فصلنامه تاریخ فلسفه
سال هفتم شماره 2 (پیاپی 26، پاییز 1395)

The book al-Huruf has never been approached from a philosophical standpoint. Unlike the common belief, it is not a purely linguistic work and, rather, enjoys great significance regarding its philosophical aspect. Al-Huruf is considered to be one of the most important philosophical works of Farabi, and most of the studies conducted on this book emphasize that it is merely a commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. That is why Farabi’s innovations have been disregarded there. This book is of great importance not only because of its focus on linguistic principles but also because of its discussing the relationships between language and philosophy, religion and philosophy, and everyday language and philosophical language. Here, the writer also reveals the nature of the 200-year conflicts between kalam, philosophy, syntax, and logic in the world of Islam. The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze two fundamental principles and evaluate the related views.
Therefore, the writer initially attends to the general and philosophical status and writing style of al-Huruf and explains the related ideas. This book is, first and foremost, a reaction to the enemies of philosophy and rationalist trends in understanding religion. Farabi begins the book with linguistic discussions and, then, in the light of his introduction, spells out the intricacies of logical and epistemological theories, and finally clarifies the nature of ontological thoughts. In this book, he discusses how ignoring fundamental linguistic principles could harm ontological and epistemological discussions. He also illustrates how linguistic studies could demystify philosophical principles and grant them more depth and essence. Second, in addition to examining the structure of al-Huruf, the writer tries to explore Farabi’s fundamental doctrine of reconciliation. In doing so, he begins with an analysis of the two schools of Kufa and Basrah and then reviews the mentioned doctrine. In the second part of this book, Farabi demonstrates in two chapters on the unity of philosophy and religion (al-Silah bayn al-falsafah wal millah) that there is no choice but to defend the doctrine of reconciliation. He emphasizes that an irrational religion is nothing but fantasy and maintains that the fundamental principles of religion are based on the intellect and reasoning. In his view, neither Abu Bishr nor Abu Saeid had grasped the significance of this view. Matta Ibn Yunus was not merely a representative of logic and wisdom; rather, he and his companions and advocates relied only on autonomous reasoning, which Farabi found insufficient. In contrast, Abu Saeid was not merely a representative of syntax as advocated by the School of Baghdad, but, in company with several people who defended a purely religious approach, he opposed the role of reason in understanding and justifying religious beliefs. In this book Farabi tries to pose and develop a third theory based on analyzing these two approaches.

Based on various interpretations, the relationship between the good and beauty in Plato’s philosophy fluctuates between being identical and different, and these interpretations lead to different consequences in Platonic ethics and aesthetics and suggest different relationships between the good and beauty and his metaphysics. Many interpreters believe that the truth and the good are the same in Plato’s view, while the relationship between beauty and the good is not clearly known to them. Through a study of the features of each of these two entities in various dialogs and contexts and the arguments adduced to describe the relationship between them, one can not only learn about the quality of this relationship but also determine the borderlines of Platonic aesthetics and, as a result, discover the place of beauty as the truth of being in this philosopher’s ontology. In this study, based on Plato’s prescriptive method in his seventh letter regarding the knowledge of every subject, the writers deal with the relationship between beauty and its equivalent concepts, such as pleasure, harmony, proportion, order, and unity. Then, by responding to the questions related to the difference of the good from beauty, they demonstrate that the other definitions and meanings of beauty can be interpreted in the same way, and that the truth of beauty is the same as the good in the sense of unity. Finally, they conclude that beauty is the cause of existence and the end of everything. Therefore, ethics and aesthetics are considered to be two dimensions of Plato’s unitary ontology.

A gnostic’s method of unveiling entails the purification of the soul, self-refinement, and observation of divine traditions and duties. Islamic gnosis is divided into two theoretical and practical types. In Ibn Sina’s view, any opposition to gnosis and gnostics is due to being ignorant of the station of gnostics. Similarly, any agreement with gnostics and respecting and appreciating them result from being cognizant of their supreme status. Naturally, people usually stand against and oppose what is unknown to them. After demonstrating the necessity of piety and worship as the necessary conditions for happiness, Ibn Sina maintains that they are not enough for attaining this goal and considers gnosis to be superior to the above qualities. However, he emphasizes that a gnostic is an individual who is not content even with attaining the status of being a true gnostic and prefers truth to gnosis. The Shi‘ite gnosis relies on a treasure of traditions and prayers in addition to Qura’nic verses. In the history of gnosis, Ibn Arabi (died in 638 AH) and Seyyed Haydar Amuli (died in 787 or 794 AH) are called the fathers of Islamic and Shi‘ite gnosis. Ibn Sina (died in 428 AH) enjoys great fame in the eye of the public in the fields of Peripatetic philosophy and medicine and has been called the new Aristotle; however, he has not developed a great name in the field of gnosis. Nevertheless, a study of his life and works prove the opposite. There is no doubt about his being a Shi‘ite Muslim; hence, this paper aims to demonstrate that the fundamental principles of the kind of gnosis he discusses in his works were developed under the influence of Shi‘ite gnosis (although the related references have not been directly mentioned in Ibn Sina’s works).

