An investigation on Meaning into Husserl's Phenomenology contrary to Wittgenstein

For Husserl, ontological frame of ideal sense is an indispensable foundation which describes phenomenon as objects of experience, being significance of language as well as objectivity of these constitution. Opposing, for Wittgenstein, meaning is noting expect logical form of sentence that is analyzed through relation between structure of sentence and its picture and the relation between the both with state of affairs. Therefore thought and thinking are provided in terms of language as we illustrate by this paper. Husserl’s concept of ideal sense is settled into “Feregean” interpretation of Husserl’s theory by “California” phenomenology. This interpretation is failed through effective writings of analytic philosophers, especially Wittgenstein, as we illustrate it comprehensively. These written works specify that internal menology is incommunicable, thereby they make invalidity Husserl’s concept of the sense and the objectivity of acts of sense. The current study ties Wittgenstein’s theory of expectation with his concepts of role-following and per- determinate instructions, as a new theory. Also, the study analyzes how bearer propositions of expectation are constituted based on per- determinate instructions in relation to indicative propositions, as another new.