فصلنامه بین المللی ژئوپلیتیک
سال سیزدهم شماره 1 (پیاپی 45، بهار 1396)

While territorialization is a collective or an individual effort to apply an exclusive supervision on a clear part of a physical space, discourse of territorialization points out to make dominant discourse by people or group beyond a physical space. In fact, goal of making such discourse is to control space without applying a hard power. Occurred changes in the Middle East during recent decade have provided causes of power finding and consolidated and stabilized position of Shiites in the Middle East. This issue has affected and challenged interests of Arabian–western axis in this region severely. Since hard war has heavy effects and consequences, decision to produce discourses like Shia-phobia by Arabian-western axis seems more logical and reasonable. In short, goal of this paper is to state approach of anti–Shia discourse of Arabian-western axis in the Middle East in general and in particular to explain philosophy, causes and continuation of this discourse in frame of apposition with resistance axis in crisis of Syria.
The research is basic in terms of its goal, and casual and descriptive- analytic in terms of method and nature. Data gathering procedure is based on library findings.
Findings : Present power of Shiites in the Middle East is the most key reason to continue Shia-phobia in the Middle East. In fact, the opposition of power finding of Shiites (Arabian – western axis) try to highlight and conceptualize danger of hegemony of Shiites on the Middle East by conceptualization of Shia in frame of discourse of Shia-phobia. Their reasons for extending such discourse in the Middle East are changes of the Middle East during several recent decades in favor of Shiites. So, it is common that they use all their effort in frame of hard power and soft power (discourse extension) to prevent hegemony of Shiites (especially Iran) on Syria. Since, changes of the Middle East always have been affected by ideological conflicts (Shia – Sunni), these conflicts has formed two opponents groups in Arabian – western axis and Shia resistance axis. The first group includes Arab states, the US, Israel, Turkey, Qatar and opponents supported by them, and the second group includes Russia, Syrian government, Hezbollah, Iran and Iraq. Like most changes of the Middle East, war of Syria also became a bed to confront Arabian –western axis with resistance axis. Arabian –western fear from resistance axis can be understood by realistic point of view. The most important concern of the West is to secure energy resources in a region where about 70 % of its population is Shia and about 68 % of sources of energy are owned by Shiites. On one hand, the only strategic and trusted alliance of the West in the region Israel is sieged by resistance axis. This concern is understandable for Arabian axis, especially Saudi Arabia, because most of occurred revolutions in the Middle East has been supported by the public which on one hand brought changes caused more power – getting of Shiites and on the other hand, increased pressure on dictatorial regimes. Clearly, Arabian–western axis in a military action against Syria and resistance could not meet their desired goals. The most important reason of this failure is reliance of Syrian government on resistance axis. It is common that resorting to a flexible and soft way like producing a discourse (like Shia-phobia) is a desired and low–cost method than hard-war. Like many of conflicts of the Middle East Crisis of Syria can be explained in frame of discourse of Shia-phobia.
The Middle East has always been a bed of events. Events like collapse of Pahlavi Regime on Iranian, Iraq war against Iran, establishment of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council, Iraq attack to Kuwait, military presence of US in the region and Arabian countries, US attack to Iraq in 2003, discourse of large Middle East, plan of Shia crescent, magnification of nuclear activities of Iran, intensification of international sanctions against Iran, connection of problems of the region with problems of Palestine and Lebanon and Syria, crisis of Bahrain etc. all are evidences of several decades of conflict and complication in this region. In following complex changes of the Middle East, ideological problems have been and are most part of problems of this region, and religious (Shia – Sunni) confrontations have shaped a continuous form of enmity, competition and non –reconcilability between Muslim countries of the region with some of western governments and countries of the region. From this perspective, during 4 decades (especially after Iranian revolution) power–getting of Shiites noticed a type of clear and hidden competitions from the given governments for Shia countries and Shia resistance, gradually. So, conceptualizations like reviving Shia, rise of Shia, axis of Shia, pan–Shiism, Shia internationality, Shia renaissance, Shia bloc, Shia emperorship and Shia awakening, etc. indicate to highlight Shia-phobia.

