A Critical Study of Relativism in Matthew Lipmann's Theory of Education

Relativism turns out to be one of the outcomes of Matthew Lipmann’s theory of education in his philosophy for children. In this discussion various views and even contradictory views have been propounded. Lipmann himself and some of his advocates are of the view that philosophy for children neither in terms of content nor form will lead to relativism. Some other people argue that though the founders of this program deny such allegation but its outcomes bring in its wake a kind of relativism. Through analytic-descriptive method the authors of this article seek to answer the following questions: Will the program of the philosophy for children as viewed by Matthew Lipmann lead to relativism? Here by relativism is meant epistemological relativism. Accordingly, axiological relativism which is one of the serious issues in this field will be excluded. The authors are of the view that basing this program on Lipmann’s views may yield a kind of relativism.