فصلنامه پژوهش های حسابداری مالی
سال سوم شماره 4 (پیاپی 10، زمستان 1390)

With regard to limitation of, resources thus, increased importance of investment efficiency, the relation between audit quality and investment efficiency in firms with high investment opportunities, has been investigated in this paper. Generally, investment efficiency (inefficiency) means accepting projects with positive net present values and rejecting projects with negative net present values. Investment efficiency is measured by changes in non-current assets, and changes in long-term investments. Firms with high investment opportunities, is determined by factor analysis on three measures, market-to-book asset, market-to-book equity and gross property, plant and equipment ratio. Results from studying 119 listed firms in Tehran Stock Exchange during a period of 2003 to 2009, indicate that firms with high investment opportunities, use high quality auditors, have experienced high level of investment efficiency. While, on the contrary to our expectation, high audit quality, has no effect on decreased manipulation of discretionary accruals.

Financial information transparency always has been one of the most influencing factors in determining investment strategy in financial markets. Despite this fact, managers as those who are responsible for preparing the financial statements, often have incentives to falsify financial information to pay for their own interests. One of manager’s actions that results in opaque financial reporting, is earning management. In process of earning management, managers try to accumulate bad news within the firm and do not disclose them. When the accumulation of bad news reaches a tipping point, it will all be released to market at once, leading to stock price crash. So, one could expect that, opacity in financial reporting increases future stock price crash risk. The main purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between opacity in financial reporting and the future stock price crash risk. Results showed that, there is a positive relationship between opacity in financial reporting and future stock price crash risk. So, it could be concluded that increase of opaque financial reporting, result in increasing future stock price crash risk. The results also showed that when there information asymmetry among managers and outside investors, the impact of opaque financial reporting on increasing future stock price crash risk is increased.

Agency problems along with management accountability and shareholders rights are related issues which need to be addressed. Management compensation is theoretically wise solution to this issues. In this paper we investigate the effect of management compensation and their percentage of ownership share of stocks on firm’s performance. The sample used for this study consists of 83 actively traded companies listedin Tehran stock exchange from 2005 to 2010. Panel data regression result indicates significant relation between management compensation and economic measures of performance (EVA, MVA and modified EVA). Findings are also indicate a significant relation betweenpercentage of manager’sownership shares of stock and market value added but no relation with other economic measures of performance.

One of the main objectives of financial statements is to provide relevant information for investors, so relation between stock prices and accounting variables has been a focusof many researchers. In this study for investigatingthe value relevance of accounting information, stock return and stock price models is used. The sample contains 48 companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange from 1379 to 1387. In this study, balanced panel data model is used that variables integrated from time series and cross-sectional data. Price model estimation results shows that earnings per share have more value relevance than book value. Return model estimation results show that changes in earnings per share to price per share ratio compared to earnings per share to price per share ratio has less value relevance. In other words, the role of accounting informationis important in determining rate of return and stock prices and improvesinvestors’ and other accounting information usersdecision making.

According to agency theory, conflict of interest between owners and managers causes agency costs. Corporate governance act seek to reduce these expenses. One of the important tools in this regard is ownership concentration and possibility of controlling manager's performance. This study seeks to identify the relationship among ownership concentration, company performance, and dividend policy in listed companies in Tehran stock exchange, Sixty four companies were selected as sample companies during a period from 2001 to 2010. We used a combination of cross-sectional and temporal data for testing the hypotheses. In this research, we have used integrated method of least squares Regression (data panel). Ownership concentration was measured as percent of main shareholder's ownership above 5 percent; performance was measured by using 3 criteria of ROA, ROE, and Tobin-Q; and dividend policy was measured by dividend ratio (DPS/EPS). Findings of this study indicate that at 95% confidence level, there is a significant relationship between ownership concentration and two criteria of performance, naming ROE and QTobin. That is, the more ownership concentration, the more control on managers and the improved performance of company. Also, there is a significant relationship between performance criteria of ROA and Tobin Q and dividend ratio. This implies that, improved performance can result in increase in dividend pay out. Yet in terms of statistics, there is no significant relationship between ownership concentration and dividend ratio.

The main purpose of this paper is investigating the effect of growth opportunities on relationship between capital structure, dividend and ownership structure with firm value, in firms companies listed in Tehran stock exchange within 1383-1387 period. Before analyzing the data, reliability of variables test was conducted. Also, Chaw and Hausman test were used to determine the appropriate model for estimating parameters and effect of independent variables on the dependent variable. Then, through the fixed effects model, research hypotheses were tested. The results show that there is significant relation between capital structure, divided and firm value, with growth opportunity the relations are negative but without growth opportunity are positive. Also, there is significant and nonlinear relation between ownership structure and firm value.

The present research examines the relationship between conservatism in financial reporting and information content of accounting earnings. Conservatism is defined as applying the high degree of reliability in recognizing and recording good news and in contrast applying the low degree of reliability in recognizing and recording bad news. Information content of accounting earnings is its ability in determining market returns. In this study conservatism was measured by Basu (1997) model and information content was measured by Easton and Harris (1991) model. This study is applied and its method is ex post facto (casual-comparative). Statistic population is firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange. By using the firm-year method during the years 1380 to 1387, 764 observations from 145 firms listed in Tehran Stock Exchange has been selected. The multiple regression test has been used to test research hypotheses. The results show a non-linear relationship between information content of accounting earnings and conservatism. In addition, the results suggest a non-linear relationship between conservatism and cost of capital.