فصلنامه تاریخ فلسفه
سال دوم شماره 3 (پیاپی 7، زمستان 1390)

The principle of nothing proceeds from the one but one is a long-standing philosophical principle. It states that, according to rational arguments, a single cause, since it is one, is followed by no more than a single effect directly.The roots of the discussion of this principle can be found in the words of Plotinus and Proclus; however, it was expanded, deepened, and defended mainly in the rational Islamic tradition by Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Tusi. Since then, it has always been emphasized by almost all philosophers and some gnostics and theologians. Nevertheless, several scholars such as Ghazzali, Ibn Rushd, Fakhr al-Din Razi, Ibn Arabi, Thomas Aquinas (in some of his works), ‘Allamah Hilli, and ‘Allamah Majlisi have mainly opposed this theory basically under the pretext of defending religious beliefs.This paper intends to have an analytic, historical, and critical study of the ideas of the opponents of this principle. Here, the writer has initially explained the arguments of some of the believers in this principle and then dealt with the objections of those who reject it. Finally, in order to defend the principle of the one, he responds to each of the objections separately.

The roots of the problem of the union of the intellect and intelligible can be found in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. It has indeed been more clearly explained in Plotinus’ philosophy and the Neo-Platonic School and its followers. This problem has also been tackled by the thinkers of the Islamic world and had some advocates and opponents there. However, we can claim that it reached its culmination in the Transcendent Philosophy.The present paper has examined the process of the evolution of this theory and its explanation in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy following an analytic-critical approach.

Since according to many philosophers, the human soul is an immaterial and simple entity, the problem of its motion has always occupied the minds of thinkers. Aristotle attributed this motion to many of the philosophers preceding him, which, given their naturalist approach, could be justified. Unlike Plato, Aristotle considers the problem of the immateriality of the soul to be unclear and ambiguous. In his view, the soul is a moving agent; however, he considers its essential motion to be absolutely false and has some unclear and inconsistent ideas concerning its accidental motion. Apparently, the first seeds of the theory of motion in the soul’s substance were planted by Tusi based on one of Ibn Sina’s statements. This theory came to fruition by Mulla Sadra, the great philosopher. He does not consider himself as the innovator of this theory and traces it back to Qur’anic verses and the ideas of gnostics and philosophers. However, he was the first to base this theory on such philosophical and, particularly, ontological principles as principiality, unity, and gradation of existence and introduce it as a foundation for propounding some innovative theories in anthropology and epistemology. In fact, it can be said that this theory is at the center of Mulla Sadra’s psychology and, in the light of its centrality, the fields of anthropology, eschatology, and epistemology have undergone great changes and given rise to some new problems following a different approach. Here, Mulla Sadra presents the art of thinking in the best way possible.

Doubt is one of Man’s psychological states and arises when one is equally uncertain of the correctness and falsity of mental judgments. The methodological skepticism of Descartes is other than that of the Sophist and pragmatic types of skepticism. In this paper, the difference between methodological and non-methodological (like those of agnosticism, Pyrrhon, Ghazzali, Montaigne, and Husserl) skepticism has been examined. The writer has also analyzed and investigated Descartes’ interpretations of skepticism and his arguments and proofs (errors of the senses and the dream hypothesis) in order to justify methodological skepticism.

The present paper explains the pure gnostic thoughts of Ibn Arabi, the well-known gnostic of the 6th and 7th centuries (AH), concerning the nature of the Hereafter, Heaven, and Hell. In his view, the relationship between the world and the Hereafter is similar to the relationship between the outward and the inward. The ontological philosophy of the Hereafter concerns the emergence of the reality and innermost of the world of being, and being in harmony with and similarity to God. The Hereafter is the day of the rise of the truth through real union and the day of the manifestation of the divine essence, attributes, and names. According to Ibn Arabi, Heaven and Hell exist through both a corporeal and a spiritual quiddity. Of course, the body of the people of Heaven is a divine and delicate body, which he refers to as a natural body; however, the body of the people of Hell is an elemental and this-worldly body. He believes that the true nature of Heaven is closeness to God, while the true nature of Hell is being far from Him and being deprived of seeing him. Ibn Arabi maintains that disbelievers’ abiding in Hell is due to the accidental nature of aberration and misleading and believes that learning about divine grace brings about sweetness and happiness.

In the field of the history of Islamic philosophy, the books which have dealt with the life and works of different philosophers either have failed in paying accurate attention to their ideas or have just dealt with earlier philosophers at the expense of neglecting more contemporary ones or vice versa. Moreover, all works on the history of Islamic Philosophy have been philosopher-centered and sometimes school-centered but rarely subject-centered.The present paper introduces the existing sources on the history of Islamic philosophy and shows in which cases they are perfect and in which cases they are lacking. The writer hopes that researchers and teachers in related fields find this work useful.

Boethius, the great Christian philosopher of the 6th century, has an important treatise on political philosophy called Consolation of Philosophy. In this treatise, he speaks of several philosophical categories one of which is power. He discussed this category on the threshold of the Middle Age following a philosophical approach and under the guise of some religious ideas. While distinguishing between human internal and external constituents, he views power as one of the constituents of human happiness, and since happiness is an internal affair, it cannot be increased or decreased by means of external factors. In its external form, power is not an appropriate factor and guarantee for the establishment and subsistence of happiness. Boethius officially recognizes external power, particularly in its political form, but he has a collective view of power. Therefore, no kind of power alone can bring about happiness for human beings; on the contrary, it might also be considered a sign of misery. This philosopher believes that a part of misfortunes of philosophy is rooted in such separated powers.