نشریه جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام
سال چهل و دوم شماره 2 (پیاپی 85، پاییز و زمستان 1389)

Kant’s ethical theory is one the most important theories in philosophy of ethics, which has always attracted the attention of the commentators and critics. Although it has many positive points, there are some objections to this theory just as to any other human theory. In this article, it is attempted to point out the critiques that seem to have been leveled against Kant’s ethics. Some of these objections are: generalizability is a feature of the law rather than a criterion for the morality of action; prescription of improper actions and prohibition of proper actions by the criterion of generalizability; possibility of disagreement among people over regarding a rule as generalizable; non-efficiency of the principle of ends; objection to the innate value of intellect; objection to [regarding] the good intention as being only intrinsically good; objection to the absoluteness of ethical commands; the problem of the conflicting of duties; inattention to the personality, motives, and inner emotions of the doer and non-coverage of the entire moral life by the concept of duty.

The theory of speech function is one of the most significant theories affecting on the two fields of the philosophy of language and the language of religion. Austin, the developer of this theory, named the application of language for such acts as announcing, promising, expressing [an opinion], threatening, etc. as speech function. He proclaimed lingual communication unit as speech functions; i.e., lingual communication takes place when the speaker makes speech function. Based on this theory, John Searle has divided speech function into five categories: expressive, declarative, dedicational, persuasive, and emotional functions. A study of the textology of Imam al-Riḍā (A.S.)’s ziyārat nāma (prayer book for pilgrimage) based on the above categorization showed that out of 107 speech functions used in this text, emotional functions with 38 instances are rated as the highest and declarative functions with 22 instances as the lowest in number; while no dedicational speech function has been used in this text. The above results indicate the formation of a deep emotional relation in the speaker to the addressee or the addressees of ziyārat nāma. In a word, the speaker of the text tries to share his emotions such as devotion, appreciation, and friendship with his addressee by means of this text. The very small difference between the numbers of the other functions used in the text does not seem meaningful comparing to the sum total of the existing functions.

Cosmo-theological argument is one of the theological arguments for [proving] the existence of God, which has been mooted since long ago and has recently been recognized in the Theo-philosophical tradition of the West and become famous as theological argument. While examining the viewpoints related to the appearance of the world, particularly the Big Bang theory, this article undertakes to analyze the theological proof of the existence of God in respect to the views of the physicists, the current critiques in the West, the principle of causality which is one of the premises of this argument and its relation to quantum physics, impossibility of actual infinity and its relation to the finite world, and the cosmological resultant of the Big Bang as the most significant issues to be studied in detail.

Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī is one of the greatest thinkers of the middle centuries (AH), who enjoys a high status in science and literature and has a worldwide reputation. Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī did not suffice himself merely with science (‘ilm) and thought and was involved in practical politics, too. The last two decades of Khwāja Naṣīr’s life in Ilkhanids courts was his period of scientific and practical activities and played an influential role in controlling the Mongols’ conducts and the revival of the Iranian culture. His tolerant and ideologically lenient personality, which paved the way for interaction with the scientists of other countries and nations greatly contributed to his success and the promotion of his position. Khwāja Naṣīr was a comprehensive scientist and fully erudite in different sciences, including theoretical and practical philosophy. In practical philosophy, Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī has examined various aspects of social life structure and in politics he has dealt with the social classes and their status in society. Among the Muslim philosophers and thinkers of the middle period (AH), Khwāja Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī has had the most perfect viewpoint towards justice and has dealt with social classes and their status in the middle period by taking into consideration the practical and theoretical aspects of the concept of justice. To my opinion, the status of justice in Iranian thoughts and the more important emphasis of Islamic foundations, and especially the Shī‘ism, on this category has prompted a more specific attitude in Khwāja Naṣīr towards social classes and their status in society (from the practical philosophy point of view). Having taken a brief look at the society and rule (ḥukūma) in Khwāja Naṣīr’s era, this article addresses his cultural position and performance and then reviews the class structure from his point of view.

In this research, the viewpoint of Mīzā Mahdī Iṣfahānī, as the founder of Tafkīk School (Separatism), concerning the most important epistemological issues like the quiddity of cognition (or episteme), types of cognition, truth, and justification of knowledge (ma‘rifa) are studied. Given the fact that epistemology has not been regarded as an independent science in the Muslim world, but the Muslim thinkers have brought it up in their philosophical, theological, and logical discussions, this article undertakes somehow to reconstruct the (epistemological) viewpoint of Mīzā Mahdī from among his theological opinions. Among the characteristics of Mīzā Mahdī is his expression of specific opinions against the current opinions on cognition. Thus, his viewpoint in epistemological discourses deserves to be researched about, critically reviewed, and seriously examined. To this end, his words concerning the nature of science, types of science, the meaning of truth, and the criterion of conviction are compiled and analyzed and criticized on the basis of the discourses raised in epistemology.

The famous theory in the field of textual meaning and interpretation is called “intentionalism” and on that basis, “the intention of the author of a work is in relation to the meaning of the work or its interpretation”. In recent years, a theory has been widely developed in contrast to the (above) famous theory, titled the theory of “anti-intentionalism”, or in its extreme form, the theory of “author’s death”. In this article, a number of reasons from among the most important reasons of anti-intentionalists versus intentionalists under the heading “non-access to the author’s intentions” are examined and with various evidences indicated that these reasons have no firm basis and that intentions in real sense of the word (phenomenological intentions) are accessible affairs.

The late ‘Allāma viewed knowledge (‘ilm) as an existential entity and agreed with Ṣadr al-Muti’allihīn in this respect, saying that knowledge is the presence of an object for an object, i.e. achievement of knowledge for a knower is the achievement of a de facto entity which is pure actuality; since, intuitively, we find that the cognitive form does not have the power to transform into another form. The sensual, imaginative, and intellectual forms are abstract archetypal and intellectual substances which exist in the imaginal world and intellect, within which exists the soul in its archetypal and intellectual rank. The cognitive form is free from matter and faculty and is present with the percipient in its external existence. Acquired knowledge is in fact an intellectual validity obtained from the presential object of knowledge.Also, the union of intelligent, intellect, and intelligible in ‘Allāma’s view means that the soul existentially expands and turns into intellectual reality, and perceives the intellectual truths rather than uniting with them. This is different from Mullā Ṣadrā’s view. Ṣadrā says: first the intelligible form appears, and this intelligible form is actual intellect, actual intelligible, and actual intelligent. ‘Allāma, however, says: first the illuminationist knowledge of intellectual truth appears, and then intelligible form; that is to say, the acquired knowledge is derived from presential knowledge.