نشریه جستارهایی در فلسفه و کلام
سال چهل و سوم شماره 2 (پیاپی 87، پاییز و زمستان 1390)

Theory of ideas (muthul) in fact delineates the infrastructure of Plato’s philosophy and metaphysics. It can be stated with certainty that by presenting this theory, Plato intended to justify the generation of the mundus sensibili in view of its transitoriness and not being assuredly recognizable. Encountering this theory, Aristotle believes that professing to it would yield illogical results. Similarly, while giving a negative assessment of it, Avicenna regards it as lacking evidentiary support. Delineating the general structure of this theory in Plato’s idea and explaining the approach of Aristotle and Avicenna to this theory, the author seeks to show why this theory is not able to explain the system of the generation of the world – along with the world of ideas.

The relation between ethics and human good and evil attributes and his nature is among the age-old discourses in the field of practical philosophy (wisdom). Since long ago, it has been of concern to the learned and the philosophers as to whether all ethics or a part of it in all human beings or in some of them is optional and acquired or non-optional, unacquirable, and unchangeable. This writing aims at bringing up and defending the theory that excellences and virtues are existential affairs and objective and acquired facts; however, moral vices are non-existential affairs, contradictions and lacking of virtuous faculties. Therefore, that the human nature is lacking in a virtue or excellence suffices to be regarded as the evidence of the opposite vice and since man in the very creation is void of excellences and is not born learned and equitable, the mere nature of man or the so-called human being in terms of its essence, is in this respect the evidence of vices and this means the “essentiality” of these features, in case the essential possibility is likely. That is to say, the vices, although being essential, like virtues are changeable and perishable and man’s free will and volition are effective on them. As a result of this, education would not lose its special standing.

The second law of thermodynamic (entropy principle) is of special theo-philosophical importance. It seems that this law, which is renowned as “the death of software design” and despite the order in the world, is like an incompatible universal. This article examines the concept of entropy in the three temperature, statistic, and information applications and addresses the contradiction of the second law with the minor premise of the argumentation of order and concludes that the order referred to in the argumentation of order is different from the application of this term in the second law and that the thermodynamic equilibrium of the natural processes can be a new explanation of order governing over the natural world.

It is well-known that “casual conditional” in Islamic logics has been used with two meanings: “specific conditional” and “general conditional”. However, viewing the works of the Muslim logicians, we find out that these two meanings of “casual conditional” have been interpreted in two various ways: each of the general and specific conditionals is sometimes interpreted as the condition of “non-necessity” and sometimes as without “condition of necessity”. We have named these two interpretations as “negatively conditioned casual” and “unconditioned casual”. On the other hand, we have indicated that there are examples in our great figures’ works of logics, which are not consistent with any of the above-mentioned meanings for “casual” and the only interpretation that can be presented of them is “material implication” and “truth-functional implication” referred to in modern logics. We have named this meaning as “most general casual”. In this article, we have found another meaning for casual conditional, which is used in natural language, but we do not find any reference to it in the earlier and contemporary works, and those are the casuals whose premise is false or impossible. Borrowing the idea of “verbal implication” from Khāwja Naṣīr, we have named them “verbal casual”.

Philosophers view the advantage of human soul over animal soul in theoretical and practical intellect. However, there is disagreement among them in stating the quiddity of these two intellects. With a deliberation on their words, at least four interpretations can be implied from these two intellects. After reporting the statements and expressing the functions of practical intellect, the article goes on to evaluate and explain the selected theory. The generally accepted view among the later scholars is that there is no more than one intellect in human soul, which understands all the general sciences and rulings. However, since some of these sciences are merely theoretical and dedicated to external and noumenal realities, they are called theoretical intellects. In this interpretation the distinction of the two intellects from one another is nominal and is in their objects of perceptions (mudrakāt). As maintained in the article, despite its popularity, this interpretation is not of interest to the distinguished philosophers and is facing various problems. But other statements, with slight tolerance, can be referred to a single comprehensive interpretation; i.e. The first and essential act of practical intellect is to infer partial practical rulings from general rulings of theoretical intellect, and since these rulings in the sovereignty of intellect over physical faculties cause the appearance of will in the soul for issuance of voluntary acts and human fabrications, the practical intellect is also called “practical faculty”.

Belief in the lofty positions and excellences of the Shi’īte Imams (A.S.) and having faith in their miraculous acts and dominion over the world affairs underlies the authentic doctrine of unconditional guardianship (wilāya al-takwīnī). When the Imams’ devotees try to maintain a demigod status for the Imams in line with this – possibly loving and devotional – belief beyond the conventional limits and proceed to excessively praise them, they have indeed passed beyond the rightful belief and engaged in zealous supposition about and untrue belief in delegation (tafwīḍ). This article tries to identify the borderline between these two beliefs – unconditional guardianship and delegation. Based on the rational and traditional criteria, this article appraises that the stations of the Imams and dominion over the world is by the permission of the Almighty God and in accordance to His will. Belief in unconditional guardianship of the Imams as an intermediate position lies between delegation and negligence and indeed the middle term between the two extremes. Thus, belief in the highest degrees in rank and functionality in the world affairs for the Imams in servitude scope does not contradict monotheism (tawḥīd), nor is regarded as delegation.