نشریه پژوهش های فلسفی
پیاپی 25 (زمستان 1397)

Constructivism is a theory that believes moral judgments are not real things but they are constructed by practical reason in a rational procedure for resolving practical problems in front of us. Christine Korsgaard, a contemporary American philosopher, is a Kantian constructivist, whose theory I consider in this paper. She is a radical constructivist and disagrees with moral realism and denies moral truths even as abstract facts. According to Korsgaard moral judgments are constructed by rational agents. She believes moral and political principles are generally solutions to human practical problems. She justifies the normativity of moral obligations from this point that they are constructed by agent for resolving his problems. There are some objections to Korsgaard’s constructivism; one of them is to place humanity as the source of value.
Keywords: Korsgaard, constructivism, practical problem, humanity.


One of the traditional problems in moral philosophy is the nature and entity of moral truths and judgments. Do humans themselves make and construct them or are they facts and truths in the world which humans just discover? Are moral truths and values subjective or objective? Subjectivism and objectivism have been two old rivals in this question. But some philosophers have proposed a new theory between them that is called Constructivism. According to this theory, moral truths are not real and objective, but are constructed by human practical reason. In this view, an action is morally right when there is a sufficient reason to perform it. In this paper I will discuss Korsgaard's constructivism.
1. Definition of Constructivism
Constructivism is a theory about the justification of moral principles. It is the view that moral principles are the ones agents would agree with or endorse if they were to engage in a hypothetical or idealized process of rational deliberation. The differences about related criteria for this rational process and deliberation have produced several varieties of constructivism like Humean, Aristotelian, and Kantian (Bagnoli, 2011).
2. Korsgaard’s Constructivism
1-3. Normative Question
Korsgaard’s Constructivism is an answer to the main question in history of moral philosophy which she calls normative question. That is a central question about moral requirements. We see that they are inescapable in the sense that they provide reasons to act regardless of an agent’s desires and interests. So the question is: from where do they get their authority and obligatory force on us? Why do we make ourselves observe moral duties and principles? What is the origin of moral obligations? What are our reasons for justifying moral obligations? (Korsgaard, 1996: 9-10(
2-3. procedural moral realism
Korsgaard is an anti-realist philosopher. This thought that “human beings simply have unconditional or intrinsic value” is a realistic one standing in contrast to Korsgaard's constructivist thought that claims “we must confer value even upon ourselves” through certain allegedly necessary uses of ethical concepts. She distinguishes two kinds of realism: substantive moral realism and procedural moral realism. “What distinguishes substantive from procedural realism is a view about the relationship between the answers to moral questions and our procedures for arriving at those answers. The procedural moral realist thinks that there are answers to moral questions because there are correct procedures for arriving at them. But the substantive moral realist thinks that there are correct procedures for answering moral questions because there are moral truths or facts which exist independently of those procedures and which those procedures track” (Korsgaard, 1996: 36-37). She disagrees with the former and agrees with the latter.
3-3.proceduralism
The constructivism Korsgaard embraces is a form of proceduralism according to which the rightness of answers to normative questions is grounded in the fact that these answers are yielded by principles deriving from procedures with some special status. Evaluative and normative facts are not there as abstract facts to be met with or discovered through theoretical investigation of the nature and structure of rational agency, but are constructed through our actual practical activities. “Values are constructed by a procedure, the procedure of making laws for ourselves.” (Korsgaard, 1996: 112)
For Korsgaard, the relevant procedures at the source of normativity are procedures involved with willing, and what gives them their special status is that they are practically necessary for us—formal procedures rational beings must employ simply to function as agents at all. Everything starts with the nature of the will and the procedures according to which it must operate if it is to function as a will at all (FitzPatrick, 2005: 654-655(.
4-3. Constructivist and resolving problems
In Korsgaard's opinion when we are faced with a practical problem in our life and we don't know what the right action is, the solution is not in looking after a normative moral reality in the world and expecting to discover it, but it is in constructing a practical solution for that problem. She thinks this solution depends on an adequate conception of that problem. For a constructivist, ethical or political principles are solutions to practical problems we are already stuck with (FitzPatrick, 2005, p. 657-658), and this is how normative force is explained: “If you recognize the problem to be real, to be yours, to be one you have to solve, and the solution to be the only or the best one, then the solution is binding upon you.” (Korsgaard, 1996: 114)
According to Korsgaard, the source of normativity in moral obligations is in our humanity and moral identity. Because of self-consciousness, human beings do not do something just out of their desires; rather they ask themselves whether it is right to act on the basis of desire. Korsgaard agrees with Kant that humanity is a value in itself and says that our reasons to do something determine our identity and nature.
She says: “we must therefore take ourselves to be important” and “humanity, as the source of all reasons and values, must be valued for its own sake” (Korsgaard, 1996: 122). Our human identity imposes unconditional obligations to us, whether we are women or men, of this or that ethnic group, of this or that religious or social group, and so on. Therefore, our human identity is the source of our moral norms and obligations. The violation of these obligations amounts to the loss of our identity. Humanity is a significant part of us. There are strong and weak points in Korsgaard theory. One of the strong points, we think, is a successful justification of moral differences in applied ethics. On the other hand, it seems that, in addition to certain objections to Korsgaard’s moral theory, it is also subject to objections to Kant’s moral theory, such as the objection that humanity and human practical identity cannot always serve as a successful criterion for the recognition of moral actions.
1. FitzPatrick, William J. (July 2005) "The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory: Korsgaard’s Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity", Ethics, Vol. 115, No. 4, pp. 651-691.
2. Lenman, James and Shemmer, Yonatan (2012) Constructivism in Practical Philosophy, Oxford University Press.
3. Nagel, Thomas (1996) "Universality and the reflective self", in the Sources of Normativity, edited by Onora O'Neill, Cambridge University Press.
4. Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996) the Sources of Normativity, edited by Onora O'Neill, Cambridge University Press.
5. Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996b) Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University.
6. Korsgaard, Christine M. (2008) The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology, New York: Oxford University Press.
7. Korsgaard, Christine M. (2009) Self-Constitution, Agency, Identity, and Integrity, New York: Oxford University Press.
8. Watkins, Eric, and Fitzpatrick, William (2002) O’Neill and Korsgaard on the Construction of Normativity, The Journal of Value Inquiry 36: 349–367.

Immanuel Kant presents several formulations of the categorical imperative, first of which is called “Formula of Universal Law” containing the well-known generalizability test. Numerous pros and cons have been associated with the nature and application of this formula in the history of moral philosophy, each with its staunch supporters and opponents. In this paper, we will first review the nature of this formula and its position in Kant's moral system. Second, we will evaluate its application in practice and argue that some thinkers have not fully grasped Kant's purpose and have attributed improper defects to this formula. Third, Shelly Kagan's consequential interpretation of the general formula will be investigated to figure out whether it is possible to draw consequential normative sentences from this formula. Finally, we will evaluate alleged criticisms against this formula in the history of moral philosophy in some detail.
Keywords: Formula of Universal Law, Generalizability, strict and wide judgments, acceptable and unacceptable in ethics, Kantian consequentialism
In this article, we will examine the first formula of Kant's ethics which is called Universal Law. In the history of moral philosophy, different interpretations of this formula have been offered. Some commentators have considered it the best and most important of Kant's moral formulas, while some others have deemed it completely futile. In our opinion, both groups must rethink their positions. In Kant's ethics, the general formula is very important, but it should be used in the right place. It also seems that in the normative ethics section, the second formula (human as an end in itself) is the most important and most practical form of Kantian ethics. Therefore, once the true meaning of the first formula is considered, many objections and misunderstandings are resolved.
This article is divided into four main sections:2.1 Theoretical explanation of the universal formulation
In this section, we refer to the position of generalization and rationality in Kant's ethics and discuss the circumstances that a rule (maxim) requires to become law.
2.2. Application of the universal formula
How can we use this formula? Are all rules that pass the generalizability test obligatory or ethical? Is "Whistling in the dark while lonely" a moral behavior because it is generalizable? Our answer is negative. We explain our point of view and prove it by referring to the works of Kant and his commentators.
2.3. Universal formula and consequentialism
Shelly Kagan thinks that we can separate Kant and Kantian ethics and then we can speak of Kantian consequentialism. This section will briefly explain and analyze this theory and Kagan's reasons. In our opinion, Kant is not a consequentialist per se and his formula is not consequential, but with some modifications this theory is tenable.
2.4. Criticisms
Two important objections have been made to Kant's universal formula: a) Generalizability may prohibit items that are not immoral; b) Generalizability may allow things that are immoral. We will examine these two issues. Concerning the first, it seems that these critics do not know the right place to use the formula and also don't understand Kant's purpose of constructing this formula. In fact, in this formula Kant intends to help moral people who do not really know the correct option, and he also wants to prevent selfishpeople who want to exempt themselves from fulfillingtheir duties. Concerning the second, it should be said their maxims do not pass the test at all. The general formula is Kant's most formal statement of the categorical imperative and provides the moral agent with the generalizability test. The function of this formula is not to put everything into a generalizability test. It has a more general function which, for the most part, is to determine the domain of permissible and impermissible behaviors. Concerning the problem of consequentialism, neither Kant nor this formula has such an attribute but we can establish a Kantian moral system that is consequential. Finally, regarding the two above-mentioned criticisms, both seem to be due to misunderstanding.
- Alasdair Macintyer, (1998) A short History of ethics A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the Twentieth Century, 2nd Edition, Routledge
- Kant Immanuel, (2002) Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ED and TR: Allen W. Wood, Yale University Press
- Kant Immanuel, (1996) On a supposed right to lie from philanthropy, TR: Mary Gregor, Cambridge
- Onora O neil, (2013) Acting On Principle, 2nd Edition, Cambridge
- Parfit, Derek, (2011) On What Matters, V1, Oxford
- Paton, H. J, (1946) Categorical imperative, oxford
- R. M. Hare, (1998) Sorting Out Ethics, Oxford
- Robert B. Louden. (2006) Applying Kant's Ethics The Role of Anthropology, A Companion to Kant, ED: Graham Bird, Blackwell
- Scott Forschler, (2013) Kantian and Consequentialist Ethics: The Gap Can Be Bridged, Metaphilosophy, Vol. 44, Nos. 1–2, January 2013, Blackwell
- Shelly Kagan, (1984) Does Consequentialism Demand too Much, Philosophy & Public Affairs,Vol. 13, No. 3 (Summer, 1984), pp. 239-254, Wiley
- Shelly Kagan, (2002) Kantianism for Consequentialists, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. ED: Allen wood, Yale University Press
- Wood. Allen, (2006) Kant’s Formulations of the Moral Law, A Companion to Kant, ED: Graham Bird, Blackwell
- Wood. Allen, (2007) Kantian ethics, Cambridge
- Wood. Allen, (1999) Kant's Ethical Thought, Cambridge
- Wood. Allen, (2004)The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy, Kant's Metaphysics of Morals Interpretative essays, ED: Mark Timmons, oxford  

