نشریه جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام
سال چهل و یکم شماره 2 (پیاپی 83، پاییز و زمستان 1388)

In theoretical mysticism, many of the mystical issues are attributed to the Qur'ānīc verses, among which is the noble verse "He is the First, He is the Last, He is the Manifest, He is the Unmanifest." The mystics have mostly regarded the names mentioned in this verse as the description of the station of essence and the absolute unknown identity, and some view the understanding and intuition of these names as a basis for understanding the unity of being and see no plurality in the world of being. In this article, the above theory is critically reviewed and with provision of various reasons it is state that the four names mentioned in this verse do not describe the station of essence, hence there is no reason for the unity of being; rather, this verse is somehow a description of "perfect human being" or "Muḥammadan reality."

This writing makes a comparison between the viewpoints of two Western and Islamic philosophers, Ustād Muṭahharī and Spinoza, concerning human will. Each one of these philosophers has presented views about human free will; the comparative study of these views can be influential in a deeper understanding of the viewpoints of each one of these two. This research aims at clarifying the similarities and differences existing in their viewpoints concerning such question as: Is man really free? Does his will and freedom simply mean his power of choice? Is a sense of choice evident in him or is it a result of his ignorance and negligence of the reasons and factors affecting his actions? To what extent and limitation is man free?These two philosophers have deep viewpoints in such important issues as intellect, freedom of man, human being, will, the relation of intellect and will, definition of determination and free choice, and the criterion for free choice, which are comparatively examined in the present article.

Employment of the famous story of "the Blind Men and the Elephant" by some philosophers of religion in religious pluralism discourses, which is originally brought up first in the texts of Jainism and then Buddhism, can lead to the misunderstanding that it is possible to infer religious pluralism in the teachings of Jainism and Buddhism, or at least some backgrounds for referring to pluralism are recognizable in these religions. In this article, pluralism is intended to mean that religious variety and plurality existing in the world is not the consequence of various errors by the founders and authorities of different religions, and that the followers of any religion, according to their own procedure of discovering truth, can really attain the truth and thus, the authority of no religion can believe that only he has attained the ultimate truth and others, if not follow his suggested religious procedure, have gone wrong. While examining the epistemological foundations of Jainism and Buddhism, it will be clarified in this article that in both of these religions incomplete cognitions (ma‘ārif) are placed before an absolute and perfect cognition and that the knowledge of the one who achieves the final stage of cognition is above all incomplete cognitions. Furthermore, it is stated that there can be an end to the relativity of cognition and the one who rightfully fares the "way" can get rid of the incomplete and relative cognitions. On the other hand, it is shown in this article that no clear concept of religious pluralism can be recognized in the main teachings of each of these religions and in the sayings of their founders and teachers of the path.

Philosophy has always been attacked by the opponents, and the proponents have defended it against the attacks. Among the opponents of philosophy, the names of Ghazālī and Fakhr Rāzī are outstanding; whereas, Ibn Rushd and Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī by writing Tahāfat al-Tahāfut and Sharḥ-i Mushkilāt al-Ishārāt have undertaken to counter the incessant attacks of these two and respond to their objections. In this article, the defense by Khwāja Naṣīr and Ibn Rushd concerning the issue of the indivisibility of Wājib (the Necessary) are compared only by using the two books of Tahāfat al-Tahāfut and Sharḥ-i Mushkilāt al-ishārāt. However, in order to better clarify these defenses, the objections of Fakhr Rāzī and Ghazālī have also been pointed out. It will be cleared in this article that contrary to Khwāja, Ibn Rushd regards Wājib as having a quiddity but views its quiddity as the very essence of its existence, believing that Wājib is equivocal genus, consequently having a limit proportionate to itself. Meanwhile, the widespread propounding of the Khwāja's defenses among the philosophers after him is considered to be the outcome of the status of his two books, Ishārāt and Tajrīd.

The study of the concept of existence is a fundamental ontological issue. Since the existence (existent) is the most universal and the most general concept, which, because of its extensiveness, has various and numerous applications and generalities and not all of which would be subject to philosophical discussion, the accurate and scholarly determination of the existing meaning or meanings which are used in theoretical sciences and entitled to philosophical discussion is necessary, considerable, and of special importance for retaining the unity and integrity of the philosophical order, determining the relation between the issues and sources of this discipline with its subjects, and removing many of ambiguities and conflicts brought up in primary philosophy. That is because questioning the mode of existence, different forms of existence, and its types and ranks is dependent upon questioning the concept of the "existent."The pivot of Aristotle's ontology is "existent" and the Muslim Peripatetic philosophers (Farābī and Ibn Sīnā) also consider the subject of primary philosophy as "being qua being" and directly deal with the existent, rather than existence.Examining the subject and problems of the traditional ontology – and comparing the two Islamic and Greek Peripatetic philosophical systems –, the present research deals with the conceptual analysis existing in these two systems.

Neo-religious (Islamic) thinkers have frequently dealt with the issue of decline and revival of Islamic civilization and are thereby engaged in tradition and modernity. They have adopted two different approaches in confronting these two issues; one group support behavior therapy and the other are inclined toward cognitive therapy. The advocates of the second approach assert that in order to solve the problems of the Islamic society, our religious thoughts have to be refined and changed. Ustād Muṭahharī is among this group, albeit his model of neo-religious thinking and cognitive therapy has its own specifics. He tends toward a type of purging and purifying cognitive therapy based on constant religious principles and foundations and dependent upon ijtahādī (subject to individual reasoning) rationality. In this model, he tries to properly make a balance between the variable and the constant as well as between tradition and modernity.

Having provided instructions about three basic issues of God, universe, and man with prescriptions and instructions on certain moral values, religions constantly aim at a desirable moral development. In Islamic texts, and on top of them, in the Quran, the duty and mission assigned to the Prophets have been dyadic, which regard the two categories of teaching and morality (purification) to be the Prophet's mission. Purification and morality means inviting human beings to desirable developments and the indubitable and axiomatic mission of religion (Prophets). The question that the present research is intended to raise concerns the efficiency of the purpose of the above mission in the world. With regard to its power of communication technology, the contemporary world has been transformed into a village, or as some say, a glass tower. The major characteristic of the glass world is the lack of borders and natural and political barriers between human beings and different cultures. Given such a characteristic, is it still possible to talk about the likelihood of the actualization of a moral development in the world today? The present article defends the efficiency of moral values in creating moral development with an emphasis on religious humanism (Islam).