نشریه مطالعات اصول فقه امامیه
پیاپی 4 (پاییز و زمستان 1394)

One of the discussions brought up in the principles of jurisprudence (Usul-e Fiqh) is the use of a homonymous word, a word that has more than one meaning. It has been a matter of contention and discrepancy among the scholars of Ilm al-Usul whether or not it is permissible to use a word in more than one meaning. The main area around which discussions have been taking place is the Quran because one of the dimensions of the Quran is its inward meaning. Historically speaking, it was Raghib Isfahani (d. 425 A.H.) who first established a link between the esoteric meanings of the Quran and the use of the words in more than one meaning. However, this relationship and link has remained hidden to the scholars and experts in the field of the principles of jurisprudence. In the Shiite’s Usul-e Fiqh, it was about two hundred years ago when, in the time of Akhund, the author of Kifayah, the discussion concerning the relationship between the esoteric meanings of the Quran and the use of a word in more than one meaning was brought forth. Akhund himself viewed that the esoteric meanings were alien to the use of a word in more than one meaning. In the present article, after giving a brief account on the history of this topic, various opinions have been put forth and elaborated on the relationship between the inward meanings of the Quran and the use of a word in more than one meaning and it has been proved that a word with more than one meaning includes and encompasses the esoteric meanings also.

The Principles of Jurisprudence (Usul-e Fiqh) being an instrumental science is an inevitable need and essential for deriving and deducing Islamic laws. While every science is useful and inclusive of important discussions, it may feature some negative aspects which would overshadow its benefits and advantages. Thus, the pathology of sciences seems to be one of the most important needs that would ensure healthy and dynamic scientific progress and which, if neglected, would lead to grave consequences. One of the challenges facing Usul-e Fiqh is to consider it as an independent science, not as a prelude to other sciences or as instrument for derivation of Islamic laws, not to mention the fact that it is expanding with discussions that have no role in a jurisprudential argumentation. While stressing on the need for Usul-e Fiqh and its being instrumental in the derivation of Islamic law, the writer describes the inclusion of unnecessary entries and expansion of this science as dangerous and harmful to the discipline in its entirety. Thus, he has proved the need for removing and doing away with the additional and redundant discussions within this branch of instrumental science.

Hermeneutics is the theory and methodology of interpretation, i.e. the theory of achieving an understanding of texts, utterances, and so on which first came into being in the West. Given the fact that this science came to be known gradually in the Islamic scientific circles and there are similarities and differences between pre-modern hermeneutics and certain topics discussed within Usul-e Fiqh, this research seeks to analyze and examine Western semantics in a bid to compare it with Usul-e Fiqh. The conclusion drawn out is that the pre-modern hermeneutics subscribes to determining the meaning of the text considering it as ‘intended by the author’. Thus, it is of the view that the author’s intent is understandable and it seeks a method which would help reach it. When it comes to the principles of jurisprudence, the purport of the text is contained in what the speaker or writer means. On the other hand the necessity of the author’s experience by the interpreter, as said by pre-modern hermeneutics, is not acceptable to the scholars of Usul. Obviously, they do believe that the circumstances, individual situations and circumstantial evidence do have an impact on what is perceived and understood later but the author’s renewed experience within the interpreter is not a necessary condition for understanding the author.

The relationship between philosophy and Principles of Jurisprudence is examined in two main areas: First, the logical relationship between philosophy and Principles of Jurisprudence; Second, the historical and existing relationship between philosophy and Ilm al-Usul. The former constitutes the logical and epistemic foundation of the latter. When it comes to the validity and correctness of applying philosophical rules in the Principles of Jurisprudence, there are two major opinions: First, there is no logical relationship between philosophy and Ilm al-Usul. This opinion is held by Mohaqqiq Isfahani and favored by Allamah Tabatabai, Imam Khomeini and Shahid Mutahhari. After these scholars, the claim that the truth and consideration (e’tibar) are mixed up and confused in the arguments presented in Ilm al-Usul, gained credit and momentum. The second opinion is that there is a relationship between philosophy and Ilm al-Usul. The most important reason given by the proponents of the first opinion is that actual and real perceptions are mixed with those which are mentally-posited. According to the writer, the second opinion is solid and defendable and that the following arguments have been presented to substantiate it: First, the binding rules known as Ahkam-e Taklifi (defining rules) are not mentally posited; second, the discussions taking place in Ilm al-Usul are analytical; third, the actuality enjoys the support of Ilm al-Usul. Additionally, the argument put forth by proponents of the first opinion is insufficient and that it is applied to varying mentally-posited concepts.

In Islamic jurisprudence, the term hukm-e irshadi designates a religious rule that is declaratory or advisory in nature, meaning that it only recommends what human reason can independently grasp about what is good and bad, advantageous or disadvantageous. Over and above to it, neither obeying it has a reward nor does violating it entail any punishments. The scholars of Ilm al-Usul have accepted this definition with little discrepancy. However, when it comes to the mechanism through which one distinguishes hukum-e irshadi from a binding (mawlawi) rule, the scholars are a bit polarized. The assumption is that these rules are not apparently different from other rules, not mentioning the fact that there is not a list of declaratory rules in jurisprudence. For this reason, some scholars have gone to say that the two types of rules (i.e. irshadi and mawlawi) are essentially different from each other. Thus, the irshadi rules are all declaratory in the sense that they are reporting something and that is the reason why obeying and disobeying them do not entail any reward and punishment, respectively. Some have reduced the domain of hukm-e irshadi to those areas in which the human mind is independent in distinguishing what is good and bad. Of these three approaches, the last claim reflects part of the criteria of a rule being declaratory. However, to cover all of the criteria, it is necessary that the thing about which one is advised should be generalized in terms of worldly and rational criteria. With that said, a declaratory rule, in all cases, notifies an individual of the advantages and disadvantages of the recommended or prohibited act which are perceivable by the human intellect.

Tanqih al-manat (scrutinizing of the intent) denotes those activities aiming at examining the properties and, in general, the nature of the object addressed by the command. It is one of the important rules in Ilm al-Usul that need to be discussed independently and which is highly significant in terms of deducing and extracting Islamic laws.
The writer is of the view that the reason why little attention is paid to this widely used rule is its likeness to analogy (qiyas) because analogy is despised in the school of Ahlul-bayt (AS) and it is viewed as a cause of the destruction of the religion. Perhaps, another reason is that the jurists using this rule cannot determine the cause with certainty. In this study, the writer seeks to examine and explain tanqih al-manat, annulment of properties and similar expressions that are associated with them. The research features the differences and similarities of tanqih al-manat with other rules and expressions such as annulment of properties, verification of the intent, extraction of the intent, analogy of preference, and analogy whose cause has been explicated. Another privilege of this research is the study of the validity and authoritativeness of tanqih al-manat and finally the application of this rule in jurisprudential texts.