Intrduction : Southeast Asia deserves more sustained attention from American policymakers than it has received in the recent past, according to the independent Task Force report. It argues that Southeast Asia has a long history of important security and economic ties with the United States and is of strategic interest. Yet the United States has benignly neglected the area and its needs and growth potential for almost two decades. With the economic crisis in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in the late 1990s, the reestablishment of U.S. diplomatic ties with Vietnam, and the recent ethnic strife and devolution in Indonesia, the region and its member nations are back on the international skyline. The shortsightedness of recent U.S. policy toward the region, the report states, is troublesome because of the region’s importance to U.S. national interests: with a population of 525 million and an annual gross national product of $700 billion, Southeast Asia has become America’s fifth-largest trading partner; it is home to several emerging democracies. Today, the region is more volatile than at any time since the Vietnam War. In several nations, especially Indonesia and the Philippines, the aftershocks from the economic crisis and rising political turmoil continue to make for fractious polities, fragile economies, and a loss of investor confidence. The report recommends that the United States maintain regional security by preserving a credible military presence and a viable regional training and support structure. That, according to the Task Force, will help prevent both intraregional conflict and domination by outside powers. The report also devotes particular attention to U.S. relations with Indonesia. The Task Force says that helping to foster economic and political reform in Indonesia—now in the “throes of social, political, and economic instability”—would have important implications in the region and the world. Indonesia, the Task Force notes, is the world’s fourth most populous nation and the fulcrum of Association of Southeast Asian Nations, and has the world’s largest Muslim community. It is also a major oil exporter and the only Asian member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries.
The research is basic in terms of its goal, and casual and descriptive- analytic in terms of method and nature. Data gathering procedure is based on library findings.
Result and The United States strategic blunders in South West Asia at the turn of the 21st Century have not led to any strategic gains to reinforce the United States image and standing in South West Asia. The United States can be said to have lost heavily in strategic terms when viewed against the fact that its military distractions in Afghanistan and Iraq led it to be militarily oblivious to the security of the Asia Pacific and East Asia in particular. The strategic vacuum caused by US inattentiveness led China to exploit this vacuum by an unrestrained and fast-track military rise for over a decade. The recent United States strategic pivot to Asia Pacific is a belated effort to reverse the above trend and win back South East Asian nations unnerved by China’s aggression in the South China Sea and East China Sea areas. On balance it can be stated that the United States strategic blunders in South West Asia have cost it heavily not only in South West Asia but also in Asia Pacific. In strategic terms it will take years for the United States to regain its strategic balance. How should the next U.S. president exercise strategic leadership in East Asia?
First, with good reason for fundamental optimism – because there remains very significant regional demand for U.S. leadership in East Asia.
Second, with empathy for allies and supporter states. It is crucial for the next U.S. president to recognize that, unlike the United States, East Asian states have to live permanently in China’s shadow. Very few regional leaders will choose – or be able to stick with – policies that actively antagonize China. This is because their relationships with China stretch beyond maritime disputes to encompass economic and security interdependence. In this context, U.S. strategic leadership means enabling these states to keep supporting U.S. leadership without forcing them to make zero-sum choices vis-à-vis China.
Third, with resolve towards China. This resolve can cut two ways. The new president can choose to play hardball, upholding U.S. interests and principles clearly and firmly and responding in kind to Chinese assertiveness. This may work: Chinese leaders may continue to be deterred by the specter of a potential military conflict with the U.S. that they might not be able to win. But I would recommend applying resolve in a different way: Persuade China to become the world’s most important supporter of a regional and global order that the U.S. wants to uphold. This is a more difficult enterprise because it will involve a change of mindset in Washington, from the current take-it-or-leave-it attitude towards some negotiation with China about reforms it wants to see and the role it wants to play in the international order.
The U.S new administration will try to consider initiating a workable framework for cooperation with China in key regional maritime issues, such as navigational safety, zones. It seems to me that the only viable short- to medium-term means of managing the South China Sea disputes is the tried and tested one of China and the other rival claimants agreeing to put aside the territorial disputes, possibly in favor of selected projects of joint resources protection, exploration and development. While these agreements will not directly involve the U.S., which is a non-claimant, Washington can lead in creating more propitious “weather conditions” for such an outcome, by shifting the current dynamic away from the deadlock over international arbitration and freedom of navigation.

Intrduction: Beginning of the Syrian crisis in the Middle East has led new kind of power formation in the reign. Syria crisis realities show that identity has an important and major role in the Middle East crisis. New wave of political change in the Middle East, especially Syria, is based on the identities and political radicalism. In fact, violence and religious radicalism are consequences of political change in the Middle East which has been called sings of Islamic awakening.