This paper focuses on the question concerning the nature of human illness in Heidegger’s thought according to the Daseinsanalytic approach to psychology in its broadest sense. In this regard, we will first clarify the relationship between illness, as a phenomenon of privation in Heidegger’s own words, the state of health, and the human specific mode of being in this framework which determines how being healthy is to be understood appropriately. Then, the importance of the general existential structures of human being, according to Heidegger, such as human spatiality and the temporal feature of human Da-sein, for the Daseinsanalytic illustration of different forms of pathological being-in-the-world will be considered. Finally, we will bring into focus a theoretical challenge related to the Daseinsanalytic understanding of human health, concerning the problematic link between the standard of human openness to the highest degree, freedom for the possibilities of life and existential awareness on the one hand, and the ordinary normal experience of responding to the basic human existential traits as a touchstone of the state of health and the deviations from it, on the other.
Keywords: Heidegger, Boss, Human Illness, Health, Daseinsanalytic Psychopathology Clinical psychologists, psychiatrists and medical practitioners work on the basis of specific concepts of human health and illness. While the question concerning the nature of health and illness, as a philosophical question, is beyond the scope of the scientific research, it is the philosopher’s task to ask about what has been taken for granted in advance in this regard. Bringing into light the significance of the mentioned question can be considered as one of the significant contributions of the collaboration of the German philosopher, Martin Heidegger, with the Swiss psychiatrist, Medard Boss, in the development of the Daseinsanalytic movement.
Following Heidegger’s discussion of illness as a privative phenomenon, it is argued that in order to understand being ill appropriately, we must first determine what it means to be healthy, for illness is nothing but the lack of health that is to be recovered through the therapeutic process. The meaning of health itself as a mode of being would depend upon the way we approach human being. Therefore, Heidegger’s existential analytic of Dasein can be of considerable importance in this connection.
From the Daseinsanalytic perspective, existing as a realm of openness, we are essentially our possibilities of relating to what shows itself to us. Human health is to be considered as being human in its fullness with respect to such a way of being. Accordingly, health in this context would be described as being free for the life possibilities, sustaining our openness to the world to the highest possible degree. Illness, then would be essentially the constriction of one’s own possibilities and what the therapeutic process can do would be to help the clients overcome such problematic constrictions.
3. Daseinsanalysis and Pathology
Daseinsanalysis as a phenomenological approach to pathology is concerned with the life-world of the clients, considering the altered structures of human existence. It focuses on the clarification of the way one carries out a disturbed form of being-in-the-world in pathological experiences. Here, the description of the structural aspects of the way we normally relate to the world provides a basis for the characterization of different forms of human illness. This approach offers a specific classification of pathological problems based on the noticeable disturbances in the normal form of responding to the existential traits.
Daseinsanalysis has difficulties in coping properly with a theoretical issue related to the link between its prescriptive pattern of human health that can be characterized by the terms such as the openness to the highest degree, freedom for the possibilities of life, full human way of being, and existential awareness, and its phenomenological approach to pathological experience that has its point of departure in the description of normal form of being-in-the-world. Though the roots of the problem can be traced back to specific elements in Heidegger’s philosophy, thinking about the problematic link appropriately is a necessity for the reassessment of the Daseinsanalytic notion of health and its theoretical strength when the relationships between the issues such as the existential awareness, authentic creativity, being-satisfied with one’s own life, and the so-called mental illness are under consideration. Although Daseinsanalysis generally deepens our understanding of pathological experiences, it suffers from the mentioned theoretical problem as a result of the application of a double standard regarding human health. Two possible solutions to the problem can be as follows: 1) the idealization of the notion of health, with the recognition of its implication that the domain of illness, as a deficiency in being human in its fullness, may include both normal and abnormal forms of experience, and 2) taking a mere descriptive stance similar to the alternative phenomenological approaches in this field with the acceptance of the normality as its base for the illustration of the experiential modifications, rather than the commitment to the both at the same time, which may give rise to ambiguity and confusion. Depending on what we are seeking for, each approach has its positive aspects. A mere descriptive approach would be of great importance when the aim is to have a better understanding of clinical data, keeping the connection with the medical concepts and classifications. But in a different context, the idealization of the notion of health would enable us to move beyond the boundaries of the common notion of health and its limitations to clarify the possibility and significance of strengthening the richness of our life in accordance with human capacities, and to bring into focus the possibility of making reference to a broader range of human illness



: - Askay, Richard and Farquhar, Jensen. (2011) Of Philosophers and Madmen: A Disclosure of Martin Heidegger, Medard Boss, and Sigmund Freud, Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Becker, Ernest. (1973) the Denial of Death, New York: The Free Press.
- Boss, Medard. (1963) Psychoanalysis and Daseinsanalysis, L. B. Refebre (trans.), New York: Basic Books.
- Boss, Medard. (1983) Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology, S Conway and A. Cleaves (trans.), New York: Jason Aronson.
- Boss, Medard. (1988) Martin Heidegger’s Zollikon Seminars, B. Kenny (trans.), in: K. Hoeller (ed.), Heidegger and Psychology, Seattle: Promethean Press

In this text, which employs the analytic-comparative method, we read the Poetics of Aristotle in a new way to take an example of translation as an artistic creation. We can present the result of the essay as a metaphor called “the art of translation”, and then we refer to four evidences which can support our metaphor: reading the text as seeing the world, understanding the meaning as perceiving the main action, representing the text as recreating an image, and word making as the art of poetic. If we want to explain the useful dimension of our research, it can be said: every translation (if it is considered as an artistic creation) has a moral dimension which depends on its imitation of the author's line and reader's culture, and also has an artistic dimension that attends to the beauty of text and new vision of culture. According to Moderation theory of Aristotle, an ideal intercultural translation sees the right of author and reader by the equal criterion. Then it shows a production that is combined with “representation”, a term which can embrace the beauty and ethic in the art of translation.
Keywords: poetics, representation, artistic creation, art of translation, cultural relationship



