The Relationship between Criteria for Choosing the Best Explanation and Realism

According to what philosophers of science formulated about deduction of the best explanation, the hypothesis presenting the best explanation of phenomena and evidences is probably true. One of the objections made to this argument is the ―objection of truth‖. According to that objection, the following questions are asked: ―On what basis does the result of the deduction of the best explanation guide us to truth and reality?‖ ―Are the ‗criteria for selection‘ the best explanation of communicating truth and reality?‖ In the present article, we have used a descriptive, analytical and critical approach to, firstly, investigate the relationship between the best-known criteria for deduction of explanation and the representation of reality, and secondly, to show that none can be a true criterion for representation of reality, although some of them such as ‗empirical sufficiency‘ and ‗uniting‘ are able to guide us to the real criterion of truth. In the second step, we use the discussions on calculation of probabilities – especially the invaluable discussions of the martyred scholar Sadr on justification of uncertain propositions (logical certainty) – to introduce ―epistemological probability‖ and, accordingly, to present – for the first time – the real criterion for justification and the probable truth of the best explanation as ―the most probable explanation from the viewpoint of epistemological probability