Concept and Essence of Confidence (etminan) in the Principles of Jurisprudence (usul -e- figh)

In Islamic legal system, high ranking clergyman (mujtahid) attempts to deduce the legislator intention from accepted resources and to have reasoning through demanded method. According to students of principles (usul), accessing to the fact has three states: certainty, suspicion, and doubt. Suspicion is not proof except in the particular instances, and doubt is rejected too. Arguments and sources of verdict and duty don’t result in logical certainty. Thus, it is evident that certainty in the jurisprudence and law is not philosophical certainty. Scholars turn practically to other state which is sometimes similar to certainty and sometimes it is similar to the suspicion. In this paper, along with the explanation of nature of confidence in the views of students of principles (usuliun) and their notice to the certainty and suspicion, it is concluded that confidence is description contained in the common knowledge, as well as is description in the logical certain knowledge. In jurisprudence, obtaining the confidence is a criterion and the confidence that has been verified in jurisprudence contained in the common knowledge. Common knowledge is not suspicion; because unlike the common knowledge, it doesn’t have dogmatism and doesn’t create carnal immobility. It isn’t logical certainty, too; because the logical certain knowledge is conditioned to the accordance to the fact. Common knowledge viewpoint of the wise and religious law is the same usuli certainty that in the epistemology is considered thematic certainty. Thematic certainty is reasonable and justified certainty that is resulted from thematic and external contexts. These contexts independently make suspicion but in the inductive process, they convey a thematic certainty, and not logical certainty. Confidence, or say the exact expression, common knowledge based upon the confidence as the sole criterion of obtaining the verdict and distinguishing of subject, is used in the different section of jurisprudence.