مجله پژوهش های اخلاقی
سال سوم شماره 3 (پیاپی 11، بهار 1392)

My aim is to reintroduce into the discussion of justice an element missing from recent accounts of it. In those accounts، the emphasis is on the formal framework within which to decide what is just. The framework consists of certain key values، a relevant set of actors، and a democratic procedure for decisions. I shall emphasize the need to go outside a formal framework in order to ask what we hope to accomplish by doing justice. Short of answering this question، we can’t know that the formal framework is right. This essay has three parts. I first sketch out a view of justice that goes beyond laying out any formal framework we must stay within to accomplish justice. In going beyond the formal، I argue that the goal of not weakening society is what is missing. Then I shall outline Nancy Fraser’s recent important contribution to answering what she terms the “what”، “who”، and “how” questions of justice. Finally، I try to show that her views are incomplete without addressing the question of the “why” of justice – the question of what we wish to accomplish by doing justice.

This article introduces Formal Axiology، first developed by Robert S. Hartman، and explains its essential features—a formal definition of “good” (the “Form of the Good”)، three basic kinds of value and evaluation—systemic، extrinsic، and intrinsic، and the hierarchy of value according to which good things having the richest quantity and quality of good-making properties are better than those having less. Formal Axiology is extended into moral philosophy by applying the Form of the Good to persons and showing how this culminates in an Axiological Virtue Ethics. This involves the systemic، extrinsic، and intrinsic goodness of persons، the intrinsic-good-making properties of persons، and the moral virtues that respect the intrinsic worth of persons in thoughts، feelings، and actions. A few obstacles to being and becoming morally good persons are also identified and explained.

This paper explores the role of moral philosophers in answering concrete moral conundrums. It proposes that the very stance we take up when we do moral philosophy — the theoretical، disengaged stance — encourages us in our tendency to self-deception rather than leading us honestly to confront the emotional obstacles that، often، block us from decent action. The proposal is defended by way of the astute account of self-deceit، and of the failings of moral philosophy، in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments.

All the theistic religions regard justice as a divine attribute. The holy book of Islam describes God as the ontological basis of justice (Āl-i ‘Imrān (3)، 18; Anbiyā (21)، 47). The Prophet Muhammad made frequent references to the justice of God in this world and in the Hereafter and exhorted Muslims to keep away from committing any kind of injustice to the servants of God، be they Muslims or non-Muslims. So the two fundamental sources of Islam state that God is just in His essence and in His acts (Sharīf al-Razī (1414)، sermons 185 & 191). The Old and New Testaments also pay a great importance to the issue of divine justice (Jeremiah، Ch. 50، p. 7). For example، the Biblical prophet Isaiah calls Yahweh the “Abode of Justice.” (Isaiah، Ch. 50، p. 7) In addition، the Scriptures describe divine judgments as just and right (Psalms، Ch. 119، p. 75). Thus، one can say that the scriptures of Islam، Christianity and Judaism have agreed upon God’s being just in His acts. However، the Muslim theologians elaborated upon the issues related to divine justice such as the consistency of divine justice with other divine attributes، the eternally staying of sinners in Hell، and the problem of evil.

Plato argues for the immortality of the soul. He presents his «substance dualism» in which the body is moving، material، and mortal، while the soul is unmoving، immaterial، and immortal. Aristotle states the unity of the soul and body on the basis of his «hylomorphism» in which the soul is the form of the body، so that it may not exist without the body. Descartes'' restating substance dualism to prove the soul''s immortality is an explicit objection to Aristotle’s view on human immortality and eventually leads to reduction of the soul to the mind. On the contrary، Mullā Sadrā holds that the soul enjoys unity and simplicity، really being identical with the body. He considers the soul as an entity having been created with the body. It becomes spiritual (and immortal) according to increasing its gradation of being through substantial motion. In this way، Mullā Sadrā argues for the soul''s immortality without ever referring to the soul-body dualism.

This paper engages in a transdisciplinary approach to and an intercultural perspective on the phenomenon of ‘otherness’ at the intersection of Ethics، Esthetics، and Cultural Studies. One of the most important contributions to the understanding of otherness is the careful deconstruction of dichotomies and generalizations. It also gives an example of intercultural understanding of otherness by a transdisciplinary deconstruction of the racial-esthetic black-white dichotomy. Since a transdisciplinary approach will be exploited for an intercultural topic the paper has to explore en passant the concepts of multi، inter and transculturality and – disciplinarity. Besides its philosophical rootedness the paper additionally utilizes the first person singular accounts and personal intercultural experience.