Examination and Criticism of Fakhr al-Razi's Objections against Avicenna's Arguments in Proving the Divine Knowledge

Avicenna provides two arguments to prove the essential knowledge for God and its inclusion to all beings. The first argument shows that because the necessary-existent God is immaterial, He can realize himself and consequently is aware of himself. In order to prove the awareness of all beings, the second argument is based on the essential knowledge of the necessary-existent and the implement of knowledge of cause to the knowledge of caused so that all beings are known by God. Fakhr al-Razi criticizes these two arguments in detail. In addition to representing the objections of Fakhr al-Razi on these arguments, in this writing we want to show the weak points of his arguments and explain his paralogisms that mainly originated from confusion of case with concept and concept with nature in human perception on God, consiodering God as the perfect cause for contingents, and his incorrect view of "relation" (izafah) in the discussion of mental existence.