As Aristotle has said about art and poetry, they are based on Mimesis or imitation. It means that he believes art is Mimesis. But his theory about this issue is totally different to Plato’s thought. He thinks that Mimesis is not imitation of Ideas as Plato thought. Mimesis in his thought is imitation from the existence, aspect or form of things in this world. So he emphasizes that Mimesis is imitation of something or maybe happenings outside of man. After collecting all of Aristotle’s thoughts, especially about poetry, it seems clear that the imitation or Mimesis is a representation of the subject of imitation in which sometimes the subject of imitation has been represented better than its fact, like tragedy, and sometimes worse, like Comedy.
It seems that we can see translation as imitation, understanding the latter as in Aristotle’s conception of art mentioned above. Indeed, a translator at the beginning of is translation process looks at the text deeply and tries to understand it as well as possible. After that, he thinks about the value of translations. In this step, if the text has repeatability in other languages and cultures, the translator starts the imitation from an original text to create another text. It seems that this process is like what an artist does to create artworks.
On the basis of Aristotle's Poetics, we want to explain some resemblances between art and translation to describe our conception of translation as an art. We think those resemblances can convince us to see translation as an art.
The first resemblance between creation of artworks and translation is at the first step of them.
The first resemblance between the artistic creation and translation is in their first step. Viewing the environment and finding something for imitation is the first step of artistic creation, which is like confronting and reading a text for translation. It is clear that viewing the environment deeply and reading a text carefully are necessary for artistic creation and translation because a surface of them cannot be suitable and helpful for Mimesis or imitation.
The second step of artistic creation and translation is the accurate understanding of the subject of imitation. In Fact, deep and accurate understanding is necessary for exact imitation. Without comprehensive understanding, imitation of things is not possible. Both artist and translator in the process of imitation should take this step. In the other words, it seems that by deep and exact understanding they can find the direction of similarity between subject of imitation and artwork or translated text.
Rewriting text in a new language like representing an image is the third step of imitation that is visible in the process of artistic creation and translation. In this step, combining their understanding and viewing the environment, translator and artist try to create the subject of imitation in a new style and a new form.
The last step of imitation in artistic creation and translation is that of choosing colors in art and words and other literary elegances in translation, and using them. In this step, paying attention to details of their work, artist and translator try to create a new thing that is similar to the subject of imitation, although it is a new thing and there may be some differences between them. As was stated, the understanding of the subject of imitation by artist and translator is a very important step, in which, however, their thought of the subject of imitation is not totally the same as it, and so, during creating the new thing their understanding and thought can affect the form and the style of the new thing. In conclusion, it seems that, because of the similarity between art and translation based on Aristotle's conception of art, we can move from ethical and aesthetic functions of art, and artist's moral duty in creating art, to the same aspects in translation and translator.
In other words, based on Aristotle conception, while translator makes a faithful imitation and a creative presentation of the source, after the ethical decision to translate and promote the original text, he should pay attention to linguistic and cultural details of his translation. In this regard, while observing his audience in the target language, he also refreshes his insights and attitudes because this two-sided view, the center of gravity of moderation, will take into account the aspects of beauty and ethics in the cultural interactions of societies.
- Aristotle, (1382), Ethics of Nicomachus, translation of Mohammad Hasan Lotfi, Tehran, New Design.
- Aristotle, (1388), About the Art of Poetry, Translated by Soheil Mohsen Afnan, Tehran, Hekmat.
- Aristotle, (1973), Fan al-Sha'r, Abdul Rahman Badawi's research, Beirut, Dar al-Safat.
- Aristotle (1392), Sermon, Translation by Ismail Sa'adat, Tehran, Hermes.
- Aristotle, (2006), Metaphysics, Sharaf al-Din Khorasani Translation, Fourth Edition, Tehran, Wisdom.
- Plato, (1380), Period of works, translation by Hasan Lotfi, Tehran, Kharazmi.
- Bermann, Sandra and Wood (Edit), (2005), Michael, Nation, language, and the ethics of translation, Princeton University Press.
- Koskinen, Kaisa, (2000), Beyond Ambivalence; Postmodernity and the Ethics of Translation, University of Tampere.
- Meschonnic, Henri, (2011), Ethics and Politics of Translating, Translated and edited by Pier-Pascale Boulanger, Benjamins Translation Library.
- Venuti, Lawrence (Edit), (2000),The Translation Studies Reader, Routledge.

In this paper I provide a reading of Derrida's seminal text, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy". In this text, Derrida deals with the encounter between philosophy and metaphor as an external element to philosophy. The conclusion is that Philosophy tends to internalize any external element. Philosophy considers metaphor as something ought to be subjected. Therefore, when one searches for the metaphor in philosophy, what he or she finds not the metaphor itself, but the concept of metaphor? Metaphor in the text of philosophy is the philosophical metaphor. Derrida at the end discusses the metaphor of metaphor, the tireless metaphorical movement, and unlimited metaphor as the truth of metaphor. Philosopher during its history always considers metaphors as something to be subjugated and controlled. So, metaphor in the text of philosophy is the concept of metaphor, not metaphor in itself, which according to Derrida, pure dissemination. In this sense, the origin of concepts is not conceptual.
Key words: Metaphor, Derrida, Dissemination, Aristotle, Proper Name

In this paper we provide a reading of Derrida's seminal text, "White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy" which deals with the encounter between philosophy and metaphoricity as its main outsider. Through an analysis of Derrida’s text and some reference to his sources, we would conclude that Philosophy tends to internalize any external element, including metaphoricity. Philosophy considers metaphor as something to be subjugated. Therefore, when one searches for the metaphor in philosophy, what he or she finds is not the metaphor itself, but the concept of metaphor.
Metaphor in the text of philosophy is the philosophical metaphor, and not the literary one. Derrida at the end discusses the metaphor of metaphor, the tireless metaphorical movement, and unlimited metaphor as the truth of the concept of metaphor. During its history, philosophy always considers metaphors as something to be subjugated and controlled. Hence, metaphor in the text of philosophy is the concept of metaphor, not metaphor in itself, which is, according to Derrida, pure dissemination. A metaphor in itself is a material movement, the material production of concepts. In this sense, the origin of concepts is not conceptual, but rather a literary movement. Concepts as the elements of philosophy are just the result of something concrete and indeterminate, namely the metaphorical dissemination. It seems Derrida stands here against philosophy, but the case is that he redefines it, by taking metaphoricity as its central motor. Philosophy appears as the surface of a profound material movement of thought, which can be found in pure literature, in the work of mad literary figures such as Artaud or Mallarme. Even in the realm of mainstream philosophy, this literary movement (this madness) is tractable everywhere, from Plato to Nietzsche. Madness is the motor of reason.
Therefore, what Derrida does is applying a therapy on philosophy from within through revealing a tendency in philosophy to objectify and conceptualize what is its subject matter. The will in philosophy to conceptualize meets its limit in the case of metaphor as its subject matter, because in this case philosophy conceptualizes something which inherently evades conceptualization and objectification. It indicates a will which is never fully successful and this is why everywhere in the history of philosophy we can find a literary attitude instead of a full philosophical conceptuality. Each philosophical concept is the result of the will to conceptualization applying on a non-conceptualizable entity, or better, movement. Hence, what we find in the text of philosophy is the concept of metaphor, not the metaphor in itself and its pure form, but the concept of metaphor reveals the metaphoricity of concepts. Philosophy wants to overcome metaphor, but at the end of the day, it is the latter that invades the purity of the former. Therefore, instead of the concept of metaphor, Derrida introduces the metaphor of metaphor, which is not any more a concept, but rather a movement. The relation between concept and metaphor is like that of signified and signifier in Derrida’s early work. What is called signification is not any more under the governance of signified, as is in the classical structuralism, but rather it turns to be a movement from signifier to signifier, having the transcendental signified as eliminated. Transcendental signified is the concept as a halt in the movement of signification. What is the case here is not that the concept does not exist, but rather is the genetic movement of concept, how it comes into existence. Derrida performs a genealogy of concept, seeking its formation in the course of history, or rather in the course of the history of philosophy. Here, we can find a very good example of what is called deconstruction, useful to understand what Derrida does on other problematics, such as writing, being a book, nature and culture, etc.
Derrida demonstrates the will to conceptualization in philosophy through some references to Aristotle, specifically when he tends to reduce any polysemy into univocity. This tendency is called logos. This is the reign of proper name over philosophy and human thinking (and human as thinking animal) in general. Only things that have proper name exist. Without a proper name nothing is a thing, so it is nothing. This is the renouncement of plurality in general. Instead, Derrida brings forward the idea of a pure multiplicity in the idea of dissemination. It is the multiplicity of sense in a metaphorical movement. Everything is a metaphor as long as it is not reduced to a unity, to one entity with a proper name. Everything is a metaphor before gaining a name. Neither human beings nor their language begins with the unity of proper names. In the beginning is not logos but rather the multiplicity of metaphors, or dissemination. The latter is the original move, the original sin. Having several meanings is just having no meaning. And having infinitely many meanings is the original sin! But history changed this story by saying that everyone and everything has just one thing to say, namely logos. The unity of logos used to stand against the plurality of dissemination. This is the birth of logic and its governance over thinking. Before the governance of logic thinking was vivid, with the multiplication of metaphors as its motor. The whole story is about the source of organizations. In a Platonic and Aristotelian view, organizations are pre-established patterns governing the creation of being. Derrida changes the story by claiming that organizations are just the results of the original movement of dissemination which is without any pre-existing organization. Grammar for example is the law of making correct phrases, but the result of an accidental formation of phrases. Grammar would be different if the historical speakers of a language could put the words together in a different way, and they really could, and it is also the case about the formation of a word through putting voices together. Therefore, metaphoricity is the original accident, the original accidental movement that produces concepts and organizations. Human being is an animal who learned to think in the course of history.
- Aristotle (1924) Metaphysics, Translated by W. D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Aristotle (2014) Poetics, Translated by Malcolm Heath, Pinguin Classics, New Edition.
- Derrida, J. (1982) “Wight Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy” in Margins of Philosophy, translated by Alan Bass, The University of Chicago.
- Heidegger, M. (1957) Der Satz vom Grund, Pfullingen, Neske 1957.
- Louis, Pierre (1945) Les Métaphores de Platon, Paris,‘Les Belles Lettres.