The research is basic in terms of its goal, and casual and descriptive- analytic in terms of method and nature. Data gathering procedure is based on library findings.
Findings : The research findings shows that:1. Arab Spring changes and its impact on security conflicts of Syria: in this context, the impacts of Arab spring, uncertainty of future and changes in the relationship of actors are discussed.
2. The role of Takfirist groups in the security crisis of Syria: in addition to ethnic and religious divisions as well as the intervention of the Great Powers, the role of Takfirist groups like ISIS and al-Nusra Front in Syria's security crisis is studied. In fact, Syrian crisis has been influenced by identity-oriented movement of Salafi groups.
3. The crisis of identity, legitimacy, authority and effectiveness and the formation of political unrest in Syria: the elite's mismanagement, along with other elements of legitimacy and cultural crisis have led to Syria's political crisis. Generally, the Syrian political system does not have structural flexibility.
4. Role of regional and trans-regional actors in the Syrian crisis: Syria is part of an axis of alliance driven by Russia, Iran and partly China. This axis of alliance is condemned by Turkey; west was Arab Union.
5. Syria crisis management based on the model of Cooperative Security: given the multiplicity of actors, the management of crisis is faced a kind of confrontation between involved actors in the Syrian crisis. The narrow security paradigm and limitation of regional actors do not lead to a desired result in the regional diplomacy and crisis management. The nature of cooperative security is plural which has led regional players to peruse different kind of objectives.
The realities of political, social, regional and international structure shows that Syria require to apply new mechanisms in order to control the cumulative threats. It is possible when the Syrian government realize its own inefficiencies and internal structural challenges. Different discourse conflict in Syria has created a kind of antagonism that has deepened divisions in the society. The depth of the divisions has threatened interests, cultures and identity of many countries. That is why achieving an agreement between these identities in the near future seems unlikely, because lack of understanding and self-interested political purposes has prevented the emergence of a peacefully situation.

The world has witnessed the transit routes between east and west that most relying on ocean routes. Hence, northern- southern communication has less been shaped by relying on land. This causes many problems, including increasing costs of transportation. Geo-economic views and needs of landlocked countries of the super continent of Eurasia and north and south communications of this continent have created the need for the development of the southern to the northern corridor. Iran route from Chabahar port to Central Asia and the Caucasus and then connect to Russia, and Pakistan route from Gwadar port to China's Xinjiang province and the continuance to periphery areas be the most important north-south corridor creation options. This research is intended to evaluate each of these corridors by the geopolitical and geo-economic views.
The research is basic in terms of its goal, and casual and descriptive- analytic in terms of method and nature. Data gathering procedure is based on library findings.
Result and Eurasia is the biggest continent in the world and Asia is the most important part of global economy that in era of global recession has remarkable growth. China, central Asia, Persian Gulf region, Indian subcontinent and the East Europe are the most important regions that need to inter commercial relations. So, this mega continent needs to construct south - north corridor to improve growth continuance. There are two possible routes for constructing of a southern - northern corridor in the heart of Eurasia as following: first, the route of Iran from Chabahar port and second the route of Pakistan from the origin of Gwadar port. The Chinese government support Pakistan for the construction of the southern - northern corridor from Gwadar to the province of Xinjiang and Russia and India support Iran for construction of the southern - northern corridor from Chabahar port to central Asia. China has extremely demand to energy and try to purpose energy security diversify energy transport routes by Pakistan corridor. Also, Chinese government tries to directly access to the Indian Ocean and oil rich region of Persian Gulf. Pakistan and Iran follow to earn transit fees and promote their infrastructures and improve the geopolitical and geo-economic position in the region and international system. India, historical rival of Pakistan, tries to open Iran corridor for accesses to central Asia and Afghanistan markets and inactive Pakistani corridor. Iran cannot use its geo-economic position to create south-north corridor which international sanctions is on hand. Signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the world powers P5 in July 2015, caused Iran to activate corridor signed a contract with Russia, Afghanistan and India. In this regard, India invests in Chabahar and China in Gwadar.
