Aristotelian Practical Reasoning as the Basis of Perelman's Juridical LogicA Reflection on how the Logic of Law Complies with the Philosophy of Law

It is certain that Perelman's concern is to go past the formal logic and analogical reasoning. However, his theoretical framework for this transition suffers from a vagueness that seems to be extended to the triad of fairness, rationality and acceptability of the judicial reasoning that Perelman emphasizes. Perelman’s emphasis on practical reason only and the fact that he seeks practical reason independently from theoretical reason have added to this vagueness. Perelman occasionally discusses the sociology of law in his works, and it seems that he is going to move away from analogical reasoning through sociology of law and its realism. Also, he sometimes underscores value judgments, the general principles of law, and the unwritten legal rules as the components of this value judgment. Do value judgments and general principles of law not imply acceptance of a type of natural law by Perelman? A type of natural law that can be considered as the theoretical framework of Perelman's Juridical Logic by denying the duality of theoretical reason and practical reason and, as a result, liberates this logic from the vagueness emanating from the pluralism of the social structure.