Mīr Dāmād, in Qabasāt argues that existence cannot be a real property for essences. If existence, he argues, were a real property of an essence, there would remain no distinction between simple-if and compound-if questions. It is well-known that Mullā Sadrā has given three different accounts in order to explain essence’s being existent: first that existence is an analytical property for essence; second that none of existence or essence is a property of the other one; and third that essence is a property of existence. In this paper, I will argue that the first account would be defeated by Mīr Dāmād’s argument. The second account concedes the conclusion of the argument and then it would be in contrary with Mullasadra’s own view on the reality of existence, unless this account is augmented with the third one. The third account, however, can evade the argument. But it should be noted that the third account is based on Mullasadra’s own view on the reality of existence and the primacy of existence to essence.
Keywords: existence, to be existent, simple-if question, compound-if question, property.



In al-’Ufuq al-Mubīn (1391H, 59) Mīr Dāmād claims that not all predicates of a subject manifest a real property for that subject. A real property of a subject is something which is superadded to the subject. Examples include a body’s being red or a body’s being above another body. In such cases, the predicates correspond with some feature of the subjects which are not the same as those subjects, in reality. This is opposed to the body’s being itself, for example. In this case, the body itself is not something which is superadded to the body.
The controversial example is essence’s being existent. Is the existence of an essence something superadded to the essence? In Mīr Dāmād’s words, is existence a real property for essence? Mīr Dāmād, in Qabasāt (1367H, 37) argues that existence cannot be a real property for essences. For this end, he notifies that there is a distinction between propositions that is parallel to the distinction between real and non-real properties. If P is a real property for a, then the proposition that a is P is a compound-if proposition. On the other hand, it is a commonplace that the only example of simple-if propositions is one that contains existence as its predicate. Now, he continues, suppose that existence is a real property. Then, the proposition that a exists would become a compound-if proposition. But this contradicts the well-established premise that the proposition that a exists is a simple-if proposition. Consequently, he argues, if existence were a real property of an essence, there would remain no distinction between simple-if and compound-if questions.
The major problem that Mīr Dāmād is dealing with is how to explain essence’s being existent. His view is that, in reality, essence’s being existent is nothing but the essence itself. He, then, goes a step forward and claims that existence is nothing in reality. We only have the concept of existence in our minds. With these moves Mīr Dāmād, in some sense, resolves the problem of the relationship between essence and existence, in reality.
It is well-known that Mullā Sadrā, Mīr Dāmād’s pupil, was in disagreement with the teacher with respect to the reality of existence (1981). He believes that existence is a real entity in the world as opposed to essence. So, he should explain how essence is existent. Actually, he has given three different accounts in order to explain essence’s being existent (1302H; 1363H). Mullā Sadrā’s first account is that existence is an analytical property for essence. He defines analytical property as the following: P is an analytic property for a iff a cannot be but not has P. Mullā Sadrā’s second explanation is that none of existence or essence is a property of the other one. His third thesis is that essence is a property of existence.
My major concern in this paper is this problem: which of these three accounts for essence’s being existent offered by Mullā Sadrā can overcome Mīr Dāmād’s seminal argument? The first account would be defeated by Mīr Dāmād’s argument, since, any kind of real property, whether it is analytical or not, are associated with a compound-if proposition. This causes essence’s being existent to be manifested by a compound-if proposition. The second account concedes the conclusion of the argument. As we saw, Mīr Dāmād claims that the conclusion of his argument guarantees that existence is nothing in the world. This cannot be swallowed by Mullā Sadrā whose own view is that existence is real. The third account, however, can evade the argument, insofar as existence is not a property of essence. But it should be noted that the third account is based on Mullasadra’s own view on the reality of existence and the primacy of existence to essence.
If the arguments rendered above are sound, we reach to a criterion in order to interpret Mullā Sadrā’s view on the relationship between existence and essence: his thesis that existence is real is more fundamental than his explanation for the problem of essence’s being existence.
References
- Mīr Dāmād, Muhammad Bāqir. (1367H). al-Qabasāt, Edited by Mahī Muḥaqqiq, Tehan: TUP.
- Mīr Dāmād, Muhammad Bāqir. (1391H). al-’Ufuq al-Mubīn, Edited by Hāmid Nājī Iṣfahānī, Tehran: Mīrāth Maktūb.
- Mullā Sadrā, Muhammad, (1981). Al-Ḥikma al-Mut‘alīyah, Beyrouth: Dar Īḥya al-Turāth al-‘arabī.
- Mullā Sadrā, Muhammad, (1302H). Majmū‘a al-rasāil al-tes‘ah, Qum: Maktiba al-Muṣṭafā.
- Mullā Sadrā, Muhammad, (1363H). al-Mashā‘ir, Edited by Henry Corbin, Tehran: Tahoori Library

One of the profound concepts in monotheistic religions and Islam is the culture of prayer and supplication. If the truth of prayer and its acceptance is not explained well, some ambiguities will associate certain theological discussions like the system of divine destiny and providence. In the current essay we have adopted a philosophical and rational approach to discuss the issue of acceptance of prayer in transcendent theosophy. We have focused on one of the key ambiguities, i.e. the relationship between acceptance of prayer and the system of destiny and providence. In the present article we have sought to provide an analysis of the issue of acceptance (granting) of prayer and its relationship with the system of destiny and providence based on Mulla Sadra's ontological perspective of the universe as well as his view of the hierarchy of the existential and epistemic initiation. The basic question of the current inquiry is as follows: "What kind of relationship does exist between the system of divine destiny and providence and the issue of acceptance of prayer according to the intellectual principles of Mulla Sadra?" Some of the points which have been uncovered through this research consist of: acceptance of prayer not only is not in conflict with the system of divine destiny and providence rather it is a part of this system and represents the means and medium through which the prayer reaches its destination. Prayer and its acceptance does not lie outside the causal system which is in line with the divine providence and there is a type of unity between the cause of acceptance of prayer and the Decretum Dei.



One of the revealed decrees of humans that have their origin in genesis is the issue of prayer, relationship with God and invocation to Divinity. According to this genetic and revealed law, believers ask their Lord to change their destiny through invocation to Him. On the other hand, one of the issue that is unanimously accepted by the men of faith according to monotheism is the divine providence based on which the destiny of all contingent beings is decided.
If a good explanation is not provided for this issue it might seem to be in conflict with some other issues like the problem of prayer and its effect on the change of human destiny. For if human destiny is decided and certain according to the system of destiny and providence, then invocation and prayer will be a baseless activity. In the current essay we have sought to analyze and study the truth of acceptance of prayer as well as divine providence and the way that invocation can change the destiny and providence based on Mulla Sadra's epistemic approach.
The data for current study have been collected through library based investigations and after that they were analyzed and critically reviewed.
The following points represent the achievements of the current research on the possibility of change of human destiny and divine providence through invocation and prayer:

One of the fundamental differences between human divine destiny and providence and those of other living beings is the existence of free will and volition in man. Will has a key role in human activities and can play a major role in his destiny and providence. Thus, every action which is volitional can be considered to be a part of his destiny and providence and is effective in his destiny. Accordingly, prayer is a volitional action and an effective factor in human destiny and providence.

According to Mulla Sadra, the level of destiny or "Um al-Kitab" is unchangeable and is referred to also as the Protected Slate and Supreme Pen. The level of providence, size and geometry is called "Book of Elimination and Establishment" because there is a possibility of change of destiny, its elimination or establishment.

In existential analysis of the issue of prayer, the acceptance of prayer does also find an existential meaning and burden according to which human request will not be necessarily and wholly realized rather in the depth of the granting of invocation and prayer the essential relationship between man and God is realized. Then, in the existential perspective of prayer, the latter is a type of human existential initiation and ascension which will be followed by human existential perfection and existential intensification in the course of acceptance.



