The Relation between Skepticism and Metaphysics in Kant’s and Allameh Tabataba’i’s Philosophy

The present paper, by focusing on the question “Is metaphysics able to cope with cognitive challenges?”, compares Kant’s views on the relationship between skepticism and metaphysics with Allameh Tabataba’i’s. Highlighting their different historical situations and their conflicting conceptions of metaphysics and their different approaches in philosophy, the author attempts to find a convincing answer to the above question. It should be noted that inappropriate conditions of science, religion, and ethics at Kant’s time, as well as, his interest in the aforementioned three domains, forced Kant to criticize (transcendent) metaphysics and its claim in responding to skepticism by distinguishing between two different conceptions of metaphysics (metaphysics of nature and transcendent metaphysics), and consequently, by adopting a different approach in philosophy. While, the historical conditions of Allameh Tabataba’i’s time and his particular conception of metaphysics (which is rooted in traditional Islamic philosophy) have led him to claim that metaphysics not only has the ability to respond to skepticism and existing challenges but is necessary for all sciences in general and that they would be subjected to skepticism without it.