A Critical Examination of Frege's View on The Predicative Existence in The Light of Transcendental Wisdom

By assimilation of existential propositions to numerical propositions, Frege concludes that the existence is a second rate predicate and thus only could be beard on the concepts and not on the objects. His argument which is based on the approval of “object for object” of existential propositions, says that if the existence on subjects could be beard as a predicate and as a first rate qualification, their causative, repeater and obstructive existential propositions would be self-destructive. Based on this logic, he considers propositions like “Socrates exists” as ill-suited and in order to propose its proper explanation, he symbolically moves the existence into a quantifier position. Considering Mulla Sadra’s approach as criterion, it would be clear that unlike Frege’s assumption, firstly, in existential propositions, the principle is the subjectivity and secondly the content of existential propositions reflects the approval of object and not the approval of object for object and thirdly, one of the preconditions of being identical quote of these propositions, is the originality of the existence, of which Frege is a denier.