Institutional relationship between Management Accounting and Corporate Governance: A New Institutional Method to Interpret of Agency Problem

In this paper we are challenging the dominant agency theory of corporate governance with affect to institutional theory, the paper show how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the organizations that are informed by the practices of management accounting systems. The results show that agency theory has many improvements in theorizing, optimum employee contracts, and motivations. It’s also, proper scientific bases to implicit management accounting importance techniques such as, manager’s performance measurement, giving bounds, budgeting, posit of benefits and participated at risk. Empirical research of agency theory presented power documents and observations in different field of management accounting. These paper identities techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices; the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic manager narrative and the reutilization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting. Research show that can presenting a new institutional method to interpret of agency problem.