پژوهشنامه مذاهب اسلامی
پیاپی 10 (پاییز و زمستان 1397)

9 Abstract: Since the very emergence of Shiism, the knowledge referability of Imam, was more emphasized rather than the other characteristics of Imam by the Shi,a Scholars, based on the statements of the Prophet Mohammad (P.B.U.H). Turning it to an essential issue in the field of Imamate, several theories have been made over the problem throughout the history, one of which is that of Abd-ul-Karim Soroush who expresses being in sympathy on it with Ghazali. 10 In this article we pursue three purposes, first: to demonstrate discrepancies of Ghazali, s and Soroush, s positions, second: to clarify the fundamental compatibility between Ghazali, s theories with the Shi,a doctrine, and third: to shed a light on Soroush, s sympathy with the opponents of Shiism, on the problem of the knowledge referability of Imam.

Revelation and quality of its decline from the time prophet mohammad was chosen as prophet , has been the center of thinkers' consideration . Revelation as a super_human inition and its recever as a human has made the revelation's understanding , quality of its decline ,its reading and explanation, etc......more difficult .Differences in interpretation and explanation of this Phenomenon for researchers of revelation such as philosophers and new thinkers is witness of this claim. This research has made the researchers of revelation to explain this phenomenon as a way to find out the differences in formation and consider in comparing revelation in religious modernzers opinion such as Nasr Hamed Abozaid ,who considered the revelation as unique,but the outside realities believe that it is obtained by present cult ure ,history anb experience of human,and molasadra as a representative fo traditional religious considers the beginning of revelation as divine and sacred. key words: Revelation ,Abozaid,molasadra,literary school,prophetic experiences

Ibn Taymīyyah can be characterized as the intellectual father of Salafis. Thus, his views, particularly those about the nature of the human and the problem of the human divine succession (khilāfa) is of great importance. He appeals to the Quran and hadiths to show that the human consists of a spirit and a body, the main part being the spirit as a self-standing, incipient (ḥādith), and created entity. Ibn Tamīyyah, as an exteriorist in epistemology and sensationalist in ontology, attacks philosophers, logicians and mystics, as well as their principles. He has a fully materialist and earthly view of the human. In his work, the human is considered as a full-blown earthly entity who has no power to affect or manipulate this world. Moreover, since he rejects any similarity between divine and human attributes in order to protect Lordship monotheism (al-tawḥīd al-rubūbī), he cannot accept the human succession of God. His view of the human gives rise to other views and fatwas of his. In his view, it is not only impermissible, but polytheistic and at odds with worship monotheism (al-tawḥīd al-‘ibādī), to visit mausoleums and make recourse to righteous people. Deploying the library method with an analytic-descriptive approach, we have in this research drawn upon Ibn Taymīyyah’s writings to answer two questions: what is the human nature and reality in Ibn Taymīyyah’s view? And given his view of the human nature, how does he account for the human succession of God?

Self-determination is a civil right held by some people to have been brought for people by human right conventions. Since rights based on Islamic doctrines cannot be understood and analyzed without an account of the human nature implied by these doctrines, it can be claimed that the Imāmī school of thought recognizes the right for self-determination as an undeniable right of people given its characterizations of the human. In this paper, we consider and analyze Quranic verses and Imāmī hadiths concerning the human nature, and then conclude that Imāmī humanological principles, including axiological and theoretical principles, demonstrate the self-determination right for all humans. As suggested by the Imāmīyya, the human choice is a theoretical humanological ground for the right for self-determination. Humans choose their fate, and are responsible for their choice. The human intrinsic dignity, as an axiological humanological principle, establishes the self-determination right for individual citizens in virtue of their humanness and regardless of their interior and exterior properties. Another axiological principle establishing the right for self-determination is the human place as God’s successor.

Shiite and Sunni exegetes of the Quran have offered different views of what is meant by the verse, “Allah will bring forth a people He will love and who will love Him…,” (verse 54 of Sūra al-Mā’ida). The majority of Shiite and a number of Sunni exegetes believe that a prominent instance of the verse is Imam ‘Alī. Some people have, nevertheless, offered other interpretations of the instance to which the verse refers, including Imam al-Mahdī and his helpers, Abū Bakr, Salmān al-Fārsī and his people, and Abū Mūsā al-Ash’arī’s tribe. Some others believe that the verse is general—it is not specific to any particular person or people. However, since the verse involves an attribute that cannot be true of anyone other than Imam ‘Alī, in this paper, written with an analytic descriptive method, we survey and analyze theological views of Shiite and Sunni exegetes, and then consider and criticize the application of the verse to people other than the imam given its context as well as relevant hadiths.

