Formulation and Evaluation of Kant’s Argument for Negation of ‘Possibility of Theoretical Recognition of the Soul’

Considering the views of Kant, his argument for ‗no possibility of theoretical recognition of the soul‘ can be formulated as follows: (a) no plurality of sensory intuitions is given from the soul (thinking ‗I‘); (b) anything from which no plurality of sensory intuitions are given would be unrecognizable; as a the soul is unrecognizable. Formally, the argument is valid, and if we consider the soul, as the thinking ‗I‘, as merely a transcendental and non-empirical reality, the result – of course just in the Kantian sense of cognition – would be absolutely true and valid. However, the ambiguity and incongruity in Kant‘s view of the soul or ‗I‘ falsifies and defaces the result of his argument, even in the realm of Kantian sense of cognition