Philosophical Secondary Intelligible in Transcendental Theosophy: With Emphasis on the Concept of Existence

Philosophical concepts have significant role in philosophy as well as in many other sciences and the basis of all sciences is made by these concepts. These concepts are, not neither the result of immediate contemplation on tangible world and nor as the result of pure mental activity, therefore, understanding and analyzing them has raised many problems in various philosophical schools. Among the intelligible, the concept of "existence" is distinct and important in many ways. On the one hand, in the Transcendent theosophy, existence is real per se while the quiddity is per accident so the concept of the existence has essentially direct referent but the concepts of quiddity fails it; On the other hand, the famous feature of the concepts that state essence of things is that they have objective reference and the famous feature of philosophical secondary intelligible is that they have not. So the question to which this research deal with can be posed: is the concept of existence a primary intelligible or a secondary intelligible? This paper by an analytical-descriptive method, aiming at analyzing the philosophical secondary intelligible, attempts to present a more precise criterion to distinguish the primary and the secondary intelligible concepts. According to this fact that existence is real, the existence itself is external and real, but the concept of existence created by mental activity is a secondary intelligible and representing the external reality. Other philosophical concepts that are affirmative represent the modes of external reality.