A Reflection on Adequacy of Intellectual Virtues in Acquiring Knowledge

Gettier’s objections to the definition of “true justified belief” compelled the epistemologists to think about an inclusive and exclusive definition. It is clamed in the new virtue epistemology that the epistemic agent achieves the truth just if the intellectual and epistemic virtues are resorted to in the process of cognition thus knowledge is defined as “a belief raised from intellectual virtues”. This new approach and the transmission of the theory of virtue to the realm of epistemology faced with many challenges, some of which concern with using the virtues including ambiguity of the quantity and quality of the intellectual virtues, not presenting a solution for contrast between these virtues, inadequate reasons in separating intellectual virtues from moral virtues and ambiguity in the epistemic function of the faculty of practical wisdom. On the other hand, the assertion according to which the usage of the intellectual virtues corresponding to each and every epistemic circumstance guides to truthfulness is disputable both as a curt claim and as a inclusive claim. Neglecting the positive points of this theory, according to the constructive and destructive reasons, it is incorrect to adequate on the usage of intellectual virtues to acquire the truthfulness of the beliefs. With a brief report of this approach to Zagzebski’s account, this article challenges the claim according to which the function of intellectual virtues would be necessary and sufficient for Acquiring Knowledge.