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The main question in this article is how egoism evidence can consistent with the theory of divine grace and God's original Favor to the “other”? In addition, the hypothesis is that: Egoism in the human realm is contradicted by Altruism, but of God Egoism does not conflict with Altruism. The reason for this is the unity of God, as the absolute perfect does not have any defect. Sadra's philosophy is: The attention of God to the creatures requires perfectibility, and the perfectibility is a sign of defect. Therefore, if God wants to be Altruism, it must be incomplete, while God is Super perfection, so God is not Altruism. The second obstacle to God's Altruism in Mulla Sadra's philosophy is In Islamic philosophy in general and in
Sadra's philosophy in particular, it is said that: God loves himself, and his love for himself requires his love for the world. Because the whole world is his works and love is effective, it is the same love for the work. In other words: God's love for creatures, then his love for himself and his love for himself. Therefore, God has an extraordinary interest to others, and this can be contrasted with the transformation in which the noble intention is raised. Then all ends come to the subject, and referring all ends to the subject can be a kind of Egoism in which the acts of any being, including God, are always affected by one motive, and that motive is nothing but the Self-love and God is no exception to this rule. Therefore, God is not Altruism. In this study, based on the internal possibilities of Mulla Sadra's philosophy, we are in this study, based on the internal possibilities of Mulla Sadra's philosophy; we are Analyzed two of these obstacles and criticize. In this paper, the library method is used, and it is the method of content analysis, and the opposite evidence of the problem (= God's Altruism) will be presented, explained and analyzed, and argued for the benefit of the problem. The structure of this paper will thus be that in the first part, the literature of the research will be titled and the opposite evidence of the problem will be clarified, then the opposite evidence will be criticized, finally, the Conclusion will be made. 1. The center of psychological and moral egoism is in the human domain, but it is possible to search for the components of egoism in a metaphysical domain, which does not mean a Category Mistake and does not apply a blind metaphor to the facts.
2. In Mulla Sadra's philosophy, there are two main obstacles in the issue of God's Altruism, namely: “Excellent no attention to below” and “reference for all purposes to the subject”. In the present study, these two obstacles have been criticized, and it has been shown that God is not egoism, but he is an Altruism, and since God is the ultimate being and the ultimate perfection, he is the most complete Altruism. In addition, because he is rich, he is absolute to provide the best of good for others without any reason.
3. An excellent being, such as God, which is by defining the most complete being, consists of all perfections, including justice, based on the principle of justice, does not injustice anyone, and It does not need the interests and perfection. And don’t conflict between its interests and the “other” interests. Therefore, there is no conflict with God's Altruism.
4. In Mulla Sadra's philosophy, according to the principle of “simple reality is everything” and the existential analysis of the principle of causation, one can show that “reference for all purposes to the subject” is not in conflict with the original attention of God.
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Wisdom and power can be regarded as the principles used by philosophers in their encounter with the universe and its explication. In the current essay, wisdom is understood as a basis for understanding the affairs which are immune to change and mortality. The power also represents one's ability to determine and change all judgments and relations on behalf of power. Then, if a philosopher considers the essential features of all entities to be existentiated, in the view of such philosopher power does not have any limitation and power will be the basis for him. But if we consider relations immune to change we have indeed prioritized the wisdom over the power and sided with the idea of priority of wisdom over the power. In the eyes of such philosopher the wisdom will be the basis. In the present article we seek to articulate this priority of wisdom over power in transcendent theosophy of Mulla Sadra based on his doctrine of primacy of existence. To this end, we will investigate the works of Mulla Sadra focusing on the doctrine of primacy of existence.

1.Introduction The relationship between wisdom and power is one of controversial philosophical issues. This relationship can be analyzed from various points of view. In the current essay we have sought to approach the issue from an ontological point of view.
One of the reasons that are proposed for demonstration of the idea of "primacy of existence" is the impossibility of the existentiation of the essence of the contingent beings. The essence of contingent beings is not existentiable. Thus, what is essentially existentiated by the existentiator is existence. It is indeed existence that becomes existentiated by the existentiator and it is through this existentiation that the contingent being becomes realized.
Existentiation of existence or essence is a philosophical problem. But in the domain of empirical sciences it can be discussed too. The researcher of empirical sciences can create new stuff through laboratorial works and mixing certain materials with other materials. He can also analyze it. Nevertheless, the identity of this new stuff is unknown and its recognition requires some efforts. Thus, even in empirical domain we should believe in the existentiation of existence versus essence.
Existentiation of essence is considered to be impossible due to the impossibility of existentiation of necessary judgments. Necessary judgments are among the affairs in which one cannot think of existentiation. Then, any idea that would lead to the existentiation of necessary judgments will be impossible and unjustified.
As to the comprehensive inclusion of power versus necessary judgments one should say that it implies the priority of power over the wisdom. When we regard power to include necessary judgments and do not consider the latter to be free from the domination of the power we have indeed prioritized the power over wisdom and made the latter subjugated to the former because it is the power that is decisive in all judgments, even in necessary judgments, and it is this power that determines the rules of wisdom and there is no restriction from this point of view.
Thus, the problem of primacy of existence or primacy of essence constitutes significant backgrounds for the thinker's theorization. If the thinker's intellectual efforts are aimed at the search for wisdom in this case the necessary judgments will be beyond the domain of power and he will define power over against the necessary affairs. But if the deepest layers of a thinker's thought are consisted of power he will give priority to power as against everything even the necessary judgments.
But the ideas proposed by Muslim theosophers in this regard and the denial of possibility of existentiation of necessary judgments and the impossibility of attribution of power to impossible affairs have their origin in religious sources. Wisdom and power can be regarded as the principles used by philosophers in their encounter with the universe and its explication. In the current essay, wisdom is understood as a basis for understanding affairs which are immune to change and mortality. Here we refer to two examples. Imam Ali is quoted to have been asked once whether God is able to put the universe inside an egg without minimizing that or maximizing this. Imam says: God is not unable but this is impossible (Mulla Sadra, 1987, vol. 3: 30). Such an answer suggests that Imam Ali does not make wisdom subjugated to power and gives priority to wisdom over power. Although Imam does not introduce the power as an absolute thing he still allows some domain of influence for it. Thus, here we are encountered with an original view of the priority of wisdom over power. If a philosopher considers the essential features of all entities to be existentiated in the view of such philosopher power does not have any limitation and power will be the basis for him. But if we consider relations in which there is no change we have indeed prioritized the wisdom over the power and sided with the idea of priority of wisdom over the power. In the eyes of such philosopher the wisdom will be the basis. In the present article we seek to articulate this priority of wisdom over power in transcendent theosophy of Mulla Sadra based on his doctrine of primacy of existence. To this end, we will investigate the doctrine of primacy of existence.
References:- Mulla Sadra, Four Intellectual Journeys on Transcendent Theosophy, Tehran, Sadra Foundation of Islamic Philosophy, 2003, vol. 1.
- Foulquié, Paul, General Introduction Philosophy or Metaphysics, trans. Yahya Mahdavi, Tehran University Press, 1998.
- Motahari, Collected Works, Tehran, Sadra, vol. 10.

According to Aristotle, definition is the first step to aquire scientific knowledge. And the full knowledge of objects is possible only by knowing their essence and essential definition. Following Aristotle, Avicenna thinks that the full knowledge of things is gained through the knowledge of their essence. Admitting the difficulty of understanding the essentials of objects, he states, based on his essentialist doctrine, that real definition should imply quiddity, truth and perfection of essential existence of the limited object so that it represents all its essence. But man can not identify essentials of objects and true definitions of them. Avicenna describes details of all kinds of definitions, and this article we modifies and completes the rules of Aristotle's theory of definition. In will explain it.
Keywords: Essentialism, Real Definitions, Genus and Differentia, Aristotle, Avicenna.


Distinguishing between essential and accidental attributes of objects, Aristotle chooses essentialism as his approach. Avicenna shows interest in Aristotelian essentialism in some of his works, but in other works he claims that kowing the essential features of objects is beyond human epistemic capacity and thus modifies the rules of the Aristotelian definitions.
2. Aristotelian Essentialism about Definition:According to Aristotle, sensitive perception represents the knowledge of particular objects and is not considered an example of scientific knowledge; but these very sensitive observations assist the intellect to discover the hidden universals within particular objects and pave the way for the reason to get access to the specific form of objects and distinguish between their essential and accidental features and succeed in revealing their true nature.
Aristotle in his metaphysical discussions distinguishes between real and nominal definitions and declares both of them possible and considers the real definition to be the first step for acquiring the scientific knowledge of objects. According to Aristotle, perfect knowledge of objects can be achieved merely by the knowledge of their nature and essence. Real definition of an object is a statement that expresses its essential features, without mentioning the name of the object itself in the definition. This definition is composed of genus (non-conditioned as a matter) and differentia (non-conditioned as a form), and it is always universal and affirmative.
3. Avicenna's Notion of Definition and His Critisism of Aristotelian Definition:Avicenna's words in Shifa and Isharat, like followers of Aristotle, are focused on the possibility of the knowledge of essential features of objects; in the essay devoted to the issue of definition in his book entitled Nijat, Avicenna endorses the possibility of definition and at the same time highlights the absolute difficulty of definition, including real and nominal definitions. However, in his book entitled Ta'liqat he clearly argues that true definition of objects is out of the reach of man. In his book entitled Mantiq al-Mashriqyyin, he provides a detailed discussion of various types of definition and makes some modifications in Aristotelian rules of definition.
In Ta'liqat, Avicenna declares real definition composed of genus and differentia to be impossible and criticizes Aristotle's method as incorrect. He restricts human knowledge of objects to knowing their features, requirements and accidents and denied the possibility of knowing their essential features and real definitions. He claims that the first epistemic means of human being is sense, which touches the superficial aspects of objects; then man distinguishes between identical and different perceptions using his intellectual powers and reason and thus understands some of their attributes and requirements and remains uninformed about others. If man was able to perceive the truth of objects he could be aware of all requirements; then man is not able to know the essence and truth of objects.
Moreover, difference of opinions regarding the nature of objects is a sign of human reason's inability to understand essential attributes of objects. Knowledge of the true differentia of compound objects lies beyond the ability of man's intellectual perception and he has access only to their requirements. So, man calls their common requirements as genus while he calls their special requirements differentia and particular accident. For example, thinking is not the true differentia of human being, but rather one of the requirements of his true differentia. Furthermore, simple objects have no genus and differentia so that man could know them by knowing these. For this reason, man does not have any access to the knowledge of the essence of objects. The completely immaterial objects are considered as externally simple and intellectually compound, as accidents. The essence of the completely immaterial entities is simple and lacks any matter or external form. We assume genus and differenia for them and bring these in their essential definition. Genus and differentia are declared to be mental matter and form when these are considered without any condition and in this case, they are parts of real definition, not components of simple entities. So, in fact, neither the essence of compound entities nor the essence of simple entities is accessible to man. Aristotle believes that every object has an essence and definition aims at knowing this very essence. Aristotle's followers contend that true definition is difficult to reach, but many Muslim philosophers in general and Avicenna in particular in some of his works argue that essential attributes of objects lie beyond the limits of human intellect.
Reaching the true genus and differentia of objects and knowing their essential features is not possible for man. What is declared to be the differentia of the object is in fact its logical differentia, which is in turn the requirement of true differentia. However, knowledge of some of the essential features and requirements leads to the undetailed knowledge of the truths of objects and their features. The major purpose of the definition is thus achieved and man is delivered from the vortex of doubt and sophistry.