Political instability and insecurity challenges in Pakistan route is the main obstacle to the corridor. Economically, the transfer of energy from corridor of Pakistan to Xinjiang province is not affordable and cannot secure energy demands of China. Because the main consumption markets of China located in east coast of China. Also, because of the length of the route access of central Asia countries to free seas through the Pakistan corridor does not seem optimal. But, Iran is an island of stability in the Middle East and West Asia and the shortest route to connect Central Asia Countries to the international waters. So, the results showed that the route of Iran corridor in terms of dimensions of the international security and economic has preferences in comparison with Pakistani corridor.

Today, the goal of any development planning is to achieve environmental equilibrium and consequently maintaining political unity and security. So the geographical inequality and uneven development leads to lack of security and makes national unity difficult. Development and security are systemic and are interdependent so there should be a systematic consideration toward them in khorasane-Razavi province. Khorasane-Razavi province which is known as a thoroughfare of drugs to European countries as well as to the vicinity to the Golden Triangle, has some problems in the domain of security and consequently development. So, in such a situation the security and defense of province have been multidimensional and complex. In this study, the relationship between development and security of khorasane-Razavi has been surveyed to help security and sustainable development of the province.
The research try to analyze the development and security in khorasane-Razavi province. After gathering the required indicators of research, expert analysis is used and also the required resources are used which categorize cities of khorasane-Razavi province in terms of infrastructural, cultural, economic, transportation and population indicators by using VIKOR technique. Then the cities of khorasane-Razavi province are ranked based on security and the relationship between development and security is assessed by using statistical methods and software.
Result and In this study, the cities of khorasane-Razavi province are evaluated in terms of various indicators and then all of the indicators were synthesized and the development of the cities were measured. In general, it can be said that the city of Mashhad is ranked first in terms of development and the city of Kalat is last. Overall, the results indicate that the border cities of Khorasan khorasane-Razavi are not desirable in terms of development.
The analysis of relationship between development and security that is resulted from statistical software indicates that the correlation coefficient is higher than 0.5 and the obtained amount of the error is less than 0.05. The answer of the study question is positive. So, there is a significant relationship between development and security in khorasane-Razavi province. Therefore in order to achieve security and sustainable development mutually, several strategies have been proposed such as creation of the required infrastructure, improvement of literacy, investment in the private sector, activation of border markets, and development of infrastructures to strengthen national integration.

Today, the Middle East is the main part of all global geopolitical crises. This paper analyses this crisis as the product of a complex interaction among three groups of actors, namely, emerging identity-based sub-national and transnational forces, fragile national states with lower structural ability, and powerful regional and trans-regional actors seeking regional hegemony.
The research is basic in terms of its goal, and casual and descriptive- analytic in terms of method and nature. Data gathering procedure is based on library findings.
The results of the paper are provided as follows:1. The rise of national and transnational identities in the context of social and cultural cleavages in the Middle East
The full-cleavage structure of Middle Eastern societies has always been a key factor in political conflicts and instability in regional environment. In recent years, factors such as imperfect integration in international processes, inefficiency of nationalist and secular authoritarian regimes, and finally the attack of the United States on the Middle East have made two main cleavages of Middle Eastern societies active, tribal-ethnic (sub-national) and religious and fundamentalist (transnational) cleavages. Thus, a set of identity-based forces has been formed as a kind of "resistance identity" which do not accept the established order based on the nation-state structure.
2. Identity uprisings and turning fragile states to failed states
The nation-state is considered as a colonial product in the Middle East that has not had the sufficient ability to overcome the challenges arising from dispersed structure and has also not been able to play expected functions of a modern state. These occur mainly as the region faces a complex and "strong" social structure based on tribal, ethnic, and religious belonging. Fragile states in the Middle East, in the face of identity-based uprisings, have practically turned to failed states.
3. Regional and international actors, and tendency to utilize identity-based forces
While fragile states in the Middle East have encountered intensified crisis and collapse, regionally strong states (especially Saudi Arabia) as well as international powers tend to use identity uprisings as a tool to put pressure on their competitors. They also try to mobilize their available resources and increase their manoeuvre power.
Discussion and Using the discussions of Manuel Castells, this paper considers sub-national (ethnic), identity-based, and trans-national (religious) forces in the Middle East as a "resistance identity". Although the identity-based forces are considered as a product of the nation-state crisis, their actions virtually intensify the already prevalent crisis of fragile state in the Middle East and turn them into failed states. In this situation, more powerful regional and trans-regional states mobilize their resources to align the developments with their own interests. They also tend to use identity-based forces to put pressure on their competitors and increase their control in the regional environment. This paper considered the Saudi foreign policy as an example that tends to use identity variables and identity-based forces as a tool to achieve their regional hegemony. This plays a key role in intensifying crises and forming a devastating balance in the Middle East crisis areas.

