Confirmation and its Paradox from Hempel’s View
One of the issues posed in logic since long ago, an issue once arisen in epistemology and now in philosophy of science, is the relationship between the researchers’ observations and the general empirical law. Each of those sciences, however, has viewed that issue from a different angle and presented it in a different form. In the philosophy of science, three views are offered in response to that issue: positivism, falsificationism, and confirmationsim. In the present article, firstly, we review the first two views, and then, we will discuss the third one, i.e. confirmationism, in a more detailed manner. Later, we will investigate the paradox produced from that view, and finally, we will deal with some solutions for getting free from the paradox of confirmation. This is because if the paradox is not resolved, the question of the relationship between the observations and discovery of the scientific law, not answered by the two former views, will be left unanswered by the confirmationist view as well.
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