- Aristotle (1980 AD), Aristotelian logic, Abdul Rahman Badawi’s research, Beirut, Dar al-Qalam, 2,418
- Aristotle (2006 AD), metaphysics, translated by Mohammad Hassan Lotfi, Tehran, Tarh-e-now, 63
- Ibn Sina, Hussein bin Abdullah (1982 AD), Mantiq Al-Mashriqiyin, Shukri al-Najjar’s introduction, Beirut, Dar Al-hedatheh, 59-67
- Ibn Sina (1404 AH), Al-ta’liqat, Abdul Rahman Badawi’s research, Qom, School Al-Alam al-salami, 34

The current studies have revealed that there are some similarities between the philosophical foundations of Sohrab Sepehri's poems and some phenomenological notions. The essence of Sepehri's message as well as that of phenomenologists is that human being should discover himself or herself through his or her pure cognitive nature, and not from science or books. Following a descriptive and content analysis approach, in this study, we have dealt with the phenomenological thoughts on the creation of some innovative image in Sepehri's poems. It is assumed that some of Sepehri's images cannot be revealed just by literary analysis, and a philosophical perspective is required too. To create images like 'a mere bird' and 'the frank sunlight', Sepehri has resorted to some notions in phenomenology. Edmund Husserl has opened a novel area of thought called 'epoche'. It refers to a stage of cognition in which the mere self or the thoughtful self and observer suspends all his or her judgements on the existence of the world. When Sepehri pens; 'the mere bird sings.', his goal is not just creating a foregrounded and innovative image, but indeed he attempts to give weight to a concept like 'epoche' by his own philosophical impressions.

Sohrab Sepehri is one of the most celebrated figures of the Iranian contemporary poets. His distinct language and thought has attracted the attention of a great number of readers of poems. In this study, we have analyzed a type of his images through Edmund Husserl's phenomenology.
The current studies indicate that there are some similarities as well as matches between the philosophical foundations of Sohrab Sepehri's poems and some phenomenological notions. In effect, this study does not aim to give a thorough picture of phenomenological aspects of Sepehri's poetry. However, in some cases a brief explanation on similarities is provided. An invitation to intuitive understanding and direct, immediate wisdom about the surrounding world and the unity of subject and object, and dealing with the essence of things constitute the main teachings of Sepehri's poetry, teachings which go hand by hand with phenomenological notions. The gist of Sepehri's poetry is that human being must acquire an understanding directly from nature, and not from science or books. Following a descriptive and content analysis approach, in this study, we have dealt with the phenomenological thoughts on the creation of some innovative image in Sepehri's poems. It is assumed that there are some of Sepehri's images and rhetorical techniques are not revealed just by literary analysis, and some domains such as philosophy are also required too. To create images like 'a mere bird', 'the frank sunlight', 'the mere forehead', 'the mere instant' and 'the white event', Sepehry has resorted to some notions in Husserl's phenomenology. In effect, in creating such images, Sepehri has paid attention to the idea of 'epoche', a notion in Husserl's phenomenology. 'Epoche' is a stage of cognition where 'the mere I' or 'the thoughtful and observing I' suspends all judgements on the existence of the physical world. By saying 'The mere bird sings', Sepehri is not merely providing an innovative and foregrounded image, but also relies on philosophical notions in order to refer to a concept like 'epoche'. 'Epoche' suspends any philosophical judgment on the real world and pushes presuppositions related to a specific area to the periphery. In an expression like 'mere bird', Sepehri comprehends bird without any sort of characteristic and feature. The idea of 'seeing in a different way' maintains that the observer should leave all presuppositions and comprehends the world directly. Sepehri connects to the essence of bird, forgetting any distinctive idea about the bird. Relying on an idea similar to 'epoche' he attempts to draw the attention of the reader to the very bird, without any judgment about the bird. In the poem 'There was no lake, there was a white event and nothing else', the rest would be interpreted by the reader depending on his own life-world. Sepehri has such approach towards the world and he does not let presuppositions make us see vulture and clover flower as ugly and debased things. He recommends his readers to suspend their presuppositions on the real world. As such, sometimes philosophical perspectives provide novel images to deeply comprehend literary texts.
It is not clear whether Sepehri had been familiar with ideas of phenomenologists such as Husserl. Maybe he was exposed to such ideas while studying in Faculty of Fine Arts of Tehran, or during his trips to Europe and U.S. It would also be possible that Sepehri had acquired such ideas through Krishnamurti's thoughts. Likewise, a personal conduct is not impossible too.
The distinct wording of Sepehri has made some of his poems ambiguous in such a way that critics had to evade some images by just general remarks. Here, it is argued that the attempts made by all critics to interpret linguistic and aesthetic aspects of such images are not fully successful as Sepehri's images are the result of his philosophical insight. His motivation to create such images was philosophical rather than literary. Most of the excellence of these images lies in his philosophical framework and his novel look to the universe. Therefore, familiarity with phenomenological thoughts could help readers to understand Sepehri's abstract images. Images like 'mere bird', 'absolute forehead', 'explicit sun', 'explicit Vodka', 'pure spot', 'pure things', 'mere lands', 'clarity of pigeons', 'no-discount decisive presence', and 'persistent mournful color' are waiting for philosophical reading rather literary interpretation. It is Sepehri's philosophical thoughts and intuitive understanding of universe and life that have made him create such images, not just a tendency to bring innovation to his poems, a tendency popular among other poets.
It seems that 'look' and 'wonder' in Sepehri's poetry are poetic counterparts for phenomenological suspension, and even if they do not match together completely, these two conditions follow a phenomenological suspension. A 'look' for this poet equals 'we should wash our eyes and see in some other way' and this would be impossible unless a phenomenological suspension is occurred whereby all presuppositions are suspended. Sepehri has followed Husserl's recommendation let alone he has been familiar with the philosopher's theory or not, as firstly always his consciousness involved things in the real world; Secondly, Sepehri has always escaped the conceptual thinking. Shamisa's and Shafiei Kadkani's explanation of Sepehri's poems involve conceptual thinking. Thirdly, in Sepehri's poem, world acquires authenticity as it appears, and this world is distinct from the world made in Sepehri's mind (i.e. idealistic world), and the independent world (i.e. realistic world) which is reflected in conceptual thinking.
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Norberg- Schulz, c. (2000) Architeture: Presence, Language, Place, Milan: Akira.
- Rashidian, Abdolkarim (2009). Husserls in context of his works, 2nd Edition, Tehran: Ney Publishers.
- Sepehri, Sohrab (2003). Eight Books. 36th Edition, Tehran: Tahoori Publishers.
- Shafiei Kadkani, Mohammad Reza (2003). Imagery in Persian Poetry, 9th Edition, Tehran: Negah Publishers.
- Shamlou, Ahmad (2003). Anthology of Works, First Book: Poems, 4th Edition, Tehran: Negah Publishers