Following Aristotle, Ibn Sina maintained that time is the number of motion which is attained by the continuous movement of a moving agent over a distance. He adduced two arguments in order to demonstrate his theory: one was based on the difference between the motions of moving things in terms of speed, and the other was based on the divisibility of the distance of movement. In contrast, through advancing various objections, Fakhr al-Din Razi challenged this theory not only with regard to its two underlying arguments but also with respect to the theory of time being the number of motion. The present paper aims to demonstrate that Fakhr al-Din Razi’s criticisms originate in his lack of enough scrutiny of Ibn Sina’s principles, particularly regarding the opposition of non-existence and habit between motion and rest, time as necessary by the other and not necessary by itself, the difference between universal and particular times of each motion, and the existence of logical fallacy in some arguments. However, the final response to some of his criticisms are given based on the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy regarding the analytic differences between motion, time, and time as the fourth dimension of being.

Neo-Platonic philosophers, in addition to advocating Plato’s philosophical and theological school and commenting on his works, also paid attention to Aristotle and explored his philosophy and theology alongside his logic and ethics. This gave rise to the development of a tradition among some of them to try to reconcile the ideas of these two philosophers with each other and demonstrate that there is no internal and external inconsistency between them. One of the prominent philosophers involved in this practice was Ammonius, the son of Hermiae, who, in spite of his anonymity during his own time, managed to exercise a great influence over the philosophical schools which emerged after him. This influence is quite noticeable initially on Islamic philosophers, particularly on Farabi, and then on Christian theologians. This paper aims to briefly introduce his character and some of his ideas.

Aristotle’s principle of middle term is commonly defined as avoiding excess and defect, which seems to be a quantitative concept at first sight. This interpretation has received some criticisms from the authorities in the field of ethics. Muslim thinkers have also taken some steps to criticize, examine, and possibly improve this principle. Their most important attempt in this regard has been the introduction of the concept of malignity to philosophical ethics in the world of Islam. This concept pays attention to both quality in addition to quantity and remedies some of the defects of Aristotle’s principle of middle term. It is noteworthy that an accurate review of Aristotle’s texts also indicates the presence of the element of malignity in his ethical system. This concept was firstly introduced by Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi in some parts of Akhlaq-i nasiri, and later Qadi Izzuddin Iji placed it in a more logical section among ethical discussions. Following them, many Muslim experts in the field of ethics accepted their idea of this concept and discussed it in their works. The present paper aims to explore the historical development of the concept of malignity and examine its significance in the related fields.

One of the issues which has united the ontological, epistemological, and anthropological dimensions of philosophical thought in the course of history and has continually affected and determined the related social and political directions and general trends is “order”. In other words, order enjoys three ontological, epistemological, and anthropological aspects with respect to political life in society and can function as the basis for the interpretation and formation of the history of philosophy. In Greek philosophy, order is one of the philosophical principles which, due to its influence over different schools of philosophy and philosophers during the whole history of philosophical thought, enjoys an important and unique role and status. The issue of order in Platonic philosophy proved to be a turning point in this regard. Accordingly, in this paper it has been tried to explore the philosophical concept of order from its epistemological, ontological, and anthropological aspects in the history of Greek philosophy ,in general, and in Platonic philosophy, in particular. The writers have also aimed to demonstrate its influence and directive role in Plato’s political philosophy. Therefore, following an analytic-descriptive method, they firstly cast a historical glance at the concept of order in the works of pre-Platonic thinkers. Then they investigate his general philosophy and, particularly, his political philosophy with respect to the above-mentioned dimensions while emphasizing his desirable political and educational systems based on his idea of order. Their findings indicate that a philosophical thought based on order might begin with a mythological and naturalist view; nevertheless, with the later development of human thought, it shifts its attention to a kind of order with mathematical, cosmological, and metaphysical tendencies. Following this process, the Platonic natural and mathematical view of order unites with a divine and virtuous view of order. Consequently, as both the context and basis of other virtues and also as the ultimate goal of philosophy, it develops a political-social form in connection with law.

This study examines the truth of attributing the Salaman wa absal treatise to Ibn Sina and explores its content based on historical proofs. Several versions of the story of Salaman wa absal have been composed in the course of history; however, Ibn Sina’s version is questionable in terms of both its existence and its content. Unlike his other works, the original text of this treatise is not available, and it has not been studied or investigated in its own right. Neither has it received much attention on the part of philosophers. Here, the writer initially examines the documents on the existence or non-existence of this treatise and, then, refers to certain reports which provide some information regarding its potential content. Accordingly, he concludes that Ibn Sina most probably wrote this work, and that his original version certainly exists. However, he maintains that there is no definite proof regarding its content and argues that there are merely two reports on two types of content for this treatise. Finally, he states that certain historical misunderstandings have occurred in relation to this work over time, which has resulted in committing some serious errors regarding its content and its attribution to Ibn Sina.