Liquidity Shortages, Competition for Deposits, and Central Bank Policies

In the case of a liquidity shortage crisis, illiquid banks start to compete in the deposit market to absorb liquidity, in order to prevent fire-selling their assets. This paper attempts to show that in such crisis, not only the competition in the deposit market does not improve the liquidity needs of these banks but it also raises the deposit interest rates in the market, increases the cost of fund for financial institutions and reduces their power to manage their other obligations. The findings indicate that with high liquidity shortages, there is a contagion in the market such that the liquid banks become illiquid too, declining their financial stability. From this perspective, the results provide a theoretical rationale in favor of central bank’s intervention. This study analyzes various central bank policies and regulation which can reduce these inefficiencies in the market and compare their effectiveness; these policies and regulations include: deposit rate cap, cap rates in the interbank market, excluding illiquid banks from entering the interbank market, interbank intervention by injection and short term bailouts.