A Critique of Tusi's Interpretation of Aristotle's Habituation

When we discuss of moral education from the Aristotle view it comes to our mind one of the important theory namely " habituation theory". The concept of habituation as a lenghthy learning process that results in a kind of social and operational condition of the individual by bothe the immediate and the broder social environment into which the individual is embedded.

The purpose of this article is a philosophical critique of habituation as the most prominent aspect of moral education in the Nicomachean Ethics basedon Tusi's interpretation. To achieve this goal, the method of content analysis and logical deduction was used.

It was shown that although Tusi's interpretation, because of its emphasis on the part of the will in the process of habituation, cannot be called mechanical interpretation, there are still serious differences, like mechanical interpretation, between Aristotle's habituation in Nicomachean ethics and Tusi's habituation in Nasirean Ethics.

I first try to elaborate mechanical interpretation, since in many cases commentators of Aristotle have considered the traditional interpretations containing Tusi's asmechanical interpretation. I try to show that mechanical interpretation is based on the principles of behaviorism, and we can’t attribute this interpretation not only to Aristotle, but to his traditional commentators like Tusi, because behaviorism refuses to acknowledge the internal workings of persons containing the will, which confirmed by Aristotle and his traditional commentators. This is while an important feature in Tusi's interpretation is to emphasize the will and strengthen it. The role of the will in Tusi's interpretation is so important that we can consider other parameters of his moral education as punishment and encourage, practical training, austerity, modeling and etc. to strengthen the will in trainee. Although mechanical interpretation cannot be attributed to neither Aristotle nor Tusi, Tusi's habituation in Nasirean Ethics isn't the same Aristotle's habituation in Nicomachean ethics. At least two major criticisms are made on Tusi's reading. First, since the will has intentionality, and virtuous acts can't be separated from certain situations, the reinforcement of pure will cannot be achieved. Secondly, Tusi doesn’t pay sufficient attention to phronesis, while it has very important role in the Nicomachean Ethics, as far as Aristotle says virtue cannot exist without phronesis. It causes the portion of reason and rational education in moral education in Nasirean Ethics is less than the Nicomakhean Ethics. In the end, it is tried to show that the interpretation of Nasir al-Din is rooted in the sharp separation of the powers of the soul, which is influenced by the separation of the material universe from the universe of ideas in Neoplatonism, which is not confirmed by Aristotle.