In this article‚ after giving a brief account of characteristics and contents of Gulshan-i Rrāz (The Secret Rose Garden) and Mahāyānah Sutras‚ we try to answer the principal questions on “Thought” and problems relating to it. This article consists of three parts. In the first part‚ the nature of “Thought” in Gulshan-i Rāz and Mahāyānah Sutras is discussed. In the second part‚ the different levels of “Thought” are studied. Furthermore, it is stated that in Gulshan-i Rāz and Mahāyānah Sutras “Thought” and “Intuition” show in two realms of rational and pararational perspectives. In the third part‚ it is stated that‚ although belonging to two different traditions‚ Gulshan-i Rāz and Mahāyānah Sutras place “Visionary Knowledge” above “Thinking”. For “Visionary Knowledge” can purify one’s heart of worldly pollutions‚ but “Thinking” cannot bring human beings to knowing all truths and setting themselves free from pain. So Gulshan-i Rāz and Mahāyānah Sutras clearly call human beings to “Visionary Knowledge”, since‚ according to the above sources‚ this level above “Thinking” is identical with union. Findings of this study show that mystical systems approximate each other in the subject of epistemology.
Keywords: Thinking, Intuition, Gulshan-i Raz, Mahāyānah Sutras One of the works in mystical thinking in which the mystical meanings and mysteries are versified‚ is the Rhyming Couplet (Mathnawi) of Gulshan-i Rāz (The Secret Rose Garden) by the Sufi Poet Maḥmud Shabistarī. In Buddisim‚ in addition to accepting the scriptures of Mahāyāna cult and Hināyāna sect, there exists a great collection of Sutras. Although belonging to two various traditions‚ Gulshan-i Rāz and Mahāyānah Sutras have great resemblances together in diferent subjects. In this article‚ after giving a brief account of the characteristics of Gulshan-i Rāz and Mahāyānah Sutras‚ we seek to answer some principal questions on “Thought” and problems relating to it. One of the most fundamental problems in Gulshan-i Raz and MahayanaSutras revolves around the issue of “thinking”. In Gulshan-i Raz, thinking is a spiritual quest from the appearance to the inner side. However, thinking is “an inner enlightenment” in MahayanaSutras, that is, wisdom, which is not gained through acquisitions but through presence and intuition. In the world view which is common between Gulshan-i Raz and Mahayana Sutras, thinking is divided into rational thinking and discovery thinking (Prajna). Rational thinking is achieved through theoretical understanding and striving. However, discovery thinking is manifested in the light of experience beyond the intellectual striving, that is, intuition of the human heart. Moreover, in the common world view of Gulshan-i Raz and Mahayana Sutras, intuitive thinking is of higher dignity and rank than rational thinking because this aspect of pure thinking can erase the seeker’s heart from the contaminations of the secular world and has a significant role in understanding the facts of existence in the current life. Although rational thinking, which is obtained from common forms of this world, is a valid method in its own territory, it does not have the capability of rescuing and relieving human from discomforting elements. Accordingly, despite their differences in such aspects as priority and posterity of rank and the degree of emphasis on the issue and the effects of thinking, Gulshan-i Raz and Mahayana Sutras, according to their structural similarities and common motifs, call humans clearly to intuition and intuitive thinking. It is due to the fact that this level of intuition, that is intuition in mystical rituals, is the same as the “reaching” to the Union. This work was a library research conducted in analytical and descriptive way. The method of analysis has been comparative regarding thought and intuition in Gulshan-i Rāz (The Secret Rose Garden)and Mahāyānah Sutras (cf. Asanga, 45-7; Conze, 71).
3. Findings and The findings of this study indicate that mystical systems bear great resemblances to each other in the subject of epistemology (cf. Lāhījī, 470). As far as thought and intuition are concerned, it is evident that these two concepts are quintessential in all mystical systems which are partly intellectual and partly intuitional in nature. It is evident that rational thought means the rational endeavour to discover the truth, whereas intuition in the human beings occurs when human beings approach the internal way. Moreover, the results of the intuition are initially realized from the pararational thought. It is amazing that rational thought is accompanied with doubt and uncertainty. However, intuition is a realm which does not need to philosophy or logical demonstration. The main point these two texts stress on is that intuiton needs hardship and Monasticism. Furthermore, in these two texts, epistemology is equal to ontology. Another point is that Gulshan-i Rāz and Mahāyānah Sutras emphasize that in the realm of wisdom the more one obtanis purification and sanctity, the higher is their degree. It is concluded that in the methodology of comparative mysticism, despite some conscpicuous differences, the degree of adaptability and conformity of mystical systems, especially on the question of mystical and epistemological problems, is very high. Gulshan-i Eāz and Mahāyānah Sutras place “Visionary Knowledge” above “Thinking”, for “Visionary Knowledge” can purify one’s heart of worldly pollutions‚ but “Thinking” cannot bring human beings to knowing all truths and setting him or her free of things of pain. So Gulshan-i Rāz and Mahayana Sutras clearly call human beings to “Visionary Knowledge” because‚ according to these sources‚ this level above “Thinking” is identical with the Union.
1. Asanga, S. (1995) ‚ Mahayana Sutra Lamkara. Translated by Surekhavijaylimaye‚ New Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications.
2. Conze, E. (1978). The prajna Parmita Literature. Second Edition, Tokyo: The Rai Yukai.
3. Lāhījī‚ S. M. (1381SH). Mafātīḥ al-I‛jāz Fi Sharḥ-iGulshan-i rāz. Introducted‚ Edited and Annotated by M. Barzigar Khālighi and E. Karbāsi. Tehran: nashr-i

Undoubtedly, Kant is one of the most effective figures in the history of western philosophy because he created a great evolution in this history by his so-called Copernican revolution and the interwoven relation of subject and object. As is acknowledged by many scholars, Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most important epistemological works in the new era that has set the boundaries of knowledge and has offered a new and unmatched description of how knowledge is gained by subject. Accordingly, most released commentaries of Kant’s philosophical outlook are epistemological. But Alain Badiou, contemporary French philosopher, contrary to common interpretation, presents an ontological one. He himself offers a kind of ontology named subtractive ontology, and believes that we can recognize it, due to how Kant formulates transcendental subject and object, forms of sensible intuition, and categories of understanding. As a result, he describes the features of Kantian ontology in his works Briefings on Existence and Theoretical Writings. The authors of this article see his claim notable and realizable. So, we will try to introduce the specifications of subtractive ontology and then check Badiou’s claim of Kant’s ontology. Finally, we will explain some reasons to criticize his belief.
Key Words: Badiou, Kant, Subtractive Ontology, Transcendental Subject, Transcendental Object The authors of this article try to read Badiou’s interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. In doing so, first we see two of his most famous books about Kant: Briefings on Existence and Theoretical Writings. In them, he claims that Kant should be read as an ontologist, because of some main notions as subject and object. Then, he tries to compare ontology in Kant with the one he names subtractive ontology and which is based on mathematics. So, we read his book, Being and Event, and review some of Badiou’s important ontological foundations as situation, set theory, void set, presentation, power set etc. in order to study his claim.
According to Badiou, the existence of transcendental subject and transcendental object, which he names proto-transcendental subject and proto- transcendental object, proves that we can consider Kant as an ontologist, and therefore an ontological interpretation of him is inevitable. In spite of this claim, Badiou also remember that, because of relational character of subject and object, we essentially describe them as epistemological entities.
Finally, we conclude that ontological and epistemological interpretation of Kant seems inseparable. For this reason, we have to pay attention to key role of void in Badiou's ontology, i.e. subtractive ontology, and show its differences with Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Ontology in Kant, according to Heidegger, is preceded by epistemology and, according to Badiou, they are implicit in Kant's thought; hence, according to Heidegger, Kant's ontology is complete and more important than epistemology. In contrast, Badiou says that Kant cannot never completely rid himself of epistemological strains. Heidegger even talks about Kant's ability to better understand. He believes that if we consider Kant to be an ontologist, we can understand him better than himself. Badiou believes that by relying more on a number of categories, instead of relying on the connection between the subject and the object, the Kantian can be seen deeper than conventional and epistemological believers. Kant is an ontologist.
However, Badiou's insistence on the existence of Kant's ontological dimensions is significant. On the one hand, he himself cannot ignore the great and inevitable role of epistemology in Kant, because the characteristics of the subject and object in his view, moreover, of the form of formation Recognizing the human being from the real world through the certainty and necessity of the past elements, and drawing the focus of past writing theorems. Therefore, the relationship between the whole and the whole subject with the object makes it impossible for each other to exist, because, in Kant's opinion, the subject creates the universe; therefore, the existence of the subject and object serves their epistemological function. Whereas the distinction Kant between Neumann and Phenomenon confines his ontological view to phenomena, while he does not directly associate the existence with such a distinction, he basically dismisses it. Counts On the other hand, the elements of Kant's philosophy, as the ontological foundations, cannot be fully coherent with the definition of a person from the ontology of introspection, because the recognition of concepts such as subject, object, sensory intuition, and categories Understanding their epistemological functions in Kant's view of one and the other, and the reasons for their explanation, namely, the need to respond to the circumstances of Kant's time on the other. Consequently, even if we want to accept the ontology of the discourse in Kant, we must rightly affirm that the ontology of discourse in Kant is on epistemology. - Badiou, A. (2006) a. Being and Event, translated by Oliver Feltham, London: Continuum.
- Badio, A. (2006) b. Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology, translated by Norman Madarasz, New York: SUNY Press.
- Badiou, A. (2009) Logics of Worlds, translated by Alberto Toscano, London: Continuum.
- Badiou, A. (1991) "On a Finally Objectless Subject", in Who Comes after the Subject, translated by B.Fink, 24-32, New York: Routledge.
- Badiou, A. (2004) Theoretical Writings, translated by Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano, New York: Continuum.
- Forster, Michael N. (2008) Kant and skepticism, Prinston University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1990) Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Forth edition enlarged, translated by Richard Taft, Bloomington: Indian University Press.
- Kant, I. (1998) Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kullman, O. (2011) Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Alain Badiou: Mathematics, Ontology, Politics, available in http://cs.swan.ac.uk/~csoliver/ Sun Yat-sen University, Institute of Logic and Cognition.
- Wolf, R. P. (1963) Kant`s Theory of Mental Activity, A Commentary on the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique…, United States: Harvard University Press.

