Evolutionary Stable Strategies to Defend of Sensitive Systems with False Attacks and Reliability Approach

Today, the crisis and its consequences, is one of the main threatening factors in organizations, and to determine efficient and sustainable strategies, according to the terms of defense and attack, proper planning must be done. In this study, with the aim of improving reliability, first, modeling the optimal strategies to defend and attack in the stationary state is presented, provided that the attacker to deceive the defender will create a number of false attacks. In the static model, considering the probability of a successful attack, defender capability in identifying false attacks, reliability block diagram and game theory approach in finding the balance point, a nonlinear programming model is proposed to determine the amount of investment defend and attack. Then, according to the results of the static model, system dynamics and implications of evolutionary game theory, a new and dynamic approach to determine sustainability strategies of defense and attack is presented, that defender use two strategies based on actual or 90% of all adopted attacks and the attacker also use two strategies use or not to use false attacks. Finally, presented model is illustrated for an applied case and final findings are analyzed.