Books of futuwwa are mystical essays in which conditions of membership in the circle of people of futuwwa (generous people) are mentioned. These texts offer particular laws and manners of every occupation (art or profession) and crafts for teaching the laws to learners based on teacher-learner hierarchies. In this problem-centered paper, by deploying library research method and referencing reliable and relevant sources, we analyze the notion of futuwwa, as well as its stages and laws in mystical texts, and then consider the bearing of books of futuwwa on professions, arts, and crafts. The most important findings of this research are concerned with solutions to teaching the Islamic art and professional training of art learners as appearing in books of futuwwa. They include: disciplined and strict training imposed by the teacher, emphasis on the exterior and the interior in educational methods, merging Iranian manners and traditions with Islamic values, and the realization of the teacher-learner system.

The Verse of Mubāhala (prayer curse) is one of the most important Quranic verses, concerning a Mubāhala meeting between Muslims and Najran Christians, which demonstrates Prophet Muhammad’s truthfulness and the sublimed place of his household (Ahl al-Bayt). Thus, many scholars and exegetes from different Islamic denominations have discussed the verse. Given the importance of the issue, in this paper we consider the views of Imāmīyya and Ash’aris with a descriptive-analytic approach. One of the most important findings of the research is that both Ash’aris and Imāmīs acknowledge the presence of al-Ḥasan, al-Ḥusayn, Fāṭima, and 'Alī in the event of Mubāhal, suggesting that “our sons” in the verse refers to al-Ḥasan and al-Ḥusayn, and “our women” refers to Fāṭima al-Zahrā. Moreover, Imāmīs and the majority of Ash’aris believe that “our souls” in the verse refers to ‘Alī, although some Ash’aris deny that this would assign any superiority to ‘Alī. Ash’aris are divided as regarding Imam 'Ali’s superiority: (1) priority for caliphate amounts to superiority in virtues, because it is impossible to make a less virtuous person prior to a more virtuous person, and (2) priority for caliphate is not evidence for superiority in virtues. The latter group acquiesced to the view that it is permissible to make a less virtuous person to a more virtuous person. They tried to support their view with objectionable arguments.

The problem of figurative language has been a challenging issue in the history of theological and exegetical problems. Each sect tries to establish or reject it based on their own argumentations, and those who deny figurative language have in some cases ended up with tashbīh (assimilation of God to creatures) and tajassum (attributing physical features to God). However, theoretical Salafis have opted to deny figurative language in their consideration of divine attributes, because they deem invalid the rational justifications for figurative language. This has led us to deploy a library research method, draw on remarks by Sunni scholars, and appeal to the component of figurative language and its role in making sense of divine attributes, in order to consider and criticize Salafi principles about those attributes, glean implicit arguments by Salafis for the denial of figurative language, and analyze the most fundamental problem with Salafis in their misunderstandings of Quranic verses and hadiths. After these considerations, it turns out that semantic manifestations of figurative language are so powerful that they should be treated as a semantic process in our languages that remarkably contribute to the constant creation of novel concepts and meaning-making changes, rather than a literary technique. Moreover, it turns out that the conceptual error by Salafis and Zahiris in their improper understanding of figurative language arises from their failure to understand the power inherent in implicit meanings of words, which cannot be captured by the primary literal convention of words. A new convention as figurative usage can make the word more suggestive and dynamize the intended meaning.

