An Investigation of the Theological Dimensions of the Theory of “God’s Right for Obedience”

The theory of “God’s right for obedience” (ḥaqq al-ṭā’a) is a new theory in Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (Uṣūl al-Fiqh) about one’s obligation in primitive dilemmas, which is contrary to the majority view. The theory was introduced by SayyidMuḥammadBāqir al-Ṣadrwhoch believes in rational caution and obligation in cases of possible obligations, as against the theory of the “wrongness of punishment without prior proclamation” and rational exemption (al-barā’at al-‘aqlīyya). The view was propounded by al-Ṣadr in his discussions of various issues of the Principles of Jurisprudence, such as the reliability of certainty, the wrongness of effrontery (al-tajarrī), and the permissibility of all horns of non-specific knowledge (al-‘ilm al-ijmālī). After al-Ṣadr, the theory was criticized and examined by scholars of the Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence. However, the theological origin of al-Ṣadr’s view, which he briefly cites in his formulation of the theory, has not been properly addressed. Thus, in this paper, we will investigate, compare, and logically analyze “divine attributes and names” and “obligation” as two theological variables in the structure of the theory of “God’s right for obedience” with a descriptive-analytic method, without going into issues about the theory in the Principles of the Islamic Jurisprudence.