A Study on Justice as Philosophy of Qur ānic Discourses (Aiming at the Role of Justice in Ijtihād)

According to some viewpoints, Justice qua jurisprudential principle qualifies for playing its role in deducting Islāmic rulings. Nevertheless, Qur’ānic arguments do not undertakeordaining the Islāmic laws; rather, the maximum we can expect fromthis scripture is the philosophy of a ruling. Certainly, merely knowing these philosophies does not suffice for deduction of Islāmic decrees. Philosophy is just a cause for ordaining the law, not the law itself. The one that is reliable for deducting the law is the cause and the condition of a subject. Contemporary scholars pose several objectionsagainst Justice to be as a principle. Fortunately, these objections are answered adequately. Regarding the problem of Justice as Philosophy of rulings, it is worthy to mention that there is a viewpoint which has sought the role of philosophy of Islāmic laws in the process of deduction. This outlook holds that there is no difference between cause and philosophy regarding generalization. Rather, the only difference is that philosophy, in contrast to the cause, does not particularize. Furthermore, Justice, even as a criterion, qualifies for actualization of non-devotional prescripts. Yet, it is not prevalent to attribute "Principle" to the impact of criterion on the scope of non-devotional prescripts. Intending to bypass the dichotomy of Cause-Philosophy, Justice can be put as the goal of Shariʿah. In this case, while criticizing the text, traditions (Ḥadīths) ought to be in compliance with the spirit of the Qur’ānic justice.