Tolerant dissimulation (taqīyya) is a Shiite theological-jurisprudential belief, which is of utmost importance today. The existence of denominational disputes in the Islamic world and an unprecedented attack on Shi’as in the present age has made it an undeniable requirement to account for tolerant dissimulation as a sign for Shiism’s will to peaceful coexistence and Islamic unity. Such dissimulation, which is grounded in religious doctrines, has been acknowledged by the majority of Imāmī jurists (fuqahā), and Imam Khomeini considers it as a way of attracting the affection of opponents without a fear of any harms and with the aim of Islamic unity. In the present research, we consider tolerant dissimulation and its rulings according to Imam Khomeini. He derives the legitimacy of tolerant dissimulation from hadiths and inferred jurisprudential rules, maintaining that dissimulation with respect to Sunni Muslims counts as one of the best worships. In the jurisprudential view of Imam Khomeini, if one acts in accordance to dissimulation, then his act will be sufficient (mujzī); that is, it does not need to be performed again as i’āda (repetition in due time) or qaḍā’ (doing or repeating an obligation after its due time). Moreover, all effects of correctness will be consequent upon an act done from dissimulation.

Today, the rule or principle of “the more important and the less important” (al-ahamm wa-l-muhimm) has shown its dominance in all fields. It has been differently appealed to by the five jurisprudential schools due to the principles and evidence they cite for its validity. All the five schools agree on the core idea of the rule and the necessity of choosing what is more important when there is a conflict in acting upon different rulings. However, they have different evidence and sharia principles to support the rule. That is to say, they share some of their evidence, such as the Quran and the Tradition, and differ over other types of evidence such as consensus (ijmā’), reason, analogy (qīyās), personal discretion (istihān), public interests (al-maṣāliḥ al-mursala), and blocking the means (sadd al-dharā’i’). Given the terminological meaning of “the more important and the less important” as it appears in the above evidence and principles, we conclude that the rule should be considered as concerning conflicts among rulings. And as to such conflicts, what establishes the “importance” is consideration of interests and harms, priorities of the rulings, time, and place.

Inductive research logic is the foundation of many methods of content analysis and a common method in scientific research. In this method, the researcher purposefully selects certain concepts and then organizes them in specific terms. Then, he comes to a conclusion with reference to data and findings, and provides a sort of description. In the present paper, I draw on the logic of induction to analyze the book, al-khilāf,in statistical terms and in terms of its documentations, as well as al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s ijtihad literature or discourse via finding the frequency of words such as consensus, hadiths, the Quran, jargons of jurisprudence (fiqh) and principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl al-fiqh), as well as his methods of argumentation with opposing views, his drawing on the views of Sunni jurists and inferential sources of Shiite jurisprudence by way of comparative jurisprudence. One research priority resulting from an induction of al-Shaykh al-Ṭūsī’s principles of ijtihad is that, because of political and religious circumstances of his time and the necessity of unity among Shiite jurists, he invented a new definition of consensus (ijmā’) as discovering the view of the Infallible (Ma’ṣūmīn) leaders of Islam, and cited it more than any other principle. Although he rejects analogy (qīyās) as a source of inferring jurisprudential rulings for Shiism, he made appeals to it in order to account for certain Shiite jurisprudential rulings and make them acceptable to Sunni jurists. Moreover, he relied on rationalism to try to develop comparative jurisprudence given his assessment of the conditions of his time and his mastery of Shāfi’ī jurisprudential sources as well as to other Islamic denominations to some extent.

Sulaymān b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī holds that Shi’as believed in the two doctrines of badā’ (alteration of the divine will) and taqīyya (dissimulation), writing that the Shi’a kept itself constantly victorious by propagating these two doctrines. The meaning of badā’ he attributes to the Shi’a implies the attribution of ignorance and the like to God. In response to this problem, Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (597 AH/1201- 672 AH/1274) denies badā’ altogether. He believes that the hadith cited by ibn Jarīr is khabar al-wāḥid (hadith transmitted only by one person) which yields no knowledge (in beliefs) and no action (in jurisprudence). The hadith, he says, concerns the succession of Ismā’īl as an Imam after Imam al-Ṣādiq. According to this hadith, when the Imam saw an unpleasant action done by Ismā’īl, he left his succession in Imamate to Imam Mūsā al-Kāẓim. Khwāja’s reply has serious opponents and proponents among the Imāmīyya. In this paper, I adopt a descriptive-critical approach. Having surveyed the views of both proponents and opponents to Khwāja’s replies, I try to adjudicate and reconcile them. I finally show that Khwāja al-Ṭūsī has denied a notion of badā’ that was not maintained by any Imāmī.