Afghanistan has always conceived significant political and geopolitical challenges throughout history. With the beginning of the Syrian crisis and the formation of ISIS, Mullah Abdul-Rauf Khadem was the first commander who declared allegiance to Baghdadi. After the 9th June, 2014 when Bagdadi called himself Muslims Caliphate and asked all them to oath allegiance to him, Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda leader, with the issuance of statement started to condemn the actions of ISIS in the Muslim world on the one hand, and made extensive efforts to strengthen the ideological and military grounds of his own in Afghanistan and other Islamic countries like al-Nusra on the other hand. In this research, we try to investigate similarities and differences the terrorist groups of Taliban and ISIS and also evaluate the future of ISIS presence in Afghanistan considering Taliban as well as regional powers such as Iran, Russia, and China.
The hypothesis of the study is tested in a descriptive- analytical way and data are collected with library and internet methods.
Findings : The most important reasons and goals for the presence of Islamic State in Afghanistan can be seen in the following cases:1. Creating diversity on battlefields, reducing pressures on the Takfirist group in Syria and Iraq, power recruitment, communicating and if possible cooperating with other Terrorist groups, extending the borders of Islamic caliphate claimed by ISIS in central Asia, being a suitable infrastructure to cultivate narcotics and earn huge revenue.
2. The reasons of the allegiance of some Taliban commanders with ISIS
3. The growing tensions between Taliban leaders and ideas scattering after the death of Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, ISIS more powerful economy than Taliban, swearing allegiance of other extremists from Africa such as Boko Haram with ISIS and the dream of Khorasan province to come to realize.
4. Explaining the similarities between ISIS and Taliban.
5. Both groups have emerged when the national-regional crises were exacerbated, both of them attempt to define and identify their geographical boundaries, another important similarity between ISIS and Taliban is fighting to central government and Shiite in the area, instrumental use of Islam is the interface of two groups, use of force and violence, terror and also having a tacit support from a number of regional and trans-regional powers.
6. Differences between ISIS and Taliban
7. Difference in nation- State, in universality, in forces constituted, in economy and financing, and difference in religion.
8. Factors leading to ISIS presence in Afghanistan (facilitating factors)
9. Diversity in the Taliban's internal structure, lacking attractive of Taliban ideology, the field conditions in Iraq and Syria, the confused situation of internal politics in Afghanistan, the geopolitics of Afghanistan and its importance for ISIS.
Analysis
Feedback of ISIS presence in Afghanistan on regional politics of China, Russia and Iran:- China and the crisis of the Islamic State in Afghanistan
- The fear of Chinese from ISIS has caused increasing security and defense cooperation, strong diplomatic relations and economic collaboration between China and Afghanistan, further support of Chinese government to Afghan security forces and increasing China's military helps to this country.
- Russia approach toward the Islamic State in Afghanistan
- Islamic State will be regarded as a threatening factor against Russia and its interests in Central Asia by two ways.
- First, through the establishment of military units specific for citizens of Central Asia and Caucasus and making them to come to civil war in Iraq and Syria and getting military experiences.
- Second, through make contact with extremists operating in Fergana valley and the north of Afghanistan.
- Security implications arising from the presence of ISIS in Afghanistan in terms of national security and Iran’s interests:1. The risk of anti-Shiite sectarianism;
2. Security threat to Iran’s borders in the east;
3. Security conflicts between countries in the region.
The Islamic State try to increase its influence in countries of Central Asia and Iran through Afghanistan. Also, ISIS try to dominate Afghanistan and some experts have warned that if the Afghan government does not seriously attempt to destroy ISIS completely, the terrorist actions maybe more dangerous and bloodier in Afghanistan than Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, a number of Taliban commanders have joined to ISIS and now operate under the black flags. Therefore, the necessary approaches must be applied to prevent the influence of Islamic State in Afghanistan by the regional powers such as Iran, Russia, China as well as Taliban in Afghanistan. The first approach will be security and military supports to central government in Afghanistan against ISIS.