The Relationship of the Logical Structure of Language and the Value and Meaning of Life in Wittgenstein's Thought

The question about life and living has a history as long as human history and it is a matter that has taken various faces in the evolution of thought history. Today, this question is being pursued more seriously, to the extent that it even became a branch of philosophy of religion in universities. Also, among various contemporary philosophical methods, analytic and linguistic philosophers have analyzed with precision and specificity the various structures of language propositions that are partly based on the attitudes of Wittgenstein's philosophical logic treatise. Therefore, analyzing the logical structure of the question of the meaning of life, and the correctness or inaccuracy of its design in Wittgenstein's thinking is attractive and new or modern; for, on the one hand, in his dual thought, propositions of some sciences such as ethics, philosophy, art, religion, and metaphysics are dumb and meaningless because they are not compatible with rational standards of language, and on the other hand, his faithful and pragmatic beliefs have led to different perceptions of human life and living. Hence, our attempt in the present article is to measure the contradiction and paradoxes in Wittgenstein's thinking in proportion to the important question of the meaning of life, and to review its possible answer.