Myth of the Nature of Reasoning

Author(s):
Abstract:
In this paper, I have tried to discuss the following questions:Do reasons that have been/have not been put forward, all have a trans-historical and universal nature or essence? And has there been or will there be a unanimous consensus on that?
Why do so many reasons in the history of philosophy that seemed convincing at a time have lost their cogency?
When we say "I have become convinced by your reasons", do we mean that your reasons have characteristics that anyone in any historical era and with whatever cultural make-up who hears or reads it will become convinced?
Do we have to ask for the convincingness or persuasiveness of reasons and its measure?
Why is it that during the long history of argumentation, theorization, and taking of positions in philosophy, and during the not so long history of social sciences, there has not been a single position for which reasons have been advanced and those had convinced all those concerned?
6. Why is it that roughly for the number of philosophers who have reflected on the Idea of reasoning, there are different Ideas of reason.
7. Are reasons necessary for acquiring important and/or interesting knowledge?
Language:
Persian
Published:
Philosophical Investigations, Volume:10 Issue: 19, 2017
Pages:
163 to 172
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