فصلنامه تاریخ فلسفه
سال هفتم شماره 3 (پیاپی 27، زمستان 1395)

In the sixth century BC, pre-Socratic philosophers introduced different research methods in the realms of science and philosophy, wrote the first scientific treatises, and presented the basic concepts in the process of deduction. However, we do not have access to any of their independent works except for some extracts which have been quoted in the works of post-Socratic scholars. Nevertheless, this method lacks the required efficiency in understanding and evaluating the words of pre-Socratic scientists at all times. Hermann Alexander Diels presented a new method of doxography in his book of Doxographi Graeci (Greek Doxographers). He returned the tradition of doxography to the one adopted in a book by Theophrastus, who was a student of Aristotle. Diels’ method was criticized by later scientists, such as Mansfield. Based on his critique, the effects of Sufists’ ideas, Aristotle’s theory of edited collections and books of principles, tradition of genealogy writing, and commentators’ glosses on the formation of doxographical texts have not been much appreciated in Diels’ method.

Reductionism has been so prevalent in contemporary philosophy in certain fields such as the philosophy of religion, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of mind that some have called our time the period of reductionism. The naive form of the idea of reduction which is expressed as the very “A is nothing but B” has appeared in so many diverse forms and models since the second half of the 20th century that its primary form can be hardly observed today. In this study, the writer aims to investigate the historical background of reductionism as an idea. In doing so, he initially provides a brief historical-logical account of the background of this idea since the second half of the 20th century onwards. In the second part of the paper, he begins his discussion with the philosophy of ancient Greece. Then he brings it to an end through referring to the analysis of this idea by the members of the Vienna Circle and connecting it to the point at which he began the first part of the paper, i.e. the second half of the 20th century.

This paper examines the functions of theoretical and practical intellects in the fields of religion and ethics in the view of Qadi Abduljabbar Mu‘tazili. Based on what appears from his views regarding the explanation of ethical propositions, we can refer to three epistemological, motivational, and ontological approaches. The writers have investigated three categories in the field of epistemology: knowledge of fundamental values, goodness and ugliness of acts, and unveiling of ethical principles based on basic propositions; two functions of the intellect in the field of motivation: the origin of human ethical implications and the basis of Man’s responsibility, and the human voluntary and rational choice in the field of ontology. He maintains that the intellect plays an essential and fundamental role in each of them, and that moral principles have been explained based on rational reasoning. Regarding the functions of the intellect in the domain of understanding religion, the writers initially deal with God’s Oneness and Justice in the light of rational reason and, then, relying on religious principles and through granting a central role to the intellect, they interpret some Qur’anic verses. Finally, they try to interpret some cases which are in contrast to the intellect with reference to certain examples.

As a science representing rationality and intellection, philosophy can liberate human beings from the sensible world, which is the abode of darkness and ignorance, through teaching them the correct method of using their thinking ability. In Ayn al-Qudat’s view, the sensible world is the world of those people who look like human beings but are deprived of the truth of humanity. This is because they are ignorant and live in an animal world which is void of wisdom and thinking. He believes that, by benefitting from rationality, Man can leave the sensible world behind and step into the world of the intellect and thinking. In other words, they can begin the learning of philosophical sciences and other useful disciplines and develop wisdom and intelligence. Moreover, through even greater use of their intellect, they can step beyond the world of the intellect and enter another world which Ayn al-Qudat calls the “beyond-intellect world”. He argues that it is possible to attain this station in two ways: A) intellectual ascetic practice, in the sense that Man should become involved in the acquisition of theoretical sciences such as philosophy; B) training of the will, in the sense that Man should purify their inner reality from unpleasant conduct and behavior and socialize with the people of taste (dhawq). In this paper, by casting a glance at the three worlds of the sense, the intellect, and the beyond-intellect in Ayn al-Qudat’s view, the writers have discussed the role of philosophy and intellection in reaching the world of the beyond-intellect and attaining insight and knowledge, which lead to other-worldly happiness.

In Islamic culture, the Mu‘tazilite were the first group who employed the rational method and considered the intellect to be the sole means of knowing the truth and to be independent from religion. That is why they have been referred to as the followers of the “religion of the intellect”. The Mu‘tazilite granted a kind of sanctity to the intellect and maintained that when human beings perfect their intellect, they can perceive essential truths, which consist of the knowledge of God and the knowledge of the good and evil. On the other hand, they never denied revelation but believed that it cannot be in contrast to human intellect. They also stated that since the intellect has a longer history than revelation, it is identical with light, without which no one can be led to the right path. The purpose of revelation is to increase intellectual knowledge and make it more accurate. The Mu‘tazilite, thus, concluded that the intellect is the criterion for revelation. This idea was one of their most important principles. Hence, it can be said that, for this group, ethics is based on a kind of intellect which is prior to religion. One of their most famous principles is, “thinking before hearing”. The Mu‘tazilite are mutikallim, and a mutikallim looks at the intellectual human being as a responsible individual before God. They consider the intellect to be sufficient regarding Man’s need to revelation at the outset of obligation. This paper deals with Mu‘tazilites’ view of the relationship between religion and ethics.

Previously, in a paper entitled Iranian Thought in Socratic Thought (presented in the “Conference on Commemorating Socrates, the Greek Philosopher”, Tehran, 2001), the writer of the present paper argued that in Plato’s dialogues, the rights of Iranians and the Iranian government have not been clearly stipulated. Socrates, who expected Iranians to officially recognize the government of Athens, does not explicitly talk about the official or de facto recognition of the Achaemenid government. Plato has spoken about the poets, playwrights, and historiographers of other nations, particularly those of Iranians, more freely than other Greek thinkers and scholars. However, he does not believe that Athenians’ democratic rights are conditioned by protecting the rights of other nations, including Iranians and Egyptians, and recognizing the legitimacy of their governments. The present paper is intended to define and review the features of Athenian self-knowledge and Iranian self-knowledge and compare them with each other. As Socrates himself considers it justified, strangers can also discuss the nature of “terms”, including the description of the characteristics of the Greeks. As we know, once Phaedrus told Socrates, “Yes, Socrates, you can easily invent tales of Egypt, or of any other country.” In this paper, the writer does not intend to copy Socrates’ approach in this regard; neither does he intend to provide a mythical, narrative, or historical account of the conditions of Greece during the time of this philosopher. Rather, he seeks to extensively explain and interpret his political view of Iran, specifically with reference to Alcibiades and Laws dialogues.

Some basic concepts such as the Ideas and farvahar hold a particular and precious place in Plato’s philosophy and the Zoroastrian religion. In Plato’s philosophy, the doctrine of Ideas introduces the origin of the forms of the material world through explaining the concept of being. Similarly, in the Zoroastrian worldview, the creation of the forms of this world has been considered to depend on their spiritual forms (farvahar). Because of certain similarities between these two key concepts, some believe that Plato modeled Zoroaster’s teachings and maintain that the doctrine of Ideas is indeed a Zoroastrian doctrine. This paper aims to verify this claim by comparing these two concepts and checking the differences and similarities between them in terms of their characteristics and functions. Apparently, the differences between them are too great to allow the easy acceptance of the modeling theory.