Examining the “Motivationa Introversion” Argument about Meaning

Kripke uses a fictional skeptical character in order to review and refuses “cognitive meaning” theory. According to this theory, the propositions which contain reference to the meaning (like the proposition, “using the word ‘table’, Maryam means the table”) show the state of mind of belief which is a correct state of mind. In order to challenge this theory, Kripke uses another theory which is known as “Normativity of meaning” in philosophic literature. According to the latter theory, meaning of a word limits its application in a normative way; for example, if I use ‘table’, I mean table, then I should use this word for the things which are really table. On the other hand, in meta-ethics, there is a famous argument named “motivational introversion argument”, presented by Michael Smith, whose purpose is to reject “moral cognitivism”, the sentences which include references to moral concepts in an action (for instance, “killing is bad”) show state of mind of belief which is a correct state of mind. The following article is going to discuss the possibility of the developing of Michael Smith’s motivational introversion argument into the sphere of meaning. In other words, this paper is a comparative study of fields of meta-ethics and philosophy of language, i.e. it examines whether there can be an argument similar to Michael Smith’s so that one can come to reject meaningful cognitivism.