The Evolution of the Principle of Innocence from the Point of View of the Fundamentalists

The principle of innocence from fundamentalist jurists’ viewpoint is as a judgement for not proving the duty for the obligee in case that the principle of the duty is doubtful. Fundamentalist jurists have explained the general conduit of the principle of innocence as doubt in duty and they have considered it currently in all suspicions of sanctions and obligations, in contrast to the Akhbaris, they consider this principle to be current only in suspicions and obligations and also they are cautious in the face of suspicions of sanctions. Attention and contemplation in the view of the jurists in all time showed the evolution in the implementation and citation of this principle in the history of Imami jurisprudence. In the earlier periods of principled jurisprudence, the issue of the principle of innocence was discussed along with the issue of presence and debauchery, but in later periods fundamental jurists focused on these two separate aspects of the principle of innocence. The discussion of the presence and absence of the observer of the wisdom of things in terms of the primary titles has been related to the use of ijtihad arguments, but in contrast to the discussion of the principle of innocence and precaution, the observer of the judgment may doubt in the real judgment.  In general, the authors in this paper studied this issue from the fundamentalist jurists’ viewpoint and contrasted it with other viewpoints.