Undoubtedly, Kant is one of the most effective figures in the history of western philosophy because he created a great evolution in this history by his so-called Copernican revolution and the interwoven relation of subject and object. As is acknowledged by many scholars, Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most important epistemological works in the new era that has set the boundaries of knowledge and has offered a new and unmatched description of how knowledge is gained by subject. Accordingly, most released commentaries of Kant’s philosophical outlook are epistemological. But Alain Badiou, contemporary French philosopher, contrary to common interpretation, presents an ontological one. He himself offers a kind of ontology named subtractive ontology, and believes that we can recognize it, due to how Kant formulates transcendental subject and object, forms of sensible intuition, and categories of understanding. As a result, he describes the features of Kantian ontology in his works Briefings on Existence and Theoretical Writings. The authors of this article see his claim notable and realizable. So, we will try to introduce the specifications of subtractive ontology and then check Badiou’s claim of Kant’s ontology. Finally, we will explain some reasons to criticize his belief.
Key Words: Badiou, Kant, Subtractive Ontology, Transcendental Subject, Transcendental Object The authors of this article try to read Badiou’s interpretation of Kant’s philosophy. In doing so, first we see two of his most famous books about Kant: Briefings on Existence and Theoretical Writings. In them, he claims that Kant should be read as an ontologist, because of some main notions as subject and object. Then, he tries to compare ontology in Kant with the one he names subtractive ontology and which is based on mathematics. So, we read his book, Being and Event, and review some of Badiou’s important ontological foundations as situation, set theory, void set, presentation, power set etc. in order to study his claim.
According to Badiou, the existence of transcendental subject and transcendental object, which he names proto-transcendental subject and proto- transcendental object, proves that we can consider Kant as an ontologist, and therefore an ontological interpretation of him is inevitable. In spite of this claim, Badiou also remember that, because of relational character of subject and object, we essentially describe them as epistemological entities.
Finally, we conclude that ontological and epistemological interpretation of Kant seems inseparable. For this reason, we have to pay attention to key role of void in Badiou's ontology, i.e. subtractive ontology, and show its differences with Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Ontology in Kant, according to Heidegger, is preceded by epistemology and, according to Badiou, they are implicit in Kant's thought; hence, according to Heidegger, Kant's ontology is complete and more important than epistemology. In contrast, Badiou says that Kant cannot never completely rid himself of epistemological strains. Heidegger even talks about Kant's ability to better understand. He believes that if we consider Kant to be an ontologist, we can understand him better than himself. Badiou believes that by relying more on a number of categories, instead of relying on the connection between the subject and the object, the Kantian can be seen deeper than conventional and epistemological believers. Kant is an ontologist.
However, Badiou's insistence on the existence of Kant's ontological dimensions is significant. On the one hand, he himself cannot ignore the great and inevitable role of epistemology in Kant, because the characteristics of the subject and object in his view, moreover, of the form of formation Recognizing the human being from the real world through the certainty and necessity of the past elements, and drawing the focus of past writing theorems. Therefore, the relationship between the whole and the whole subject with the object makes it impossible for each other to exist, because, in Kant's opinion, the subject creates the universe; therefore, the existence of the subject and object serves their epistemological function. Whereas the distinction Kant between Neumann and Phenomenon confines his ontological view to phenomena, while he does not directly associate the existence with such a distinction, he basically dismisses it. Counts On the other hand, the elements of Kant's philosophy, as the ontological foundations, cannot be fully coherent with the definition of a person from the ontology of introspection, because the recognition of concepts such as subject, object, sensory intuition, and categories Understanding their epistemological functions in Kant's view of one and the other, and the reasons for their explanation, namely, the need to respond to the circumstances of Kant's time on the other. Consequently, even if we want to accept the ontology of the discourse in Kant, we must rightly affirm that the ontology of discourse in Kant is on epistemology. - Badiou, A. (2006) a. Being and Event, translated by Oliver Feltham, London: Continuum.
- Badio, A. (2006) b. Briefings on Existence: A Short Treatise on Transitory Ontology, translated by Norman Madarasz, New York: SUNY Press.
- Badiou, A. (2009) Logics of Worlds, translated by Alberto Toscano, London: Continuum.
- Badiou, A. (1991) "On a Finally Objectless Subject", in Who Comes after the Subject, translated by B.Fink, 24-32, New York: Routledge.
- Badiou, A. (2004) Theoretical Writings, translated by Ray Brassier and Alberto Toscano, New York: Continuum.
- Forster, Michael N. (2008) Kant and skepticism, Prinston University Press.
- Heidegger, M. (1990) Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Forth edition enlarged, translated by Richard Taft, Bloomington: Indian University Press.
- Kant, I. (1998) Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kullman, O. (2011) Some Remarks on the Philosophy of Alain Badiou: Mathematics, Ontology, Politics, available in http://cs.swan.ac.uk/~csoliver/ Sun Yat-sen University, Institute of Logic and Cognition.
- Wolf, R. P. (1963) Kant`s Theory of Mental Activity, A Commentary on the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique…, United States: Harvard University Press.

The controversial idea of incommensurability in Kuhn’s works was gradually replaced by the translatability thesis, for which two distinct arguments could be formulated. The first is extracted from his theoretical contextual approach to meaning, and the second form his taxonomic conception of natural kind terms. According to each one, it could be given an untranslatability condition, in terms of which we can talk about untranslatability of theories with different vocabularies. I will formulate these untranslatability conditions in this essay, confessing that accepting these conditions will terribly limit the possibility of translation. On the other hand, the maxims critics of Kuhn suggested for translation involves a potential tension and fail to play the role a reliable maxim plays in a translation. In fact, within various versions of these maxims, there is a potential tension between maximizing rationality and maximizing truth in the original text that makes us suspect to follow them systematically.
Keywords: Incommensurability, Untranslatability, Classification of natural kinds, Principle of charity, Principle of humanity


Incommensurability, the most frequent term in debates on Kuhn, was not originally a homogenous term. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions different meanings were meant by incommensurability, which can be distinguished in three types; epistemological, semantic and perceptual. In next writings, however, he restricted it in semantic type. But even this type was not a stable idea. While incommensurability was originally related to communication failure, it was connected then to untranslatability. In addition while he initially seemed to claim a total incommensurability between two theories with different vocabularies, in 1990s he restricted his claim to local incommensurability.
The terms he employed to explain incommensurability was not uniform too; in some cases it is formulated in terms of linguistic stuff like words, meaning and reference, and in other cases in terms of cognitive means like concept and classification. This difference leads to two different account of semantic incommensurability as untranslatability. What I’m concerned in this essay is the conditions for translatability which can be extracted from these two accounts. The first account is resulted from his contextual approach to meaning; a theory according to which meaning of a term is determined by its mode of application in that theory. Using conceptual role semantic the first condition for untranslatability can be articulated:First condition: two theories are untranslatable if and only if scientific laws and possible inferences in two theories do not correspond.
I employ this condition to show that why P. Kitcher’s response (1978) to Kuhn on theories in different sides of chemistry revolution in 19th century does not work. This condition, however, is too strong, respecting which not only revolutionary theories, but also most different theories are impossible to be translated.
The second account concentrates on concepts arranged in scientific classifications. This account seeks to exhaust content of a theory by classification, which includes an arrangement of specific categories with interconnected relations. Now the second condition can be introduced:Second condition: two theories are untranslatable if and only if there are cross-classifications between natural kinds in their domain.
As Career (2001) indicated this condition is neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not necessary because two conceptual systems may be untranslatable without violating principle of non-overlap in their lexical structure. It is also not sufficient, because the overlap between two taxonomies might be such that it can be amended and turn out to be consistent. This condition is weaker that what Kuhn needs to claim incommensurability between theories.
Then I attempt to show that while translation conditions are articulated, Kuhn's account of incommensurability requires more articulation, maxims for translation introduced by Kuhn’s critics, like Putnam (1980) and Davidson (1991) suffer from an essential tension which frustrates their projects. According to Davidson a translation must care a principle called principle of charity. This principle includes two distinct principles; according to first one, i.e. principle of coherence, the translator must maximize logical consistency in speaker’s thought. According to second principle, i.e. principle of correspondence, he must understand the speaker such that he is responding to the very features of the world to which the translator would respond in similar circumstances. By first principle the speaker seems to be almost rational, and by the second the translator attributes to the speaker some of what he considers to be true about the world. The principle of charity is result of two concerns; inferential concern and representational concern. Now the question is what should we do when these two maxims diverge; i.e. the inferential concern is in different direction from representational concern? Especially when there is no doubt, regarding pervious theories, that they are partially true. As was said, Kitcher’s question was to give instructions to determine how much Prestley says really. In fact, there is a way to separate items with a reference to the use of a phrase from non-reference items. In his current statement, his focus was on principle, with the aim of separating sentences which are based on the theory of the next. But I think that pursuing this concern will amount to a violation of the principle of solidarity. The principle of Putnam's Guide, by giving priority to the transfer and preservation of our concept of one thing in relation to our perception of it, inevitably makes the scientist's rationale sacrificed for the concept of its vocabulary. Davidson has also deliberately articulated two principles in his formulation of the principle of good faith.
- Carrier, M. (2001) 'Changing Laws and Shifting Concepts: On the Nature and Impact of Incommensurability' in Boyd, R. Hoyningen-Huene, P. Sankey, H. (2001) Incommensuraibility and related matters, Springer.
- Davidson,D. (1991)'Three Varieties of Knowledge', Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 30, pp 153-166.
- Kitcher, P. (1978) 'Theories, theorists, and Theoretical Change', The Philosophical Review, Vol. 87, No. 4 (Oct. 1978), pp. 519-547
- Kuhn, T. S. (1970) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed.
- Putnam, H. (1981) 'Two conceptions of rationality' in Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press