Critique of Guyer's Understanding on Kant's Idealism

In this paper I try to refute Guyer’s reading of Kant’s refutation of idealism in a way in which I defend Kant’s idealism which has been denied by Guyer. By the notion of idealism according to Kant’s philosophy I mean we are not allowed to use space referring to thing in itself, as opposed to Guyer’s claim. In other words according to Kant objects of experience are objectively constructed by subject based upon lawful connection between them, as he expresses in the first analogy of experience, overlooking what they are really in themselves as mind-independent reality. I shall show Kant’s refutation of idealism does not involve any knowledge of thing in itself as opposed to Guyer’s reading; rather, Kant uses outer thing as an object of experience, that is, outer things are experience-sensations under application of categories. Some scholars such as Allison (2004) have defended Kant’s idealism. Dina Emundts (2010) shows, as opposed to Guyer’s claim, Kant has located refutation of idealism in the right place, namely after analogies of experience in edition B. She also shows refutation of idealism can attain its goal and it does not thus fail; that is, it can rebut problematic idealism. I endeavor to concentrate on the issue which indicates Kant uses outer thing in refutation of idealism in edition B as object of experience not as thing in itself. Meanwhile, I rebut Guyer’s argument and adduce my own reasons point-by-point in order to defend Kant’s idealism.