition of beauty is objective, practical and not school–based. If artists take his definition as their starting point, they would be able to contribute to the world of art in an innovative way.

In comparative philosophy, the philosophers’ conception of philosophy within their philosophical systems are compared. As one way to infer a philosopher’s conception of philosophy is through his/her definition of philosophy, in this article, we compare the definitions of philosophy provided by Plato and Sohrevardi. Both philosophers consider philosophy as a process and consider it as a transition from multiple world to the world of oneness. For both, the outcome of this transition is observation through illumination. From Plato’s point of view, the first stage of this process is wonder, love of wisdom, existential involvement with a philosophical problem, all of which are dedicated to theanalysis of the philosopher’s inside world. For Plato the transition from the multiple world is possible through practice of death while Sohrevardi starts this process with complete separation from universe without the analysis of the philosopher’s inside world. Assimilation to God, being in company with God, and becoming eternal are the final goals of philosophy from Plato’s point of view. For Sohrevardi wisdom has no limits.

The present paper examines four of the theological knowledge sources with a distinct approach from that of the early Imamyyah theologians during the presence ara. To this end and to identify the necessary components of a paradigm and an independent model of thought among early Imamyyah theologians who distinguished themselves from their contemporary ones and also from the thinkers of the later eras, the study adopts a historical analysis based on narrative, theological, and historical sources. About the first source (intellect) and its relation to revelation, all of Imamyyah theologians, except for a small group of scholars, believed in joint authority. The early Imamyyah theologians also believed in the independent authority of intellect, but, unlike the Mu’tazila, not exclusively and without recourse to revelation. In relation to the issue of fiṭrah, the early Imamyyah theologians believed that one of the most important missions of the prophets was the awakening of human nature not rational argumentation about monotheism. As for the issue of perception, the sharp-sightedness of sense perceptions is not what theologians questioned. Finally, in contrast with the extreme views of tradition-oriented Sunnis and also intellect-oriented Mu'tazilites, they took the position of explaining the ultimate being through heart sight..

The notion of space is one of the most interesting and attractive topics in Merleau-Ponty̕ s phenomenology of perception. Unlike Husserl who looks for certain facts in the field of pure consciousness, i.e., in the field devoid of natural assumptions such as time and place, but more like Heidegger’s idea of Being- in- the- world as the essential state of human beings; Merleau-Ponty believes that cognition of space is an a priori condition for our knowledge of objects and events. In addition, through more reflection on the psycho-physiological findings in contemporary psychology, Merleau-Ponty argues that our body is the ground or horizon by which objects take spatial features, and therefore it is the source of a dual relation between the subject and the world. He reiterates the point that all of our experiences followed by creation of new spatial levels that formed successively, and that our experiences are the result of the formation of new spatial levels of embodiment subject. A significant result of this view is that the individual subject is a historical one whose moments are formed by successive experiences in which the body’s spatial levels are aggregated to form a more complete special level compared with the previous ones.

Apperception is the most important Kantian teaching and his major epistemological principle in transcendental deduction of the Critique of Pure Reason derived from the most fundamental form of Being’s experience. This term has been used in Kant’s work with pure, original, and transcendental attributes. Some commentators have interpreted this principle as confirmation of Cogito, as a replay to Hume’s skepticism, as the attributability of representation to oneself, and some others have presented a logocenteric reading of that. Indeed, apperception is a reasonable account of unity of thinking and thinker, which is based on presential cognition and the experience of existence in concreto or non-conceptual being. But such an original experience is inconsistent with Kantian subjectivism. Kant, in principle, should not have spoken of predicative, concrete and external existence, otherwise his words would become incompatible with the limitations he has imposed upon himself.