فصلنامه تاریخ فلسفه
سال هشتم شماره 2 (پیاپی 30، پاییز 1396)

The conceptual argument which is called the “ontological argument” in Western philosophy moves from a concept in the mind to its external referent. This argument is only about a concept which exclusively applies to God. Philosophers unanimously concede that the move from the (mere) concept to the referent is not allowed; at the same time, they agree that the concept representing God, like the existence of God, which is unique and different from that of any other existent, is different from all other concepts and has no parallel among them. Anselm and Descartes have presented the conceptual argument in different ways. Irrespective of the truth or falsity of the leveled criticisms against these two arguments, the present paper suggests another version of this argument (conceptual argument) which, under the necessary conditions, will attain its end more conveniently. This concept enjoys certain features, among which representation is of great importance. The intended concept is the same concept of existence; an intelligible concept which is a part of the nature of the intellect and stands at a distance from any kind of association with whatness and non-existence. After interpreting this argument and exploring the writings of Muslim philosophers, including Mulla Sadra, the author concludes that some of his words could be used as proof for the truth of this claim. If this argument yields fruit, it demonstrates not only the general capability of the intellect in knowing God and His Attributes but also the possibility of providing a new version of some of the objectives of the great figures in the fields of philosophy and gnosis.

This paper initially deals with the meaning, place, and role of eros in the view of Proclus and, then, presents the changes that he created in the meaning or role of this concept by bringing it close to its rival Christian concept of ágape. Although Proclus himself never acknowledged this semantic change in any of his books and believed that what he had done was in conformity with Platonic philosophy. Here, the writers demonstrate that, given his intended meaning of eros, there is no opposition between this concept and ágape, and they are, rather, consistent with each other.

In the view of Mulla Mohammad Na‘im Taleqani, the theory of the individual unity of existence necessitates either the absolute identity of Almighty Necessary with objects or His possible being. Therefore, several objections can be advanced against this theory, which render it into an implausible and unacceptable one. Here, after analyzing his view regarding this theory through using such concepts as the copulative existence of the effect and encompassing plurality and distinction, the writer clarifies the theory of the individual unity of existence and demonstrates that none of the mentioned objections are justified. He finally concludes that Taleqani has failed to explain and analyze gnostics’ views regarding this theory.

According to Islamic philosophers, the soul’s self-perception is of the type of presential knowledge. In other words, the soul’s awareness of its own essence, unlike what Descartes states in his concept of Cogito, does not occur through external objects, body organs, or soulish acts. Rather, the soul perceives its self free from its acts and states and with no reliance on the activities of material body. The prominent Islamic philosopher, Ibn Sina, has posed different arguments in order to demonstrate this claim, the most important of which is the argument of “floating man” or “suspended man”. However, an evaluation of such arguments seems to reveal that they are not capable of demonstrating their claim and, under the best circumstances, they can merely prove the difference between the soul’s self-knowledge and its knowledge of other objects. Therefore, it seems that either more solid arguments are necessary to demonstrate the soul’s independence in self-perception or the soul should not be considered independent of the body and, particularly, the brain in this regard.

Ya‘qub Ibn Ishaq al-Kindi is one of the prominent scientific figures of the Islamic world who is usually referred to as the first Islamic philosopher. He was the first to introduce philosophy as an independent field of study in the world of Islam. In addition to translating several philosophical works into Arabic, he made great efforts in order to introduce and reveal the coordination between rational thinking and Islamic teachings. Although some consider al-Kindi to be a follower of Judaism or Christianity, available evidence indicates his belief in Islam. Moreover, there are different ideas regarding his kalami views. Some believe that he was a follower of Abu Hanifah; some view him as a Shi‘ite philosopher, and some consider him to be associated with the Mu‘tazilite school of thought. A study of available proofs demonstrates that there are several religious and historical reasons suggesting his attachment to each of these schools. However, meticulous scrutiny reveals that he followed a particular kind of Shi‘ism which was prevalent in his own time called “Muhibbi Shi‘ism” and the “Mu‘tazilite School of Baghdad”. A synthesis of these two trends demonstrates that he was a believer in a religious school called the Mu‘tazilite Shi‘ism.

The philosophical explanation of corporeal resurrection is one of the most important philosophical problems which has attracted the attention of researchers during the post-Sadra era. Given the existing ambiguities and questions in this respect, the legacy of earlier philosophers, particularly Mulla Sadra, in relation to this problem, and the principles of the Transcendent Philosophy, such as the trans-substantial motion and the gradedness of existence, Hakim Agha Ali Modarres Zonouzi has carefully investigated the issue of corporeal resurrection and provided a new analysis in this regard. His view is based on three premises: firstly, after death, the soul leaves certain soulish effects and forms in trust with the cells and elements of the body. Secondly, such effects result in the trans-substantial motion and the change and evolution of the body. Thirdly, after the perfection of the body in the light of its trans-substantial motion, it joins its own specific soul so that no other soul would be appropriate enough to unite with it. Hakim Zonouzi managed to demonstrate his new explanation for corporeal resurrection relying on certain philosophical principles and analytic studies of authentic hadith sources. The present paper investigates some of Hakim Zonouzi’s philosophical principles such as the union of the body and the soul, the true and unitary texture of the form, and the quality of its subsistence in two states. Finally, it elaborates on consolidating Hakim Zonouzi’s specific theory based on a tradition from Imam Sadiq (a).

Place has always been one of the most challenging philosophical discussions in the history of Islamic philosophy. Aristotle was the first to trigger this discussion. Through explaining the signs of place, he not only clarified the view of surface in this regard but also criticized other related theories, particularly, the theory of immaterial dimension or empty space (void). His misunderstanding of Plato’s words in the dialogue of Timaeus led to the development of the theory of void in the discussion of place. Muslim philosophers, especially Ibn Sina, criticized this theory while ignoring this historical mistake. One of the most important arguments in this regard is the overlap of dimensions and their realization without matter. Through criticizing Ibn Sina’s arguments, Fakhr al-Din Razi supported the theory of void. In this paper, the authors demonstrate that his objections to Ibn Sina’s arguments originate in his neglecting the principles of the Peripatetic philosophy, particularly, the impossibility of the realization of dimensions without matter.